§ 290.
With ὁρᾷν, and the like, μή seems to have more interrogative force. Ὁρῶμεν, μὴ Νικίας οἴεται, you do not say N. thinks? (surely he does not think?) let us see whether he does. Ὅρα μὴ τίθης, see whether you are putting: ὅρα μὴ τιθῇς, see whether it may not turn out that you are putting: ὅρα μὴ θήσεις, see whether you will be putting.
§ 291.
In sentences of intention, § 122, ἵνα, ὅπως, &c., μή, and object-sentences after verbs of endeavour, &c., § 123, the μή has the same force as in the prohibitive sentence, e. g. τὴν γέφυραν λῦσαι ὡς μὴ διαβῆτε, the primary sentence being, " Μὴ διαβῶσιν, let them not cross."
§ 292.
The use of μή in conditional (εἰ μή), § 202, temporal (ὅταν, ὁπότε μή), and, generally, relative sentences (ὅς, ὅσος, &c., ὃς ἄν, &c., μή), ib. and 203, is determined by the thought, " no notion of," " not to be supposed," or the like. Thus, εἰ μὴ δώσου σιν = " in case there be no notion of their giving;” but εἰ οὐ δώσουσιν, “ in case of their not-giving: " i. e. the difference is the same as that between μὴ δώσω = don't suppose I shall give, and οὐ δώσω, I shall not give: of which the former is obviously more suitable to the hypothetical form of statement with εἰ, εάν. Hence also with ὅς, ὅσος, &c., ὅτε, ὁπότε, &c., the principle is that μή is used when there is room for supposition in each case that the thing does (will, &c.) occur, or that it does (will, &c.) not, but the supposition of its occurrence is negatived. Thus, ὃς οὐκ οἶδεν, "a person who (as matter of fact) knows not,” ὃς μὴ οἶδεν, " who (as matter of necessary supposition) knows not: " in the one case, the εἰδέναι is denied directly; in the other, there is implied a previous consideration, μὴ οἶδεν, “ do not suppose he knows," whence ὃς μὴ οἶδεν, “ the sort of person that does not know: ” ἃ μὴ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἴομαι εἰδέναι, " what I know not," = " if there are things that I do not know," or, " say I do not know them." And just so with ὅτε and other adv. forms of the relative. - With ἄν (ὃς ἄν, ὅταν, &c.) the negation is necessarily μή, in virtue of the notion of contingency conveyed by that particle.
§ 293.
In § 124, R. 4, the use of οὐ μή with second pers. fut. indic. denoting peremptory prohibition, is distinguished from that (ib. R. 3) which, with subjunct. or also fut. indic., expresses a strong negation in the form of an assertion. In the latter, the μή is usually explained as referring to a suppressed verb or verbal notion, e. g. δέδοικα, δέος ἐστί, which is negatived by οὐ: comp. the full expression οὐ γὰρ ἦν δεινὸν μὴ ἁλῷ ποτε, Hdt. 1,84, with καὶ τῶνδ᾽ ἀκούσας οὗ τι μὴ ληφθῶ δολῷ: while the former, e. g. οὐ μὴ ληρήσεις, is explained as, “ will you not not-trifle? " = " will you not have done with your nonsense? " But both phrases are referable to the same origin, and (considered in themselves) admit alike of the interrogative or of the assertive notion, i. e. on the one hand, οὐ μὴ ληρήσεις may be, “ no, don't think you will (shall) talk nonsense,” a union of οὐ ληρήσεις, with μὴ ληρήσεις (= μὴ ληρήσῃς): on the other, οὔ τι μὴ ληφθῶ (= ληφθήσομαι), “ shall I not-be-taken? " i. e. " shall I not be safe from being taken? " (Cf. Herm. Cens. Elmsl. in Eur. Med.) In the practice of the language, however, the οὐ μή of prohibition with second pers. is best understood interrogatively; in other cases, οὐ μὴ is assertive. Thus, in the exx. given in § 124, R. 4, and Eur. Bacch. 340, οὐ μὴ προσοίσεις χεῖρα, βακχεύσεις δ᾽ ἰών, μηδ᾽ ἐξομόρξει μωρίαν τὴν σὴν ἐμοί; where the groundwork of the sentence is οὐ βακχεύσεις; will you not go, play the Bacchanal? into which μὴ προσοίσεις χεῖρα, do not imagine you shall lay your hand upon me, is inserted, and μηδ' ἐξ., &c., is added as opposition. But in Soph. Ed. C. 173,οὔτοι μή ποτέ σ᾽ ἐκ τῶνδ᾽ ἑδράνων, ὦ γέρον, ἄκοντά τις ἄξει, the interrogative form is evidently not intended, and the sense is," no, assuredly! do not imagine, do notfear, &c. (= μή) that any shall carry thee off, &c." The usage of the language would rather require ἄξῃ (ἀγάγῃ), but the thought prominent at last in the speaker's mind is οὐκ ἄξει: hence the future indic. = " do not imagine that the thing shall be; it shall not be." So Ed. C. 848, οὔκουν ποτ᾿ ἐκ τούτοιν γε μὴ σκήπτροιν ἔτι ὁδοιπορήσεις -, where, though the verb is in the second person, οὐ μή is assertive, not prohibitive; you shall not have these do not imagine it-as props in your wayfarings, and the assertion is stronger than with ὁδοιπορήσῃς. Soph. El. 1052, ἀλλ᾽ εἴσιθ · οὔ σοι μὴ μεθέψομαί ποτε, οὐδ᾽ ἦν σφόδρ᾽ ἱμείρουσα τοῦτο τυγχάνης, the fut. indic., as in the preceding instance, because the action is negatived for all future time. Arist. Ran. 508, μὰ τὸν ᾿Απόλλω, οὐ μή σ᾽ ἐγὼ περιόψομαι ἀπελθόντα, an asseveration beginning in the usual form, μὰ τὸν ᾿Α. οὐ, and strengthened by the prohibition of imagining the contrary [1]. - In the dependent sentence, ἐθέσπισεν ὡς οὐ μή ποτε πέρσοιεν, Soph. Phil. 607, represents οὐ μή ποτε πέρσουσι of oratio recta. So acc. c. inf., σαφῶς γὰρ εἶπε Τειρεσίας, οὐ μή ποτε σοῦ τήνδε γῆν οἰκοῦντος εὐ πράξειν πόλιν, Eur. Phœn. 1606.
[1] The pres. subj. is rare: οὐ μὴ δύνωμαι (Xen.), and οὐ μὴ οἷός τ᾿ ἧς (Pl.), are not conclusive instances, since these verbs have no aor., and, besides, δύνασθαι and οἷόν τ' εἶναι have in themselves the future signification which is required in this phrase. In Soph. Ed. C. 1023, the text is uncertain: οὓς οὐ μή ποτε χώρας φυγόντες τῆςδ᾽ ἐπεύχωνται, al. ἐπεύξωνται, for the ἐπεύχονται of the MSS. Ellendt receives ἐπεύχωνται, in the sense, " are now giving thanks to the gods," viz. " because Theseus surmises the persons to be already taken: with ἐπεύξονται or ἐπεύξωνται, he would imply, that they would be taken;" and so Hermann in 1.; but Schneidewin reads, οὓς οὐ δή ποτε, and ἐπεύχονται. As regards the principle, there is no reason why the vulg. should not be retained, viz. μή and ἐπεύχονται, " they are not – never imagine it! - giving thanks -."
§ 294.
The usage of μὴ οὐ is derived from that of μή prefixed to a verb negatived by οὐ.
In the independent sentence, this combination does not occur with the indicative, i. e. not μὴ οὐ γράφεις; you do not say you are not writing? but only μῶν οὐ: thus, ἐν οἷς τί χρῆν ποιεῖν ἐμέ; μῶν οὐχ ὅπερ ἐποίουν; Soph. Ed. C. 1727. But with the subjunctive in a form of sentence which may be considered as elliptical (cf. § 289), we have μὴ οὖν, ἔφη, οὐ δύνωμαι ἐγὼ... ἐξηγήσασθαι; you do not say I am not to be able? Xen. Mem. 4, 2, 12. ἡμῖν δὲ... μὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκεπτέον ᾖ, where the supposed ellipsis is ὅρα, Pl. Crito, 48.-In the dependent sentence, δέδοικα μὴ οὐκ ἀποθάνῃ, ἐδεδ. μὴ οὐκ ἀποθάνοι, δέδοικα μὴ οὐ τέθνηκεν, require no further explanation.
§ 295.
With the inf., see § 211, comp. § 210. Here observe that (1) οὐκ ἀρνοῦμαι οὕτως εἶναι represents the simple assertion οὕτως ἔστιν, with negation of denial, οὐκ ἀρνοῦμαι. (2) In ἀρνοῦμαι μὴ οὕτως εἶναι, there is a union of ἀρνοῦμαι οὕτως εἶναι with μὴ οὕτως ἔστιν, you do not say that it is so? or with φημὶ μὴ οὕτως εἶναι: the phrase is therefore stronger than (1), viz. = both I deny that it is so, and, I have no notion that it is so; and, the whole phrase being negatived, οὐκ ἀ. μὴ οὕτως εἶναι = I do not deny that it is so, and, I would not have you imagine that it is not so, which is equivalent to contendo ita esse. (3) Lastly, οὐκ ἀρνοῦμαι μὴ οὐχ οὕτως εἶναι may be referred to a union of οὐκ ἀρνοῦμαι οὕτως εἶναι and μὴ οὐχ οὕτως ἔστιν, you do not say that it is not so? In this construction, the leading verb must be expressly or virtually (by interrogation) negatived, or must contain a negative notion, δεινόν, αἰσχρόν, αἰσχύνη, &c. (cf. § 211 b): thus, οὔτε μὴ μεμνῆσθαι δύναμαι αὐτοῦ, οὔτε μεμνημένος μὴ οὐκ ἐπαινεῖν (Xen. Apol. fin.), where μὴ μεμνῆσθαι is the necessary infinitive form of οὐ μέμνημαι, and μὴ οὐκ ἐπαινεῖν of μὴ οὐκ ἐπαινέσω: you do not imagine I am not to praise him? Impossible (not to do so).[1]
[1]: "Per μή certo, per μὴ οὐ dubitantius negatur," Hermann ad Vig. p. 797. But in many places, the meaning is rather that of wondering or indignant repudiation of the opposite notion, e. g. οὐδ᾽ ἐθέλω προλιπεῖν τόδε, μὴ οὐ τὸν ἐμὸν στοναχεῖν πατέρ ἄθλιον, Soph. El. 131; I will not forego or desert this sad duty – you do not imagine that I should not bewail, &c.? Hence (as H. also suggests) its force may be rendered by mirum foret, ni –.
§ 296.
With the participle, μὴ οὐ (rare in Attic prose, § 211 c) will be found to involve the same relation to μὴ οὐ with the indicative = you do not suppose, &c., that – not –? Thus, οὐκ ἂν ἀξιόπιστος εἴην μὴ οὐχὶ πρότερον αὐτὸς φανεὶς οἷός εἰμι: with οὐ only, this sentence, reduced to its simplest form, is οὐ πρ. φανείς –, οὐκ ἀξ., "a person not first showing himself what he is, is a person not worthy of credit:" with μή only, οὐκ ἀ. ἂν εἴην, μὴ πρ. φανείς: both expressions are united upon the basis of the expression μὴ οὐ πρ. ἐφάνην, you do not suppose I have not first showed myself? so that the whole is not simply = without first showing myself, which would be sufficiently expressed by μή alone, but together with this, as it is not to be supposed that I should not. So Soph. Ed. T. 13, δυσάλγητος γὰρ ἂν εἴην τοιάνδε μὴ οὐ κατοικτείρων ἕδραν, without οὐ [2], the sense would be, εἰ μὴ κατοικτείροιμι, with it δυσάλγ. must be resolved into a negative expression, and we have then οὐ κατοικτείρων, οὐκ εὐάλγητος: οὐκ εἴην ἂν εὐάλγ. μὴ κατοικτείρων: and, as the basis of their union, μὴ οὐ κατοικτείρω, you do not imagine that I do not take pity? Soph. Ed. C. 359, ἥκεις γὰρ οὐ κενή γε, τοῦτ᾽ ἐγὼ σαφῶς ἐξοῖδα, μὴ οὐχὶ δεῖμ᾽ ἐμοὶ φέρουσά τι: the negation is οὐ κενή, and this is taken up and enlarged upon in the last clause, which, however, is formed as if the negation were οὐχ ἥκεις: thou comest not empty – (not) without being the bearer – I am sure it cannot be otherwise – of some terror to me. With ellipsis of the participle, αἱ πόλεις πολλαὶ καὶ χαλεπαὶ λαβεῖν αἱ τῶν Φωκέων, μὴ οὐ χρόνῳ καὶ πολιορκίᾳ (Dem. in § 211, c). The ellipsis is ἁλοῦσαι, or the like, and χαλεπαὶ λαβεῖν = οὐκ εὐάλωτοι, and the explanation is the same as in the former instances. With the gen. absolute: εἰνάτῃ δὲ οὐκ ἐξελεύσεσθαι ἔφασαν μὴ οὐ πλήρεος ἐόντος τοῦ κύκλου, Hdt. 6, 106. The elements are, οὐ πλ. ἐστιν ὁ κ., οὐκ ἐξελευσόμεθα: οὐκ ἐξ. μὴ πλ. ἐόντος τοῦ κ.: μὴ ἐξελευσόμεθα, οὐ πλ. ἐ. τοῦ κ., "do not imagine we shall go out with the moon not at the full."
[2]: Omitted by Schneidewin on grounds which seem to be insufficient, since, according to the explanation in the text, the οὐ before κατοικτ. does not serve for "merely external correlation " to the οὐ involved in the primary clause. In Ed. Τ. 221, οὐ γὰρ ἂν μακρὰν ἴχνευον αὐτός, μὴ οὐκ ἔχων τι σύμβολον, the μή is better omitted (with Schn.), since Ed. does not mean to allege that he has a clue, and οὐκ ἔ. τι σ. carries on the notion of αὐτός, " left to myself alone."
§ 297.
ἄν, and enclitic κε, κεν (not Attic). Ἄν is probably cognate with the preposition ἀνά (Hermann, de Part. Ἄν, Opusc. t. iv., makes ἐβουλόμην ἂν εἰ ἐδυνάμην = ἐβουλόμην ἀνὰ τοῦτο εἰ ἐδυνάμην, secundum hoc); and κε, κεν with κατά, therefore also with καί (Hermann), and pre-eminently with the enclitic τις in the form κος (κου = που, κως = πως). – In the earlier (not Attic) Greek, κεν and ἄν often appear in correlation (cf. τε – καί, § 222), the former in the protasis, the latter in the apodosis, εἴπερ γάρ κε βλεῖο –, οὐκ ἂν – πέσοι βέλος, Il. 13, 288, but often so that the apodosis stands first: thus, αὐτὸν δ᾽ ἂν πύματόν με κύνες πρώτῃσι θύρῃσιν ὠμησταὶ ἐρύουσιν, ἐπεί κέ τις – ἐκ θυμὸν ἔληται, Il. 22, 66. ὡς ἂν ἔπειτ᾽ ἀπὸ σεῖο – οὐκ ἐθέλοιμι λείπεσθ᾽, οὐδ᾽ εἴ κέν μοι ὑποσταίη θεὸς αὐτός, Il. 9, 444. The force of κεν – ἄν is, in some (or, any) way (sort, case, &c.) –, in that way (sort, case, &c.). More frequently κεν appears in both clauses (cf. τε – τε, § 227): εἰ δέ κε μὴ δώωσιν, ἐγὼ δέ κεν αὐτὸς ἕλωμαι = if in any way – then in some way. ὁ δέ κεν κεχολώσεται ὅν κεν ἵκωμαι. But the one or the other particle is often omitted: αἴ κ᾽ αὐτὸν γνώω νημερτέα πάντ᾽ ἐνέποντα, ἕσσω μιν χλαῖναν. And very often the protasis or condition to which ἄν or κεν refers, is not expressed. Thus, πληθὺν δ᾽ οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ μυθήσομαι οὐδ᾽ ὀνομήνω, viz. (εἴ κε –) “if I try,” or, “if another can:” καί κέ τις ὧδ᾽ ἐρέει, viz. “(if in any wise so be,) then may-hap –.” Ἄν, and in apodosis κεν, always thus looks back to a supposition expressed or understood.
§ 298.
But ἄν, though it properly belongs to the apodosis, is often drawn into the protasis, viz. with the particle ei in ἐάν, ἤν, with ὅς, and its adverbial forms (ὃς ἄν, ὅταν, ὡς ἄν, &c.); also εὔτ᾽ ἄν, ἐπεὶ ἄν, and ἐπήν, &c. In all these cases, the ἄν, together with its verb, is apodosis to a suppressed condition: thus, ὄψεαι ἦν ἐθελῃσθα = thou shalt see, if, when the time comes, then thou shalt be willing (i. e. if in the event it shall appear that thou art willing). So with the relative forms. Οὓς ἂν ἴδῃς κάλεσον, = whom, if so and so (e. g. if there be any to be seen), you shall see. ὡς ἂν ἐγὼν εἴπω, πειθώμεθα = in what way (whatever the way may be,) I shall speak, or, in what way (supposing that I speak,) I shall speak: i. e. the groundwork of the sentence is, if I speak, I shall speak so (εἴ κ' εἴπω, τὼς ἂν εἴπω), and this thrown into the relative form becomes ὡς ἂν εἴπω. So ἐκ γὰρ ᾿Ορέσταο τίσις ἔσσεται ὅπποτ᾽ἂν ἡβήσῃ: the groundwork, "when the time shall come (ὅτε κεν –), τότ᾽ ἂν ἡβήσῃ," in the relative form, ὅπποτ᾽ ἂν ἡβήσῃ. Or, as all relatives imply correlation, the relative with ἄν may be explained as condensed from demonstr. with ἄν together with relative with κεν, viz. τότ᾽ ἂν (ἔσσεται) ὅτε κεν ἡβήσῃ. So Il. 15, 232, τὅφρα γὰρ οὖν οἱ ἔγειρε μένος μέγα, ὅφρ᾽ ἂν ᾿Αχαιοὶ φεύγοντες νῆάς τε καὶ ῾Ελλήσποντον ἵκωνται = τὅφρα ἂν (ἐγερεῖς) . . . ὅφρα κεν ἵκωνται. Hence, where ἄν appears in the protasis, the apodosis rarely (perhaps never) has κεν: i. e. it would be difficult to produce a sentence of the form ἣν δὲ μὴ δώωσιν, ἐγὼ δέ κεν αὐτὸς ἔλωμαι. In νῦν γάρ χ᾽ Ἕκτορ᾽ ἔλοις, ἐπεὶ ἂν μάλα τοι σχεδὸν ἔλθοι, Il. 9, 304, the κεν in the first clause corresponds with an unexpressed εἴ κε θέλοις, εἴ κεν ἔλθοι, or the like, not with ἐπεὶ ἄν in the latter clause, which resolves itself into some such correlation as διὰ τοῦτο ἂν (sc. ἔλοις) ὅτι κεν μ. σχ. ἔλθοι.
Sometimes ἄν and κεν appear in the same clause: thus, ἵσταντο φάλαγγες, ἃς οὔτ᾽ ἂν κεν Ἄρης ὀνόσαιτο μετελθών, οὔτε κ᾽ Ἀθηναίη, Il. 13, 127, where ἄν (see next paragraph) is attracted by οὔτε, and the sentence may be resolved either into ταὶ ἂν ἔσονται (αἱ φ.) ἃς οὔτε κεν Ἄρ., οὔτε κ᾽ Ἀθ., or, independently of the relative, οὔτε, εἴ κεν Ἄρης ἔλθοι (or ἐθέλοι, &c., or εἴ κεν Ἄρη λέγοις, &c.), Ἄρης ὀνόσαιτο ἄν. (See other instances under ὅφρα.)
§ 299.
With respect to position in the sentence, κε never recedes far from the beginning. Εἰ δ᾽ Ὀδυσεὺς ἔλθοι –, αἰψά κε – ἀποτίσεται, Od. 17, 540. ἀλλ᾽ ἤτοι νῦν μέν κε νεμεσσηθεὶς ὑποείξω, Il. 15, 211. καί κέ τις ὧδ᾽ ἐρέει, Il. 4, 176 (not καί τίς κ᾽ ὧδ᾽ ἐρέει, like μαθὼν δέ τις ἂν ἐρεῖ, Pind. Nem. 7, 68 [1]).
[1] Hermann remarks, that ἢ κε μέγ' ὠμώξειεν ὁ Πελοπίδης ᾿Αγαμέμνων, Hdt. 7, 159, was suggested by reminiscence of ἢ κε μέγ' οἰμώξειε γέρων ἱππηλάτα Πηλεύς: else the speaker would have said, ἢ μέγ᾽ ἂν ᾠμ.
But ἄν, besides its attraction by the relative or conditional word, though its proper place is with the predicate, usually attaches itself to the emphatic word of the clause. Thus, πατρὸς δὲ καὶ μητρὸς οὐκέτι μευ ζωόντων, ἀδελφεὸς ἂν ἄλλος οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ γένοιτο, Hdt. 3, 119 (see § 139 b). Hence it likes to attach itself to words by which the simple form of the sentence is altered, such as οὐκ, οὔτ᾽, οὐδ᾽, οὔποτε, &c., τίς, τί, πῶς, ἆρα, &c., adverbs of time, place, manner, such as ἐνταῦθα, τότε, τάχα, ἴσως, εἰκότως, ῥᾳδίως, ῥᾷστα, μάλιστα, μόλις, σχολῇ, ἡδέως (ἄσμενος), σφόδρα, καί (κἄν, etiam, vel), &c., and the inferential οὖν, τί οὖν ἄν τις εἴποι -, the principle being the same in all, viz. that that term of the apodosis which is to have the greatest prominence in reference to the conditional sentence (expressed or unexpressed) draws the ἄν after it, because ἄν has the same reference. For other remarkable attractions (hyperbaton) of ἄν, see § 139 b, R.