Древнегреческий · Грамматики

J. N. Madvig, Syntax of the Greek Language: Appendix, On the Use and Meaning of the Particles

Syntax of The Greek Language, especially of the Attic dialect, for the use of schools, Dr. J. N. Madvig, professor in the university of Copenhagen. Translated from the German by the rev. Henry Browne, M. A and edited by the rev. Thomas Kerchever Arnold, M. A, late rector of Lyndon, and formerly fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Together with an Appendix on the Greek Particles, by the Translator. 2nd edition. Rivingstons: London, Oxford, and Cambridge, 1873.

Английский Грамматика Продвинутый 19 век J. N. Madvig

Pages 211–254 of the book.

On the Use and Meaning of the Particles.

The office of the particles is either

(1) adverbial, i. e. as they are used to denote certain modifications, qualifications, or affections of the assertion, or of one or more of its terms (viz. affirmation and denial ; absoluteness and conditionality ; concession and opposition ; confirmation and limitation; parity and disparity, etc.), or

(2) conjunctional, as they serve for connexion of sentences or terms of sentences. The two uses at so many points run over into each other, that it will be more convenient, for the purpose of this Appendix, to comprise the subject under one general view. As the principal uses of conjunctions have been already described in Chapter VII, the adverbial, which is also the original, use will here principally come under consideration.

καί, connected by its origin with the form κο- of the relative and interrog. pronoun, is therefore cognate with que and τε, which are forms of the same pronoun, but as indefinite. Hence the primary force of the combination τε – καί is any-where (some-where), any-how, &c. – where, how (so), &c.; of καὶ – καί, where, how, &c. – where (there), how (so). Of καί, as conjunction, see § 185. As adverb, etiam, also, too, it denotes increase by accession.

The adverbial καί corresponds to another καί sometimes expressed, but as often left to be understood. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ταῦτα ἔλεξεν, Socrates, too, said this, i. e. καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι (or the like) καὶ ὁ Σ., originally where the others, there S. So in οὐ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ –, the full construction is οὐ μόνον, ἀλλὰ [καὶ –,] καὶ –, not only –, but [where –,] there –.

In ὥσπερ (or other relatives) καὶ –, καὶ –: εἴπερ καὶ – καὶ –: the original parataxis καὶ – καί is taken into the syntactic form, i. e. καὶ ὁ Σ. καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, united with ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι, οὕτως ὁ Σ., gives the form καὶ ὁ Σ. ταῦτα ἔλεξεν, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, S. also said this, as did also the others.

Where both clauses are expressed, the καί is often omitted in one or other: the first, when in conceiving the first clause the speaker has not the second clause or its καί distinctly present to his thoughts; thus, ὁ Σ. ταῦτ᾽ ἔλεξεν, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι: the second, when he means to make the first more weighty than the other, καὶ ὁ Σ. ταῦτ᾽ ἔλεξεν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι. Often, also, the καί seems to be drawn over by a kind of attraction from the clause in which the thought would rather seem to demand its presence, to the other: thus, στρατεύονται μεθ᾽ ὧνπερ καὶ οἰκοῦσι, for with those they live with, they also take the field; ὁ Σωκράτης, εἴπερ τις καὶ ἄλλος, where we should say, καὶ ὁ Σ., εἴπερ τις ἄλλος. – In like manner it is often withdrawn from the (preceding) temporal or conditional secondary sentence to the (following) primary, to denote immediate sequence: it may then be rendered immediately, forthwith: Αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δείπνησε –, καί οἱ πλησάμενος δῶκε σκύφον, Od. 14, 112, after he had supped –, he also (forthwith) filled the cup and presented it to him. So in Hom. εἰ – καί, and ὅτε – καὶ τότε. Ὡς δὲ ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἐχώρουν εὐθύς, Thuc. 2, 93, for ὡς καί, simulatque: simulac decretum est ab iis continuo discesserunt. (In these instances the original relative and demonstrative force of καί is distinctly perceptible.)

As the relative clause is often omitted, e. g. καὶ ὁ Σ. ἔλεξεν (viz. ἅπερ οἱ ἄλλοι), so is often the demonstrative clause: Πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, τῷ ἀῤῥύθμῳ σώματι ἁρμόττοντα τὸν θώρακα εὔρυθμον ποιεῖς; Ὥσπερ καὶ ἁρμόττοντα, ἔφη (sc. οὕτω καὶ εὔρυθμον), Xen. Mem. 3, 10, 11.

In the single clause, it depends upon the nature of the unexpressed clause whether the καί heightens (aggravates) or lowers (extenuates): even = after all, in addition to all the rest, or even = but (so much as) independently of all the rest. In rendering this particle it is sometimes necessary to add to, or even substitute for, the literal rendering of the καί, some other particle or adverb. Thus:

a) really, indeed: Ἥνπερ καὶ φρονῶν φαίνῃ, ὅσαπερ λέγεις πρὸς ἡμᾶς, if you make it good that [besides professing] you also (really) entertain the sentiments you profess (or, that you do entertain).

b) even him- (her-, it-) self: aye –: and that –: Καὶ ἂν Διὶ πατρὶ μάχοιτο. So καὶ λίην, καὶ κάρτα, καὶ πάνυ, καὶ πολύς, καὶ πᾶς.

c) still, yet, with comparatives and in some other cases: καὶ μᾶλλον, yet more, καὶ ἀμείνονας ἵππους, still better horses, πολλοῦ γε καὶ δέω, I still want much of = far from it: καὶ ἄλλοτε, καὶ πάλιν, καὶ τρίς, &c., ἔτι καὶ νῦν, καὶ ὀψέ (late though it be, yet still), καὶ ἔπειτα, καὶ δή: καὶ ὥς, καὶ οὕτως, still even so, for all this.

d) even already (without going further): Ἀλλ᾽ ἀρκέσει καὶ ταῦτα, this already (of itself) will suffice. καὶ αὔτως (Hom.) even (already) as it is. To this head may also be reduced: καὶ πρίν, καὶ χθές, καὶ πάλαι, καὶ πρότερον, καὶ αὐτίκα, καὶ ἄρτι, καὶ ἤδη, καὶ δή.

e) only, but (so much as): Εἰ πώποτ᾽ ἔκλεψα τῶν σῶν ἄξιόν τι καὶ τριχός, worth but a hair. Ὀκνῶ καὶ λέγειν, I fear but (even) to say it.

f) Often it is best rendered by the emphatic present or past (do, did), or emphatic auxiliary: εἰ δέ τις καὶ οἴεται, but if a man does think. Τί γὰρ ἄν τις καὶ ποιοῖ ἄλλο; why, what else should one do? Especially the καί following an interrogative: Πῶς καὶ διώλετ᾽, εἰπέ, how did he perish? "Τί χρὴ λέγειν asks, What is one to say? not, Whether there is anything to say: but τί χρὴ καὶ λέγειν not only asks what, but doubts whether anything at all is to be said (fully: quid dicendum est, si omnino aliquid dicendum est?)" [1] Or, more strongly, at all, on earth: Τί χρὴ καὶ προσδοκᾶν, what on earth is one, or, what is one at all, to expect? Ἔστιν ἄρα δικαίου ἀνθρώπου βλάπτειν καὶ ὁντινοῦν ἄνθρωπον; Plat. Rep. 1, 335, B, any human being at all, be who it may? ἵνα καὶ ἴδῃς ὅσα καὶ εἴδη ἔχει ἡ κακία, ib. 4, 445, C, how many forms (after all). In like manner, the frequent combination ἵνα καί, especially with εἰδῶ, ἴδῃς, &c., may be explained, that if there is anything (or, as there is something) to know, I may know it.

[1]: Hermann ad Vig. p. 837, 320. But Krüger says, that the καί emphasizes the term to which it is prefixed, as being the particular point about which one requires to have full information. Similarly Klotz: "si dico τί χρὴ καὶ λέγειν; proprie hoc quæro, quid sit dicendum etiam si solum de dicendo cogitemus."

In καὶ γάρ, nam etiam, the καί belongs to the next following word, from which it is separated by the necessity of placing γάρ second in the sentence: Καὶ γὰρ πρὸς τούτους αὐτῷ ἐπεποίητο συμμαχίη, Hdt. 1, 77, for with these also. Καὶ γὰρ νῦν ὁμολογῶ, i. e. καὶ νῦν, Plat. Gorg. 467, B. Sometimes it is namque, and then the καί is not idle, but denotes the reciprocal correspondency of the clauses: ἀκούσατε, ἔφη, καὶ γὰρ ἄξιον, for, let me also tell you, it is worth hearing.

In εἰ καί, the καί is even, and refers not merely to the εἰ, but to the whole concessive sentence = etsi, quamquam: Εἰ καὶ μητρὶ διαφορὰν ἔχει, if it even be that he has a quarrel with their mother, if it be ever so much the case that –: in καὶ εἰ, the καί refers only to the condition, = etiamsi. Κεἰ μὴ πέποιθα, even if (for all that) I have no confidence. Εἴ τι καὶ ἀγροικότερον εἰρῆσθαι, Pl. Gorg. 486, C, if it be even somewhat rude (as it is), i. e. though I own it is somewhat rude: but καὶ εἰ ἀγροικότερόν τι εἰπεῖν ἐστιν, ib. 509, A, even if it be somewhat rude (which I do not allow). Both forms are abbreviated into the participial construction: thus, τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν ἔπραξε καὶ πρώτη λαχοῦσα, Pl. Rep. 10, 620 = εἰ καὶ or καὶ εἰ πρώτη ἔλαχεν. See § 175, e.

τε, also, so, denoting parity of the term appended. See § 222, and for the use as conjunction, § 185.

The adverbial use of this particle is almost entirely confined to the ancient epic style, having disappeared, except a few traces, from the later language. Its meaning is so faint that, for the most part, it does not admit of being rendered otherwise than by an exaggerated analogy: it does little more than intimate the correspondency of the clauses which it accompanies. In its origin, τε is cognate with enclitic τις: in its use, it almost exclusively accompanies other particles which connect protasis and apodosis or other parallel members, and sometimes appears in both, oftener only in one. Τε τε, any-where, -how, -way, -time, &c.... somewhere, how, &c.: hence it is the slightest possible intimation of as – so, alike – alike: Κραιπνότερος μὲν γάρ τε νόος, λεπτὴ δέ τε μῆτις, Il. 23, 591, as on the one hand the mind is more rapid, so also on the other is the counsel slight. Εἴπερ τε νοήσῃ, ἀλλά τε οἱ βράσσων τε νόος λεπτὴ δέ τε μῆτις, Il. 10, 224, although in-any-wise he has the wit, yet likewise slower alike (on the one hand, μέν om.) the wit, scanty alike on the other hand the counsel. Οὐ μὴν οἱ τόγε κάλλιον οὐδέ τ᾽ ἄμεινον, yet is this not for his honour, and (as not for his honour) so not for his good either. Ος κε θεοῖς ἐπιπείθηται, μάλα τ᾽ ἔκλυον αὐτοῦ, whoso obeys the gods (as he obeys them) so do they hear him. In sentences correlated by demonstr. and relative, te is used only when the dem. and rel. do not come close together, or when the dem. is not expressed: in other combinations it is frequent: thus we have, εἴπερ τε ἀλλά τε, or simply τε: εἴπερ τε: and εἴπερ τε with second clause omitted. Μέν τε – δέ τε or ἀλλά τε (sometimes the μέν τε, sometimes the second re, omitted), also (μέν omitted) τε δέ τε: δὲ ΤΕ: ΤΕ δέ: TE

αὐτάρ. Again, ἢ τε, so surely: καί τε (as -) so also: γάρ τε, for (as -), so: and sometimes ἤτε, or ἤτε – ἤτε.

Hence the usage of τε attached to relative words in dependent sentences to give force and clearness to the correlation: thus, ὅστε, he, or, that, who (Hom., lyr. poets, and lyrical parts of Tragedy, sometimes Herodot.), also ὅστις τε, οἷος τε, ὅσος τε (just such, or so great, as), ὥστε, so as, so that, ὡσεί τε, ἅτε, ὅπως τε, ἠΰτε, ὅτε τε (then when), ὅθι τε, ἵνα τε (there where). Of these the Attic prose has retained οἷός τε εἶναι, I am in such sort as to, in a condition to –: ὥστε, ὡσεί τε, ἔστε (ἐς ὅτε) quoad, ἅτε, quippe, ἐφ᾽ ᾧτε, on condition that (Herod. also ἐπείτε, postquam). Corresponding forms in Lat. (τε = que, -pe) are namque (γάρ τε, comp. καὶ γάρ, etenim), atque (= ad-que καί τε), quippe (ἅτε), also quisque with its adverbial forms, as ubique, &c., uterque, usque, and the suffix -cumque.

δέ, on the other hand (comp. μέν, on the one hand, § 232). Opposition is denoted by the particles which originally denote on the other hand, viz. αὖ or αὐτε, and αὐτάρ (= αὐτ᾿ ἄρα), which, shortened, is ἀτάρ. Synonymous with these is dé, which, both as adverb or mere particle, and as conjunction, in virtue of its origin (cognate with the second numeral δύο, the δείς in οὐδείς, and the pronoun of the second person), means in the second place. For the conjunctional use, see §§ 188, 189. The adverbial use appears in

α) καὶ δέ, and on the other hand, and also (moreover). In Homer the particles usually stand together; in Attic, the word that has the emphasis comes between. Καὶ δ᾽ ἄλλῳ νεμεσᾶτον, and of another also ye take it amiss. Καὶ σὺ δ᾽ αὐθάδης ἔφυς, Eur. El. 1122, and thou too art self-willed (not Ægisthus only). Καὶ οἵ τε ἄλλοι..

ὑπηρέτουν, καὶ ἡ τῶν Θηβαίων δὲ πόλις... ξυνέπεμπε, Xen. Hell. 5, 2, 37, and Thebes also -.

REM. Kai being both and and also, the Greek was obliged to have recourse to

dé to express and also.

b) in the demonstrative sentence or the apodosis of a condition: Οἵη περ φύλλων γενεή, τοίη δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν, as is the nature of the leaves, so is, on the other hand (also) that of man. Οἱ δ᾽ ἄρα Μηθώνην... ἐνέμοντο, τῶν δὲ Φιλοκτήτης ἦρχεν, Il. 2, 716, (comp. οἱ δ᾽ Ἄργισσαν ἔχον..., τῶν αὖθ᾽ ἡγεμόνευε... Πολυποίτης, ib. 738). Ἐγὼ μὲν οὓς ἂν τῶν λόγων ἀλγῶ κλύειν, Λαερτίου παῖ, τοὺς δὲ καὶ πράσσειν στυγῶ, Soph. Phil. 86, I also, on the other hand, hate to do. Αἰ δέ κε λίσσηαι ἑτάρους..., οἱ δέ σε... δεόντων, Od. 12, 54, let them, on the other hand (or, however), bind thee. ᾿Αλλ᾽ εἰ σύγε Παυσανίαν αἰνεῖς, ἐγὼ δ᾽ ᾿Αριστείδαν ἐπαινέω, I, on the contrary, praise Α. ᾿Αλλ᾽ εἰ μηδὲ τοῦτο βούλει ἀποκρίνασθαι, σὺ δὲ τοὐντεῦθεν λέγε, do thou, however, say. So, especially in Attic, dé after an abbreviated protasis in the form of a participle: Θαυμάζω σου, εἰ ἐκείνους ῥᾳδίως χειρούμενος, τούτοις δὲ μηδένα τρόπον οἴει δυνήσεσθαι προσενεχθῆναι, Xen. Mem. 3, 7, 8, that although, yet –. Cf. § 188, R. 6.

When in an alternative, two protases, each with its apodosis, are opposed to each other, the form may be μὲν – μέν (prot. and ap.), δὲ- dé (prot. and ap.), or also μὲν – δέ, δὲ – δέ: thus, ὃς μέν τ᾽ αἰδέσεται κούρας Διὸς...., τὸν δὲ μέγ᾽ ὤνησαν...., ὃς δέ κ᾿ ἀνῄνηται.. · λίσσονται δ᾽ ἄρα ταίγε Δία, Il. 9, 509, whoso reverences the:- virgins, him they benefit (might also be τὸν μὲν..) -: but whoso repulses them, then they pray, &c. For Attic instances, see § 188, Rem. 4.

c) in the combination οὐδέ, μηδέ, also not, not even. Here the particle dé stands for itself and also for καί, as καί cannot follow οὐ and μή in this sense. Its usage, therefore, exactly agrees with that of καί; so that οὐδ᾽ ὡς, not so too, not so either, stands on the same footing with καὶ ὥς, οὐδὲ γάρ, neque enim, with καὶ γάρ, etenim, οὐδὲ μὲν οὐδέ, neque vero etiam, with καὶ μὴν καί, et vero etiam, οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδέ, for also not, or for not even, with καὶ γὰρ καί. The particle sometimes puts the things on a par (also not), sometimes exalts the latter (not even), ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ἔοικε, because it is also not seemly (therefore must it also not be). Τὰ γὰρ πεπρωμέν᾽ οὐδ᾽ ὑπερβαίην ποτ᾽ ἄν, Eur. Ion, 1388, that which is fated for me can I also not escape. Οὐδέ νυ τοῦπερ φείσατο, 11. 24, 235, not even him did he spare; οὐδ᾽ ὄναρ, not even in a dream. Οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδέ τις ἄλλος, Od. 8, 32, etenim ne alius quidem. Οὐδὲ μὲν οὐδὲ Τρώας ἀγήνορας εἴασ᾽ Ἕκτωρ εὕδειν, Il. 10, 299. Not, however, the T. either (any more than the others).

Not the Trojans moreover (either) did H. suffer to sleep. μέν, on the one hand, indeed.

This particle, bearing the same relation to the first numeral (μείς) μία, that δέ bears to the second and to the δείς in οὐδείς (not οὐδ᾽ εἷς) means therefore in the first place, and a μέν is usually followed by a corresponding dé. But as the dé has not always a preceding μέν,

μέν, so μέν not always a following δε. This, however, is always implied in the thought. Φιλοτιμίᾳ μὲν ἐνέχεται, δεινῷ κακῷ, Eur. Iph. A. 527, ambition indeed (in the first place, as far as that goes) he is liable to (the suppressed opposition being, but what of the rest, but what then?) Καὶ ὁπόθεν ποτε ταύτην τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔλαβες τὸ μανικὸς καλεῖσθαι, οὐκ οἶδα ἔγωγε· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις ἀεὶ τοιοῦτος εἶ, for in your discourse (to begin with that, it must be owned, at any rate), &c. (Pl.) Λέγεται δὲ καὶ ὅδε ὁ λόγος, ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐ πιθανός, Hdt. 3, 3, to me for my part (but what others may think I know not). Οὔτοι δὴ ἀφίκται, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μέν μοι ἥξειν τήμερον, Pl. Crito, 43 D, it seems to me, for my part. So οἶμαι μέν, ἡγοῦμαι μέν, δοκῶ μέν, οὐκ οἶδα μέν. Παρεγένου μὲν τῇ μάχῃ, Pl. Charm. 153 C, you were present surely (or, I suppose) -? (suppressed: but if not, I have no more to say.)

REM. In Homer and Ionic, μέν is frequently used in the same sense as the

cognate form μήν, μάν, § 231: in the later dialects, only so in the combinations

μέντοι, μὲν οὖν, μὲν δή.

μήν Dor., and Ep. μάν.

This particle, cognate with μέν, involves the same primary notion "first and foremost," "to begin with," but more strongly expressed, as here the whole statement stops at the μέν, as if the one thing were all: it insists upon one thing (the first) to the exclusion of the rest. Hence it is confirmative and concessive, and also oppositive and adversative (as Lat. vero). Accordingly, it stands in hortatory addresses and exclamations: εἰ δ᾽ ἄγε μήν, πείρησαι, but come now, do try (in the first place, now, for once); ἔπου μήν, do follow: in questions, τίνος μὴν ἕνεκα μανθάνετε τοξεύειν; to what end (let me ask you one thing) do you learn –? especially τί μήν; thus, οἱ τὸ παράπαν ἡδονὰς οὔ φασιν εἶναι. “τί μήν;” i. e. τί μὴν ἄλλο φασὶν αὐτὰς εἶναι; what else, I pray (for one thing), do they affirm them to be? Ὁρᾶς οὖν ἐκείνην τὴν ὑψηλοτάτην πλάτανον; “τί μήν;” Pl. Phil. 44, what else, I pray, do I but see it? = to be sure I do: in argumentative assertions with latent interrogation, σώφρων μὴν (I suppose I may assert this one thing) ὁ γε τοιοῦτος καὶ οὐδαμῇ φιλοχρήματος, Pl. Rep. 485, and adversatively, ταῦτ᾽ ἐπιεικῶς μέν ἐστιν ὑπό τι ἄτοπα, δηλοῖ μήν –, this is indeed somewhat strange; it shows, however –: οὐ μὴν ἐρεῖς γε, but then surely you don't mean to say: in asseverations, ὧδε γὰρ ἐξερέω, καὶ μὴν τετελεσμένον ἔσται, and be sure of one thing = assuredly; so ἢ μήν, the usual formula of swearing, ἐπομνύω σοι, ἢ μὴν ἐγὼ βούλεσθαι, verily and truly (for one thing, come what will): in announcing the coming of a new person: ὅδε μὴν Αἵμων, here, however, comes H.! (The notion however, which often renders μήν, is given by the suppressed opposition, "for one thing, however it may be with the rest," or the like.)

καὶ μήν, καὶ μὴν γε, the καί adverbial. Καὶ μὴν χάριν γ᾽ ἂν ἀξίαν λάβοις ἐμοῦ (well be sure of one thing -): “ καὶ μὴν μάλιστα τοῦτ᾽ ἀφικόμην, ὅπως (well, sure enough -), Soph. Ed. T. 1004, 5. Adversatively: ἀλλ᾽ ἐκδιδάσκει πάνθ' ὁ γηράσκων χρόνος. “ καὶ μὴν σύ γ' οὔπω σωφρονεῖν ἐπίστασαι," yet, sure enough. καὶ μὴν πάρεισιν οἶδε, Soph. El. 1412. καὶ μὴν ὁρῶ τάλαιναν Εὐρυδίκην, Ant. 1165 (announcing the arrival of a new person). καὶ μὴν Τάνταλον εἰδεῖδον, then or moreover (for one thing) -. Od. 11, 582 (comp. Attic καὶ μενδή, § 236 c.) – καὶ μὴν καί, and (for one thing) moreover.

ἀλλὰ μήν: ἀλλὰ μὴν κεκραξόμεσθά γ᾽ ὁπόσον ἡ φάρυγξ ἂν ἡμῶν χανδάνῃ, well then, we will cry (if that be all), expressive of readiness to do something which one is challenged to do: ἀλλ᾽ ἐστι μὴν οἰκητός, Arist. R. 258, well, it is inhabited (I see that for one thing, sure enough): εἰ εἰσὶ βωμοί, εἰσὶ καὶ θεοί· ἀλλὰ μὴν (atqui) εἰσὶ βωμοί· εἰσὶν ἄρα θεοί, but there are altars. ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μήν, but not, be assured of that, especially in hasty rejoinders: τῆς δ᾽ ἑκοῦσα παιδὸς οὐ μεθήσομαι. “ ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐγὼ μὴν τήνδ᾽ ἄπειμ᾿ αὐτοῦ λιπών, " no, nor will I; be assured of that -. (For ἀλλὰ μὴν δή, which often occurs in some copies of Plato, the critical edd. restore ἀλλὰ μὲν δή.)

γε μήν, quidem certe, see under γε, § 250.

REM. In Homer, μέν is often used in precisely the sense of μήν: thus ἢ μέν:

οὐ (μὴ) μέν: οὐδὲ μέν = ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μήν: καὶ μέν.

δή. This particle, related to δέ as μήν is to μέν, insists upon the dé to the exclusion of the μέν: its general force therefore = " leave all that is before (or intermediate) and come to that," " come to that at once, and stop there." Hence its very frequent use in emphatic statements of place, time, degree: in peremptory determinations and conclusions, urgent demands, impatient questions, in putting something as generally acknowledged (= " everybody has come to that conclusion"), and in the expression of irony and derision. Except in the epic style, δὴ τότε, δὴ γάρ, it never begins a sentence, and it is usually attached almost like a suffix to the word which it qualifies: comp. τόσος δή with τοσόςδε, αὐτὸς δή with i(s)dem, πρὶν δή with pridem, ἄγε δή with agedum.

1) With numerals, demonstratives, local and temporal adverbs, words of dimension, superlatives. τρεῖς δή, three (not short of, and not beyond): ἕκτον δὴ τύδ᾽ ἦμαρ, this is now the sixth day (it has come to that), πάντως and πάνυ δή. πολλοὶ and πολλάκις δή. – ἐκεῖνος, οὗτος, οὕτω, ἐνταῦθα, ὧδε δή: τὰ αὐτὰ δὴ ταῦτα: so the personal pronouns, σὲ δή, thee there –: νῦν δή, τότε δή (Hom. δὴ τότε, δή ῥα τότ'): ἔτι, οὐκέτι, πάλαι, πρὶν, ἀεὶ, τέλος, ὄψε δή δαρόν τε δὴ χρόνον. – ἐν βραχεῖ δή. – πλεῖστα, κράτιστοι δή.

2) With relative, interrogative, indefinite pronouns. ὃς, οἷος δή. τίς δή, who' ever? (= when are we ever to get at him? who on earth?) πῶς, ὅσος δή; ἄλλος δή, alius nescio quis. δή τις, quidam nescio quis. δή που, somewhere or other. όςτις δή and δήποτε.ὡς and

δή που, surely (= that somehow), and οὐ δή που, surely not, see under που. ἵνα (final) δή, precisely in order that. ὡς (as) δή with irony us if forsooth (so very certain is that!), ἅτε, οἷα δή.

3) With particles of asseveration and negation. ἢ δή, verily (= that, whatever comes before it), comp. ἢ μήν (= this, whatever comes after it). οὐ δή, not (that!), μὴ δή (do not think of that!), μή τι δή (cf. nedum), and μή τί γε δή, to say nothing of-, much less - (= only not that!).

4) With nouns: τότε δὴ ὁ Κῦρος λέγει· Ὦ Κυαξάρη, ὥρα δὴ ἐξαπαντᾶν, Xen. ἐπειδὴ δοκεῖ λήθη τις εἶναι κανάπαυλα δή, Soph. Phil, 866, a cessation at last (it has come to that). Often with irony, τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους φίλους δὴ ὄντας, Thuc. 6, 80, friends forsooth (so likely that!). εἰσήγαγε τὰς ἑταιρίδας δή, the pretended concubines (that, to be sure, was what everybody would acknowledge them to be!). Comp. δῆθεν, § 234.

5) With verbs: ἄγε δή. θώμεθα δὴ φόρτιον. ἐπεὶ προθυμεῖ, χρὴ λέγειν. ἄκουε δή, well then, hear. οἶσθα δὴ τὸ πᾶν, there thou knowest the whole. σύμπεμψον τοίνυν μοί τινα. “ λαβὼν δὴ ἴθι, ἔφη, ὅντινα ἐθέλεις, ” take then (without more ado: as matter of course come to that at once). With irony, δεδιώς περὶ αὐτοῦ, μὴ διαφθαρῇ δὴ ὑπὸ ᾿Αλκιβιάδου, Pl. Prot. 320.

With the whole sentence: νῦν δ᾽ αὖ μόνα δὴ νὰ λελειμμένα, since it has come to this, that we are left alone. ὁ μὲν χρόνος δὴ διὰ χρόνου προὔβαινέ μοι, Soph. Ant. 58, denoting the slowness of the passage of time.

In conclusions: ἐκ δὴ τούτων -, from this then it follows (comp. μήν of the steps of an argument). In resumption after interruption: ἐν τούτῳ δὴ ἄν τις γενόμενος, Pl. Men. 240, well then (to come back at last to that point) if one be in—. Both uses are exemplified in δεῖ δὴ (of course then it is necessary) πραότερόν πως ἀποκρίνεσθαι. δημοκρατία δή (Well then -). In enumerations, denoting the accession of some weightier consideration, ὑγίεια καὶ ἰσχὺς καὶ κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος δή (denique), Pl. Men. 87: so καὶ τὸ δὴ μέγιστον: or something special, ἄλλος τε καὶ δὴ καὶ –.

καὶ δή, in replies: βλέψον κάτω. “ καὶ δὴ βλέπω," well, I am looking (that S already): ταῦτα δή, there, ' tis done! in the supposition of a fictitious case, καὶ δὴ τεθνᾶσι, well, they are dead (suppose it).

μήν and δή exclude each other, therefore this combination never occurs in good authors; but μὲν δή is frequent, especially in dismissing a consideration: εἰεν τὰ μὲν δὴ τύξ᾽ ἔχεις, the bow thou hast (enough of that). τοιαῦτα μὲν δὴ ταῦτα, hæc hactenus. ἀλλ᾽ ἦλθε μὲν δὴ τοῦτο τοὔνειδος τάχ᾽ ἂν ὀργῇ βιασθέν, but in fact or, it may be enough to say that (one consideration, μέν, and there an end, δή). Hence μὲν δή approaches nearly to μήν, and Plato renders Homer's καὶ μὴν Τάνταλον εἰςεῖδον by καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ Τάνταλόν γε εἰδεῖδον, Prot. 315, and moreover (the enumeration begun with μέν cut short by δή). ο οὐ μὲν δὴ λήξω, Soph. El. 103 = οὐ μὴν λήξω. βασιλικοὶ μὲν ἄνδρες, οὐ μὲν δὴ ἐπιστήμονές γε (where Stallb. would read μέντοι for μὲν δή), Pl. Phad. 266. καὶ μὲν δὴ χαλεπὸν ἐπιχειροῦμεν, Pl. Pol. 287 (porro etiam). ἂν μὲν δὴ καὶ ὑποπίῃ, Pl. Lys. 89, jam si adeo. μάλιστα μὲν δὴ (in fact, or, and that one consideration enough) ἔπειτα μέντοι (but then), Soph. Phil. 350.

δῆτα. This more emphatic form of δή (comp. ἔπειτα from ἐπεί, τηνικαῦτα from τηνίκα), not found in Hom. and Dor., rare in Herodot., is frequent in Attic, where it accompanies all the parts of speech.

In replies: ξυμβόλαια δὲ λέγεις κοινωνήματα, ἤ τι ἄλλο; “ κοινωνήματα δῆτα” (just so, that is the very thing!), Pl. Rep. 1, 333. In earnest iterations: οἴκτειρε δ᾽ ἡμᾶς... “ οἴκτειρε δῆτα," yes, do pity, Eur. El. 678. ἰώ. “ ἰὼ δῆτα,” (it is') alas! indeed, Soph. Ed. 541. ὡς μ᾿ ἀπώλεσας θανών. ἀπώλεσας δῆτ᾽, how hast thou undone me! [1] yes, undone indeed! Soph. El. 1155. σκόπει δῆτα, only look! In wishes: ἀπόλοιο δῆτα, oh that thou mightest but perish! In questions: τί δῆτ᾽, ἐπειδὰν –; quid tum demum dicetis, quum? τί δῆτα κλαίεις; what are you weepingfor? τίς ἄρα ῥύσεται, τίς ἄρ᾽ ἐπαρκέσει θεῶν ἢ θεᾶν; ποτέρα δῆτ᾽ ἐγὼ ποτιπέσω βρέτη δαιμόνων; am I then (and what avails that)? Æsch. Sept. 93. οἶσθα δῆτά γε; thou dosť, surely, know? ᾔδησθα γὰρ δῆτ', I suppose you knew (ironically). ἢ δῆτα, yes, verily. οὐ δῆτα, minime vero. μὴ δῆτα δράσῃς ταῦτα, only not this! ὅτε δῆτα, just when. καὶ δῆτ᾽ ἐτόλμας, and, forsooth, you had the audacity, Soph. Ant. 445.

[1]: The particle belongs to the whole sentence, but attaches itself to μόνα. So in Æsch. Eum. 3. (First Gæa, and after her, Themis) ἢ δὴ (ut satis constat) τὸ μητρὸς δευτέρα τύδ᾽ ἔζετο μαντεῖον, it belongs to the sentence as a whole, but more closely to τὸ μητρός. Fully expressed, the meaning is: " who succeeded to the oracle which everybody knows that was her mother's before her, and to which therefore as everybody must see she had the fullest right." Müller on the Eum. § 91, n.

δαί (Attic). This particle occurs onlyin the combination τί δαί; πῶς δαί; and is usedin forcible transitions, with indignation, wonder, or other emotions: what then? how so? τί δαὶ τἆλλα; what then say you to the rest? It occurs only in the familiar Attic style.

-θε, -θεν. The first only as a suffix in εἴθε, " would that," " if but" = in this (or, in that) case. The second as a suffix of case, οὐρανόθεν, from heaven, ἐντεῦθεν, thence, &c.: hence, in composition with δή,

δῆθεν.

This particle (not used by Hom.), originally =from that (as the terminus a quo) is almost always ironical (= something which all the world acknowledges, to set out with!), forsooth, in pretence, of course (derisively). τοῦτο τὸ ἄγος οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐλαύνειν ἐκέλευον, δῆθεν τοῖς θεοῖς πρῶτον τιμωροῦντες, Thuc. 1, 127. ὡς ἐκπεφευγὼς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς, οἱ μιν · · ἠθέλησαν ἀπολέσαι δῆθεν (as he pretended), Hdt. 1, 11. τῆς ἐκεῖνος οὐδαμὰ βλάστας ἐφώνει, δῆθεν οὐδὲν ἱστορῶν, Soph. Tr. 381.

δήπουθεν. See above, δή τις, and δήπου, under που: hence this (Attic) particle originally = from that in anywise, or, surely; therefore, I should hope, or, surely. ἐγὼ δὲ, ἢν ἱππεύειν μάθω, ὅταν μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἵππου γένωμαι, τὰ τοῦ ἱπποκενταύρου δήπουθεν διαπράξομαι, Xen. Cyr. 4, 3, 20. ἑστάναι γὰρ ἐξέσται δήπουθεν αὐτῷ, Dem. οὔτε γὰρ μαγείρῳ μαχαίρας οὐδὲν ἔστ᾽ ὄφελος δήπουθεν, ἥτις μὴ τέμνει, Pl.

θήν. This stronger form of θέν (§ 239) is Homeric and Doric (Sicilian). In Hom. always ironical, = δήπου, especially with ἢ οὐ, οὐ μέν θην – γε, yet surely, yet surely at least not. In Theocritus ἐγὼ θήν, Ifor my part, τὺ θήν, thou for thy part, and = denique. πείρᾳ θὴν πάντα τελεῖται, Adoniaz. 63.

ἤδη. As δή to δé, so is ἤδη to ἠδέ (which answers to ἠμέν, as on the one hand, so on the other hand [1]. It denotes, therefore, the absence of an interval, chiefly with reference to time, this (that) instant, immediately.

[1] The ἤ = as, so, not ἦ, verily, but the original of ἤ, or, than, whence also ἦμος and ἠΰτε, when.

(a) As temporal particle, it answers to Lat. jam, now, in the senses, forthwith, henceforth, already, at last, still, the now being either that of the speaker, or of the person, &c. spoken of, not, as νῦν, simply " at this present time." Thus ἤδη ἀπῆλθεν, hewent awayjust now; ἤδη ἀπελήλυθεν, is just gone; ἤδη ἀπελεύσεται, will go directly. νῦν ἤδη, ἤδη νῦν, now this instant. ποιήσας δε τοῦτο, τὰ ἄλλα ἤδη ἤρχετο διοικεῖν, anon, without more ado, Xen. Hell. 7,1, 12. ἤδη οὐκ εἴχομεν, we were not yet (erewhile) able; ἤδη οὐχ ἕξομεν, we shall henceforth not (or, no more) be able. λόγοι ἔσφηλαν ἤδη (ere now = full oft) καὶ κατώρθωσαν βροτούς, Soph. El. 408. ἤδη ποτ' εἶδον (in my time), ἤδη πάλαι (this long while).

(b) In the other instances, the temporal signification, though less strongly marked, is still discernible: ἀπὸ ταύτης ἤδη Αἴγυπτος, at this point immediately Egypt begins. δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε ἤδη καὶ παιδί (even to a child): so οὗτος-, τότ' ἐνταῦθ᾽ –, οὕτως ἤδη. τὰ δὲ παννυχίδων ἤδη –, and then the vigils; vigilias demum si commemorem, Soph. El. 92.

REM. δήν, jam diu, evidently connected with δή, ἤδη, denique, dudum, donec.

νῦν. This is the Latin nunc, at this present time (the now of the speaker). Hence it usually occurs in connexion with the present, or present-perfect, or future, the latter in the sense, as the case is now, he, &c. will -, or, he is now going to-. With the proper past (imperf. or aorist indic.) either the sense is present, as νῦν δ᾽ εἰς τὸ κείνου κρᾶτ᾽ ἐνήλαθ' ἡ τύχη, but as it is now, destiny has; or the immediate past is denoted, ἐν ᾧπερ νῦν ἐκάμνομεν, Eur. Hec. 1144. νῦν ἐμέλλομεν, we were now about to -. νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, just now: νῦν δὴ λέγω ον λέξω, nunc cum maxime, at this very time.

νῦν, igitur, jam vero, further serves to denote transition or argument: μὴ νῦν ἀτίμα θεούς, then do not –, Soph. Aj. 1108. εἰ νῦν ἐπίστω, if then thou knowest, Soph. Phil. 1224. In the formula of adjuration: πρὸς νῦν σὲ γονάτων, πρὸς νῦν θεῶν, now by –.

This νῦν is reduced to an enclitic (our unemphatic " now "); but, as a single word, only in the poets; in Ionic prose μένυν, in Attic τοίνυν. Homer has it, e. g. δεῦρό νυν, hither then, Il. 23, 485. [1]

[1]: Krüger says, that in Aristoph. the v is long (but still to be written vuv encl., not vûv), in the Tragic poets long or short.

Connected, if not identical, with enclit. vuv is the enclit. vu of Homer, used in asseveration with somewhat of irony: οὐ νύ τ᾽ ἀοιδοὶ αἴτιοι, nempe, scilicet, Od. 1, 348. θνητὸς δὲ νυ καὶ σὺ τέτυξαι, but I suppose, Il. 16, 622. So ἐπεί νυ, ἢ ῥά νυ, μή νυ τοι, οὔ νυ τι. Also καί νύ κεν in apodosis with præt. indic. to an hypothesis also with præt. indic., and doubtless –. In questions: τί νυ οἱ τόσον ὠδύσαο, Ζεῦ, Od. 1, 62, why art thou -? τί νυ σ᾽ ἔτρεφον, Il. 1, 414, why did I-?

νή, ναί, μά.

νή (cf. na) asseverates, but only in affirmative sentences: νὴ τὸν Δία.

This lengthened becomes ναί, yea, verily (cf. δή, δαί): often followed by μά, as ναὶ μὰ τὸν Δία, a stronger form of νὴ τὸν Δία. The μά in itself is neither negative nor affirmative, but simply = "by;" but unless the ναί is expressed, μά must always have a negative expressed or implied, either preceding or following: οὐ μὰ τὸν Δ., or μὰ τὸν Δ., οὐ –. μὰ τὴν τέλειον τῆς ἐμῆς παιδὸς δίκην, Ἄτην, Ἐρινύν θ᾽ –, οὔ μοι φόβου μέλαθρον ἐλπὶς ἐμπατεῖν, Æsch. Aj. 1354.

ἦ. This particle (always adverbial) expresses assurance: ἡ = ἀληθῶς, ὄντως, Hesych., indeed, surely. ἢ μήν, § 231, a strong asseveration, assuredly (come what will, &c.). ἢ που, assurance with a mixture of doubt, real or pretended (hence ironically of self-evident conclusions), or confident conjecture, sane opinor, surely. ἀλλ᾽ ἢ (often falsely written ἀλλ᾽ ἤ), at profecto. ἢ ρα, ἤτοι. See under ῥα, τοι.

The same particle used interrogatively, asks a question with confidence or conjecture. In Hom. without other particles, when the speaker answers his own question by another: τίπτε τόσον ἐβόησας –; ἢ μήτις σευ μῆλα – ἐλαύνει; ἢ μήτις σαυτὸν κτείνειν; Od. 9, 405. Frequent in Attic, especially in Tragedy: ἢ τολμήσατε; aye, did ye dare? ἢ κεῖνος ὤμοσεν; then did he swear? With other particles: ἢ δή; ergo revera? ἢ ταῦτα δῆτ᾽ ἀνεκτά; then is this to be borne? ἢ που [1], num forte? expects an answer in the negative, ἢ που τετόλμηκ᾽ ἔργον αἴσχιστον τόδε; do you mean to say that? Eur. Med. 695. Η ῥα Att. ἆρα; ἢ γάρ; See under ῥα, γάρ.

[1]: Elmsley, Heracl. 55, Med. 678, 1275, and Stallbaum, Pl. Lys. 207 D, deny the interrogative use of ἢ που, which Hermann, Opusc. iii. 161, has vindicated.

περ. Etymologically connected with πέρι, “ through and out at the other end," περᾶν, &c., comp. περί, Lat. per, this enclitic particle has for its fundamental meaning the notion, throughly, thoroughly, throughout. Hence

a) (In Homer) its meaning sometimes seems to be confined to the word which it accompanies (cf. pergratus perque jucundus): μίνυνθά περ οὔτι μαλὰ δήν, Il. 13, 573, a very little while, = just a little while: πρῶτόν περ, ὕστατόν περ, quite or just first, last: γεινόμενόν περ, just = precisely at the birth, Il. 23, 79. ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοί περ πονεώμεθα, ourselves precisely (and not others), Il. 10, 70. οἴκαδε περ σὺν νηυσὶ νεώμεθα, home just that (and nothing else), Il. 2, 236. τόδε πέρ μοι ἐπικρήηνον ἐέλδωρ, just this (and only this) prayer, Il. 8, 242. ὁ δὲ πείσεται εἰς ἀγαθόν περ, to what is good if to nothing else = at any rate, Il. 11, 789.

b) (also in Hom.) for all that: ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ὡς ἑτάρους ἐῤῥύσατο ἱέμενός περ, though quite desiring, all eager as he was, Od.1,6. ἀγαθός περ ἐών, allbrave as thou art. οὐδὲ θεοί περ – δύνανται, not the gods either for all that (they be gods), Od. 3, μῆτερ, ἐπεί μ᾽ ἔτεκές γε μινυνθάδιόν περ ἔοντα, τιμήν περ μοι ὄφελλεν ᾿Ολύμπιος ἐγγυαλίξαι, all shortlived as I am, (yet) honour, if nothing else, Il. 1, 353.

c) With relatives and conjunctions (this usage is Attic as well as epic): ὅσπερ, just what, precisely who, the same that; ὅσοςπερ, just so great as; οἷος περ, just of the same kind as; also with ὡς, οὗ, οἱ, ὅθεν, ᾗ, ὅπου, ὅτε, ἔνθα, ἕως, ἐπεί, ἐπειδή, &c. εἴπερ, if the case be just so, if really (εἴπερ εἴργασται τόδε, ἴσμεν γὰρ οὐδὲν τρανές, Soph. Aj. 22): sometimes, if ever so much; ἐάνπερ, if indeed and provided only that: εἴπερ, ἐάνπερ καί, albeit that even; ὅτανπερ, when (provided only it be so).

d) The Attic poets sometimes allow themselves the use of περ as in Homer: γενναῖός περ ὤν, all noble as thou art; but in this sense καίπερ with the participle is usual (rarely with indic.), § 175, e. (Sometimes καὶ περ with the emphatic word between. μῶν καὶ θεός περ ἱμέρῳ πεπληγμένος; Æsch. Aj. 1125.)

γε (Dor. γα). This is also enclitic, and connected in its origin with qui in quidem, and our yea. Its (original) meaning may often be conveyed by yea, with repetition of the word to which it is attached thus, ὡς δ᾽ ὅτ᾽ ἀνὴρ χαλκεὺς πελέκυν ἐν ὕδατι βάπτῃ... τὸ γὰρ αὐτε σιδήρου γε κράτος ἐστίν, for that in the case of steel (yea, of steel) is strengthening, i. e. of steel indeed (for in the case of other things it may be weakening). πῶς οὐχὶ Σίμων᾽ ἐνέπρησεν, ἀλλὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ γε νεὼν βάλλει; his own temple (that, of all things!). εἰ δὲ μὴ ἑκόντες γε, ἀλλ᾽ ἄκοντες, if not willing (yes, if not that), yet –. ἔγωγε ταῦτα ποιήσω, Ι' (yes, I: if none other).

(a) When the force of the particle is confined to the one word which it accompanies, this force can often be rendered in English by added emphasis, sometimes by indeed, at least. In general, any word admitting of emphasis may be followed by γε. Especially pronouns, personal and demonstrative: ἔγωγε (the accent retracted), σύγε, οὗτός γε, ἐκεῖνός γε, ὅδε γε, αὐτός γε: relatives and correlatives, ὅς γε, ὅσος γε, τόσοςγε, τοσοῦτόςγε (οἷόςγε rare in Attic): pronominal adverbs, &δέγε, ὥς γε, ὥστεγε, ὥσπερ γ᾽: νῦν γε: interrogatives, rare in Attic, but not unknown, τίνος γ᾽ ὑπ᾿ ἄλλου; by whom' else? Eur. Hec. 774. τίνα γ' εἶπας; Troad. 241. πῶς γ᾽ ἂν ψέγοις; how indeed? Soph. Ed. C. 9811; negative particles, οὐ γε, οὐ δή που γε: μή πω γε: conditionals, εἴγε (in Trag. most usually εἰ-γε), certe si, at least if, if indeed, if (that is), &c.: εἴπερ γε, if" really, if really.-With nouns of every kind, if with article, the ye often attachedto it: thus, τό γ' ἶκον πρᾶγμα, the involuntary deed (as certainly it was), Soph. Ed. Col. 981: and often to the preposition, ἔκ γε τῆςδε γῆς, the emphasis on τῆςδε, Soph. Tr. 798: and with verbs, with various kinds of emphasis, παῦσαί γε, do cease! χρή γε, oportet nempe! behoves, forsooth, aye? ζῶν ἢ θανών γε, living or even dead. ἆρ᾽ οἶσθάγε; thou knowest, aye? ἢ μαίνεταί γε; is he mad even? [1]

[1]: "The particle does not increase the force of the interrogation, but the natural force of the interrogative word." Klotz.

But in all these cases, it should be considered in each particular instance whether the ye is limited to one word, or whether its use comes under the following head:

(6) It approaches to the nature of a conjunction, where, attached to one of two sentences or members of a sentence, it virtually belongs to both.

In a reply, containing something additional to the preceding expression, the ye is placed as near as may be to the beginning, with the emphatic word first: εἴπω τι δῆτα κἄλλο; “ Ὅσον γε χρήζεις," yes, (and) as much as you wish, Ed. Τ. 364. τί μέλλεις κομίζειν –; “ μαθοῦσά γ' why delayest thou to carry -? " yes, (I will carry) when I have learnt -," Ed. Τ. 680. Τροίαν σ᾽ ἑλεῖν δεῖ. “ οὐδέποτέ γ ” (take Troy!) Never! Phil. 987. στεῖχε –. “ μήπω γε πρὶν ἂν -" (yes, go:) not yet, at least (however, though) until —, Phil. 1409.

Frequent in replies with secondary predicate (participle); e. g. καλῶς γ'᾽ ἐγὼ ποιῶν, "aye, and well too for me to do so," Pl. Rep. 5,474. ὀρθῶς γε σὺ λέγων, Lach. 192. ταύτην γ᾿ ἰδὼν θάπτουσαν, yes (I did it) because I saw, Soph. Ant. 400. In explanatory additions: κλῦθι εἰ ἐτέον γε σός εἰμι, if, namely (or, that is) I am -. In enumerations: γενναῖοι ἢ σοφοὶ ἢ τίμιοι ἢ γέροντές γε ἢ νέοι, yes, or old, Pl. Hipp. Maj. 301. πρακτέον καὶ γυμναστέον καὶ ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον, Crito, 47.

§ 249.

καί γε (only Attic), et quidem: ἀλλὰ παρῆσάν τινες, καὶ πολλοί γε, Pl. Phæd. 58. καὶ ταῦτά γ᾽ ἄλλα, Soph. Phil. 38. κρεῖσσον κἀμέ γ', ὦ πάτερ, θανεῖν, even me too, Trach. 1226. καὶ γε πρός, yes and to boot. καὶ κατακτενῶ γε πρός, Eur. Phœn. 619. νὴ τὸν Δί᾽ ἐς κόρακάς γε, καὶ σαυτόν γε πρός, Arist. Pac. 19. τὸν ἀδίκως γε ἀποκτείναντα (sc. ἄθλιόν φημι), καὶ ἐλεεινόν γε πρός, Pl. Gorg. 469.

δέ γε: εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶν φῶς ἐστιν· ἡμέρα δε γέ ἐστιν, but it is day. ἐγὼ δὲ γ᾽ ἄνδρ᾽ ὄπωπα, Soph. Aj. 1150 (in rejoinder to 1140, ἤδη ποτ᾿ εἶδον ἄνδρ᾽ ἐγώ, aye, but I too). οὐδέ γ᾽ ἐς θυμὸν φέρω, no, not even.

In εἴ γε, siquidem, the ye influences the whole clause; in εἰ -ye it distinguishes the interposed word. Τίνι ἄλλῳ τις ἂν εἴη σοφός, εἴ γε μὴ ἐπιστήμη; Pl. πρώτη θάνοις ἄν, εἰ δίκης γε τυγχάνοις, Soph. The same remark applies to ἐπείγε, quandoquidem.

§ 250.

γε μήν: ὅρα γε μήν, look to it, however, Soph. Ed. C. 587. λόγῳ γε μὴν εὔκλειαν, in word at least, however, Soph. El. 973. τοξικήν γε μήν, archery, at least, for one thing, Pl. Conv. 197. Εἴς γε μὴν δικαιοσύνην, In respect, however, of justice, Xen. An. 1, 9, 16: where γε μήν expresses an opposition more strongly than dé, but with transition to something new: ib. § 20, φίλους γε μὴν ὅσους ποιήσαιτο: 7, 6, 15, Ἐπεί γε μὴν ψεύδεσθαι ἤρξατο Σεύθης. [1]

[1]: Ellendt adopts Blomfield's ὅραγε μέντοι on the ground. that μὲν δή de rebus adhuc faciendis non dicatur: which is not true.

γε δή, qui-dem, ἐπεί γε δὴ – ἐκτησάμην, since it has come to this that -. ὥσπερ γὰρ –, ταύτῃ γε δὴ –, in this way, sure enough, Pl. Rep. 330.

γε μὲν δή, preceded by ἐπεί, Soph. Trach. 484 (ἐπεί γε, quandoquidem), ὅρα γε μὲν δή, Ει. 1242 (cf. γε μήν).

§ 251.

γέ τοι (see under τοι), at least though (thus much at least is certain, that –). ταύτης δὲ (sc. τῆς) ἀπορίας καὶ σύ μοι δοκεῖς κεκοινωνηκέναι· μεταβαλλόμενος γέ τοι ἄνω καὶ κάτω οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν παύει, Pl. Alc. 2, 17. Therefore often preceded by δοκεῖ, and the like: τὸν ἄνδρ᾽ ἔοικεν ὕπνος ἔξειν· κάρα γὰρ ὑπτιάζεται τόδε. ἱδρώς γέ τοί νιν πᾶν καταστάζει δέμας, at any rate a sweat –, Soph. Phil. 823. ἆρά γε πρὸς τὸν θεὸν προσευξόμενος πορεύει; “Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.” φαίνει γέ τοι ἐσκυθρωπακέναι = I guessed as much: for sure enough you seem, Pl. Alc. 2 init. Ἐπιθυμεῖ Σωκράτης ἀκοῦσαι Γοργίου; Ἐπ᾿ αὐτό γέ τοι τοῦτο πάρεσμεν = (Like enough,) for to be sure –. Φορᾶς γέ τοι φθόνησις οὐ γενήσεται, the carrying indeed, as far as that goes, Soph. Trach. 1212. ᾿Αλλά – γέ τοι, after a condition: ἐγὼ δὲ σὸς, κεἰ μὴ σὸς, ἀλλὰ σός

γέ τοι καλούμενος, certe tamen. Εἰ δ᾽ ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ἡττώμεθα, ἀλλὰ τό γέ τοι πῦρ τοῦ καρποῦ κρεῖττόν ἐστιν, Xen. An. 2, 5, 19. Often with δή added: thus (in answer to a question), φασί γέ τοι δή οἱ τούτων κύριοι, yes, at least this is quite certain that -, Pl. Crito, 44. κείνου γέ τοι δὴ παῖς ἐκλήζετο, Soph. Ed. T. 1171.

γε μέντοι, yet – at least. τούς γε μέντοι ἀγαθούς, yet the brave withal, Xen. An. 1, 9, 14.

§ 252.

τοι. This enclitic, derived from το (connected with tamen and though), is originally demonstrative, and by individualizing restricts and excludes.

The original demonstrative force appears especially in rousing exclamations: σέ τοι, σὲ κρίνω, ναί σε, thee there (thee only), Soph. El. 1445, so Aj. 1228: and other pointed allocutions, σύ τοι, σύ τοι κατηξίωσας, thou', thou alone -, Phil. 1095: and with emphatic pronouns, ἐγώ τοι, ἔγωγέ τοι, I, for my part. ἐγώ τοι οὐκ ἀμφισβητῶ, I', be sure of that -, Pl. Hipp. Maj. 369. ταῦτά τοι, this and this only. ταῦτά τοί σ᾽ ἔχθει πόλις, therefore, and reason enough that, Eur. Androm. 212. It is frequent in replies, in the sense be sure of that! never fear! ᾿Αλλὰ ταχύ τοι ἀποκρινοῦμαι, Xen. An. 6,4 (al. 6), 34. εἰρήσεταί τοι, it shall be spoken (rely upon that!), Eur. Ion, 760. ὅρα κατ᾿ ὄρφνην μὴ φύλαξιν ἐντύχῃς. “ Φυλάξομαί τοι," Eur. Hipp. 567.- ἴσθι τοι τίσουσά γ᾽ ἀξίαν δίκην, be sure though, Soph. El. 290.

This particle is especially frequent in gnomes, maxims, and general reflexions, in the sense, sure enough that! Μήτι τοι δρύτομος μέγ᾽ ἀμείνων, ἠὲ βίῃφιν, Il. 23, 315.

τοῖς τοι δικαίοις χώ βραχὺς νικᾳ μέγαν, Soph. Ed. C. 884. κάρτα τοι φιλοίκτιστον γυνή, Aj. 577. ἡδύ τοι ἀνδρεῖόν τι καὶ καλὸν νῦν εἰπόντα καὶ ποιήσαντα μνήμην παρέχειν ἑαυτοῦ, Xen. An. 6, 3 (al. 5), 24. ἥ τοι τῆς διανοίας ὄψις ἄρχεται ὀξὺ βλέπειν, ὅταν ἡ τῶν ὀμμάτων τῆς ἀκμῆς λήγειν ἐπιχειρῇ, Pl. Conv. 219.

§ 253.

καί τοι, properly "and that" (an accession qualified by though, or "also this" viz. "ortoattamen, be considered"): hence especially frequent in the corrective sense, tamen certe, and quamquam. ἀλλὰ κἀμέ τοι (me also, though) ταὐτὸν τόδ᾽ ὄψει δρῶντα κου μέλλοντα ἔτι. καίτοι σ᾽ ἐάσω, yet, or, however, I will let thee go, Soph. Phil. 1255. καίτοι τί φημι; quamquam quid loquor, what am I saying though? & Θάνατε, Θάνατε, νῦν μ᾽ ἐπίσκεψαι μολών· καίτοι σὲ μὲν κἀκεῖ προσαυδήσω ξυνών· σὲ δ᾽ –, Aj. 854. ᾿Αλλὰ ἰόντων (Well, let them go) –, καίτοι ἔχω γε αὐτῶν καὶ τέκνα -, and yet (= take this also into the account). With secondary predicates: οὐδέ μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιττάκειον νέμεται, καίτοι σοφοῦ παρὰ φωτὸς εἰρημένον, quamvis a viro sapiente dictum, Pl. Prot. 339. The force is explained by resolving καί τοι into καὶ ·εἰρημένον, καὶ (οὐδ᾽) ὥς (= τῶς, οὕτως). A stronger expression of this sense is καὶ ταῦτα: τοιαῦτα ὕβρισεν, καὶ ταῦτα τηλικοῦτος, and that too! Soph. El. 614: even with the finite verb, though rarely, καὶ ταῦτα κούφως ἐκ μέσων ἀρκυστάτων ὤρουσεν, Æsch. Eum. 112. Placed at the end of the sentence: Νῦν γοῦν ἐπεχείρησας, οὐδὲν ὢν καὶ ταῦτα, being nothing worth (yet), even so (for all that!), Pl. Rep. 341.

In καίτοι γε, the ye belongs to the whole sentence: καίτοι γε ὀφειλόμενόν που ἐστι τοῦτο ὁ παρακατέθετο, and yet to be sure (it is true that -), Pl. Rep. 331 fin. In καίτοι ye, the ye belongs to the interposed word: καίτοι τοσοῦτόν γ᾽ οἶδα, though indeed thus much at least I know, Soph. Ed. T. 1455.

Often followed by ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως, which, again, illustrates the original force of καίτοι = καὶ ὡς (τῶς): καίτοι οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἴρηκα ὧν προεῖπον· ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως -, = yet for all that: the thing is even so (καὶ τῶς), yet even so (ὅμως), Pl. Euthyph. 3. καίτοι φασὶν Ἰφικράτην– ἐλθεῖν εἰς ἔχθραν· ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως -, Dem. Mid. 41, Buttm.

§ 254.

μέντοι = for one thing, this'. In rousing exclamations, like τοι: οὗτος, σε λέγω δ μέντοι, σὲ τὸν τεθνηκότα. – Usually it may be rendered however, to be sure, with an opposition to something preceding: ἔπειτα μέντοι, anon however (though). μάλιστα μὲν δὴ – · ἔπειτα μέντοι, Soph. Phil. 350. τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὤκνει –, ἔπειτα μέντοι εἶπεν, Pl. Charm. 159.[1] In affirmative answers (§ 199 c, R. 2): φαμέν τι εἶναι δίκαιον αὐτὸ ἢ οὐδέν; “ φαμὲν μέντοι, νὴ Δία,” we affirm it, to be sure (true enough that), Pl. Phæd. 65. οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη; “ πολλὴ μέντοι νὴ Δία,” ib. 68. - Εἰ γὰρ ῥέοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἀπολλύοιτο –, ἀναγκαῖον μέντ᾽ ἂν εἴη –, to be sure, it would be necessary, ib. 87. Σὸς μέντοι Σιμωνίδης πολίτης· δίκαιος εἶβοηθεῖν τῳ ἀνδρί, to be sure, S. is your countryman, you are bound to stand up for him, Pl. Prot.339fin. Δῆλον ὅτι Σεύθης – ἀπαιτήσει με, καὶ ἀπαιτήσει μέντοι δικαίως, and for the matter of that, Xen. An. 7, 6, 17. So An. 4, 6, 15, 16, ἐπιδείξασθαι τὴν παιδείαν καὶ φυλάξασθαι μέντοι (withal) μὴ ληφθῶμεν κλέπτοντες... ᾿Αλλὰ μέντοι (well, for the matter of that, i. e. talking of stealing) καὶ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἀκούω τοὺς ᾿Αθ. δεινοὺς εἶναι κλέπτειν τὰ δημόσια – καὶ τοὺς κρατίστους μέντοι (and your best men withal). - In questions with οὐ, nonne? having the force of an affirmation: οἱ ἀντίδικοι τί δρῶσιν; οὐκ ἀντιλέγουσι μέντοι; they oppose each other, to be sure, don't they? Pl. Phæd. 261. οὐ τῶν καλῶν μέντοι ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστί; Pl. Charm. 159.

[1]: Stallb. Pl. Phæd. 266, says, that a preceding μέν requires μέντοι to follow, not μὲν δή.

καὶ μέντοι – καὶ μήν together with καίτοι (corrective): Pl. Alc. 1, 113, ἐμε δὲ αἰτιᾳ μάτην. καὶ μέντοι καὶ εὐ λέγεις [1], and yet, to be sure, you do say well. Similarly, ἀλλὰ μέντοι, οὐ μέντοι (οὐ not interrogative), οὐ μέντοι οὐδέ –. Comp. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ - with οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ (καί), yet no! but - = attamen, verumtamen. Βούλει οὖν ἐπιχειρήσωμεν –; “ Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. οὐ μέντοι ἀλλ᾽ ἔγωγε ἐκεῖνο ἂν ἥδιστα ἀκούσαιμι," not so, though; but, Pl. Meno, § 22 init.

[1]: Not simply καὶ μήν, as Buttm. in l.

γε μέντοι is a frequent combination, where both particles severally claim the second place in the sentence: thus, τούς γε μέντοι ἀγαθοὺς εἰς πόλεμον ὡμολόγητο διαφερόντως τιμᾶν, Xen. An. 1, 9, 14, the sentence being compounded of τούς γε ἀγ. and τοὺς μέντοι ἀγ. δο οἶμαί γε μέντοι, ἔφη. But when the first word does not admit ye, but does admit μέντοι, the order is changed: thus, λέγουσι μέν τι· οὐ μέντοι γε ὅσον οἴονται, Pl. Rep. 329. οὐ μέντοι ταχύ γε ἀπαγγελῶ, Xen. An. 2, 3, 9.

Οη γέ τοι, see § 251.

§ 255.

ἤτοι, comp. of ἢ and τοι, is epic: [2] verily, assuredly: ὦ φίλοι, ἤτοι κλῆρος ἐμός: often ἤτοι μέν. Sometimes in oppositions: ἤτοι Νεστορίδην –, Τηλέμαχον δ' -, Od. 15, 6. ἤτοι ᾿Ὀδυσσεὺς ὕστερος, αὐτὰρ Τηλέμαχος πρόσθ' ἡγεμόνευεν, 24, 154.

[2]: But Soph. Ed. C. 1366, ἢ τἂν οὐκ ἂν ἢ = ἢ τοι ἄν, and El. 498, ἢ τοι οι ἤ τοι.

In the alternative ἢ - ἤ, the Attics often add τοι to the first ἤ. ἤτοι κλύουσα παιδὸς ἢ τύχῃ πάρα, Soph. Ant. 1182, Trach. 149. ἤτοι ὅλου τοῦ εἴδους ἢ μέρους ἑκάστου, Pl. Parm. 131. Often with ye added: ἤτοι θεούς γε ἡγούμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας, Apol. 27. ἤτοι ἐπιστάμενοί γε – ἢ ὕστερον, Phæd. 76. In Rep. 344, Ε, ἔοικας - ἤτοι ἡμῶν γε οὐδὲν κήδεσθαι, the first ἤ is suppressed, the sense being, or (else) in that case, you do not care for us at all.

§ 256.

οὔτοι, not - though, surely not: οὔτοι γε: οὐτἄρα: usually at the beginning of a sentence, or preceded by ἀλλά.

μήτοι (the prohibitive μή), do notthough: μήτοι τις ἡμᾶς – θορυβήσῃ, Pl. Rep. 438. μήτοι γε: μήτοι γε in aposiopesis, Xen. Cyr. 2, 3, 24. Μὰ Δί᾽, ἔφη ὁ ταξίαρχος, μήτοι γε ἐν μιᾷ γε ἡμέρᾳ, not in one day though: often (in the same sense μή τι γε) = nedum, αὐτοὺς ἐποίει, μήτοι καὶ ἀλλήλους γε, – ἀδικεῖν, not to say one another, Pl. Rep. 352. μήτοι θεούς γε, εἰ δ᾽ οὖν θεούς, μήτοι τόν γε μέγιστον τῶν θεῶν, ib. 388. Sometimes μήτοι γε δή.

§ 257.

ῥα and ἄρ (Epic), ἄρα.[3]

[3]: The supposed derivation from ἄρω (Kühner, Nägelsb., Stallbaum) explains some of the facts (see Il. 14, 511, and the preceding vss.); more satisfactory is that (cf. Hartung) which connects the simple ῥα (ap) with the verbal root, denoting easy or sudden motion, which appears in ῥέω, ῥέα, and ῥάδιος, rapio, repente (applied to mental action in reor, ratus), rite, and with the suffix in comparatives and comparative words, δεινότερος, πότερος, alter(o), δεῦρο, ultro, intra, ἡμέτερος, longer, other, either, hither, our, &c. nostr(o). On this view, a-pa is the pronominal root ả- (ἀ-πό, ἀ-νά, ἀ priv., ἀ-τὰρ, ἄ-τερ, &c.) compounded with ῥα.

a) ῥα enclitic, ἄρ the same inverted, and also ἄρα [4], are often attached (in epic poetry) to relatives and demonstratives, particles and conjunctions, at the beginning of a sentence or clause of a sentence, with a notion of progress or sequence, which is sometimes perceptible, but often so slight that the particle might as well be absent, and seems only intended to help the metre or to close an hiatus. Thus we find, indifferently, ὡς ἔφαν and ὡς ἄρ᾽ ἔφαν, never ὡς ῥ᾽ ἔφαν or ὡς ῥ᾽ ἔφατ᾽: ὡς ἔφατ᾽, οἱ δ᾽ ἄρα and ὡς ἔφατ᾽, οἱ δέ: οἱ δ᾽ ὅτε δή ῥ᾽ ἵκοντο and οἱ δ᾽ ὅτε δὴ σχεδὸν ἦσαν: τῶν μὲν ἄρ᾽ ᾿Αμφίμαχος and τῶν μὲν Ὀδυσσεύς: οἵ τ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ᾿Αμύκλας εἶχον and οἱ τ᾽ ἔχον Αἴγιναν: δὴ τότε and δή ῥα τότ᾽. – Ὡς ἔφατ᾽ ἔδδεισεν δὲ –, καί ῥ᾽ ἀκέουσα καθῆστο, with reference to the preceding command, ἀλλ᾽ ἀκέουσα κάθησο, Il. 1, 565–8. τίς τ᾽ ἄρ σφωε θεῶν ἔριδι ξυνέηκε μάχεσθαι; and who then, with ref. to διαστήτην ἐρίσαντε, Il. 1, 6–8.

[4]: But in numberless passages, a slight alteration will give ῥα or ἄρ where the edited text has ἄρα, ἄρ᾽.

It frequently appears in one member of an alternative: ἤ ῥα – ἤ, – ἄρα – εἴτε, οὔτ᾽ ἄρα οὔτε; or correlation, τόσσον ὅσσον ἄρ᾽, ἡμος – τῆμος ἄρ᾽: or opposition, μέν ῥα – δέ (ἀλλά, αὐτάρ): οὐκ ἀλλ᾽ ἄρα. Also ὅττι ῥα, ἐπεί ῥα, οὖνεκ᾿ ἄρα, ὅτε ῥα, ὅτε and τότε δή ῥα. γάρ ῥα. ἢ ῥα (verily): οὐκ and οὐδ᾽ ἄρα, εἰ μὴ ἄρ᾽.:

b) This use is less frequent with other words: it is found, however, in primary sentences after some monosyllabic verbs: ἡ ῥα, so spake he; βῆ δ᾽ ἴμεν and αὐτὰρ ὁ βῆ ρ᾿ ἰέναι, Il. 21, 205 (even not at the beginning of a sentence, μετὰ δὲ κλειτοὺς ἐπικούρους βῆ ῥα μέγα ἰάχων, Il. 17, 215): more frequently in apodosis, αὐτὰρ ἐπειδὴ –, βὴ ῥ᾽ ἴμεν, and ἀλλ᾽ ὅτε δή ῥα –, γνῶ ῥ᾽ ἄνδρας, Il. 10, 357. αὐτὰρ ἐπειδὴ τεύξε σάκος –, τεῦξ᾽ ἄρα οἱ θώρηκα, Il. 18, 609. αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ –, εἴατ᾿ ἄρ᾽, Il. 22, 127. οἱ δ᾽ ἐπεὶ οὖν –, στῆσαν ἄρ᾽, Il. 24, 349. Similarly, ἤτοι ὅγ᾽ ὡς εἰπὼν, κατ᾿ ἄρ᾽ ἔζετο, Il. 1, 101: and with the participle, τὸν δ᾽ ὡς οὖν –, κινήσας ῥα κάρη, Il. 17, 198. Rarely with substantives: Αἴας ῥα πρῶτος, Il. 14, 511. ἀσπὶς ἄρ᾽ ἀσπίδ᾽ ἔρειδε, Il. 16, 201. With preposition: τοῦ δ᾽ ὡς οὖν –, μετ᾿ ἄρα δμωῇσιν εἶπεν, Od. 17, 493.

c) ἄρα (not ῥα) denotes subjective consequence, so then –! why, then –! it appears, or, turns out! always with a feeling of surprise, of finding oneself mistaken and, agreeably or disagreeably, undeceived. This use is known to Homer: Ἕκτορ, εἶδος ἄριστε, μάχης ἄρα πολλὸν ἐδεύεο, Il. 17, 142. σχέτλιε, Πηλέος υἱὲ, χόλῳ ἄρα σ᾽ ἔτρεφε μήτηρ, Il. 16, 203. οἷσιν ἄρα Ζεὺς ἐκ νεότητος ἔδωκε καὶ ἐς γῆρας τολυπεύειν, Il. 14, 85. νηλεές, οὐκ ἄρα σοίγε πατὴρ ἦν ἱππότα Πηλεύς, &c., Il. 16, 33. So –

Hdt. 1, 111, πυνθάνομαι – ὡς ἄρα Μανδάνης τε εἴη παῖς, that after all (or, who would have thought it!) –. In this sense, ἄρα is very frequent in the Attic writers of poetry and prose. οὐκ ἐνενοήσαμεν ὅτι εἰσὶν ἄρα τοιαῦται φύσεις, οἷας ἡμεῖς οὐκ ᾠήθημεν, Pl. Rep. 375. ὦ παῖδες, ὡς ἄρα ἐφλυαροῦμεν, ὅτε –, how, as it now appears, we did trifle –! Xen. Cyr. 1, 4, 11. ἐμοὶ, ὦ ἄνδρες, θυομένῳ – οὐκ ἐγίγνετο τὰ ἱερά. καὶ εἰκότως ἄρα οὐκ ἐγίγνετο· ὡς γὰρ ἐγὼ νῦν πυνθάνομαι –, and with good reason, as the result has shown, Xen. An. 2, 2, 3. μάτην ἄρ᾽ ἡμεῖς, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἥκομεν, why then it appears –, Soph. El. 762. ὅτ᾽ οὔκετ᾽ εἰμί, τηνικαῦτ᾽ ἄρ᾽ εἰμ᾿ ἀνήρ, Œd. C. 394. οὕτω κοινόν τι ἄρα χαρᾷ καὶ λύπῃ δάκρυά ἐστιν! Xen. Hell. 7, 1, 32. Hence the use of the imperfect, ὅδ᾽ ἦν ἄρα –, this then is he –! (he was so all along, as it now turns out), Soph. Phil. 966. καὶ ἐνενόησα τότε ἄρα καταγέλαστος ὤν, ἡνίκα – ἔφην –. οὐδὲν εἰδὼς ἄρα τοῦ πράγματος –. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ὑπ᾿ ἀβελτερίας ὤμην –. τὸ δὲ ἄρα, οὐ τοῦτο ἦν –, ἀλλὰ –. εἰ δὲ ψευδῆ, οὐδὲν ἄρ᾽ ἦν πρᾶγμα... ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἤδη ἄρα –, Pl. Conv. 198 C–E. Sometimes in the middle of a sentence: πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκότες ἄρα ἀδίκως ὑπ᾿ αὐτῆς ἀπόλλυνται, ὡς ὁ τούτων λόγος, Pl. Gorg. 519. ὡς δὲ ταῦτα γελοῖά ἐστι, κατάδηλον ἔσται, ἐὰν μὴ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι χρώμεθα ἄρα, ἡδεῖ τε καὶ ἀνιαρῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ καὶ κακῷ, Pl. Prot. 355.

On ἄρα in sentences with μέν – δέ, see § 189 a.

§ 258.

In interrogations it denotes surprise, perplexity, or impatience: τίς ἄρα ῥύσεται; τίς ἄρ᾽ ἐπαρκέσει θεῶν ἢ θεᾶν; Eur.

In exclamations, ὅρα, τίς ἄρ᾽ ἦν; (in disappointment at not finding the person who was expected;) Soph. Ed. C. 118, πῶς πότε – πῶς ἄρα; Phil. 684, ὡς οὐκ ἄρ᾽ ἤδη –! how ignorant, it seems, I was! El. 1176. So ei and εἰ μὴ ἄρα -, if(or, unless), which I do not expect, &c.: ποταμὸς δ᾽ εἰ μέν τις καὶ ἄλλος ἄρα ἡμῖν ἐστι διαβατέος, οὐκ οἶδα, if it should turn out that there is -, Xen. An. 2, 4, 6. εἴτε – εἴτ᾿ ἄρα, whether or (should such unexpectedly be the case). With ὡς, " that,” it is often ironical: ὡς ἄρα οἱ πρόγονοι μεγάλα εὐ παθόντες οὐδένα ἐτίμησαν, that it should seem forsooth -, Dem.

§ 259.

Peculiarities: ταῦτα δὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ἄρα ξυνέφασαν, Pl. Conv. 177. The force may be expressed by, they could but assent: ταῦτα ἀκούσας ὁ Κῦρος ἐπαίσατο apa (in his surprise) τὸν μηρόν, Xen. Cyr. 7, 3, 6. Σακῶν δὲ ἰδιώτης ἀνὴρ ἀπελιπεν ἄρα (to the surprise of everybody) τῷ ἵππῳ τοὺς ἀλλοὺς ἐγγὺς τῷ ἡμίσει τοῦ δρόμου, Xen. Cyr. 8, 3, 25. ὥστε ἐπεὶ ἐδεδειπνήκεσαν, καὶ τὰ πάντα πολλὰ ὄντα διαπεπόμφει ὁ Κῦρος ἀπὸ τῆς τραπέζης, εἶπεν ἄρα ὁ Γωβρύας· ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἐγὼ, ὦ Κῦρε, πρόσθεν μὲν ἡγούμην (said in his surprise, or, could not help saying), Xen. Cyr. 8, 4, 7. In some places, the sense as it turned out subsides into in fact, or, it should be remarked that: “ Σάκα δὲ οὐδὲν δίδως; ” ὁ δὲ Σάκας ἄρα -, now Sacas, it should be observed, was, &c. (or, it would turn out upon enquiry, that -). So, in explanation of a preceding speech, οἱ δ᾽ ἄρα τῶν βασιλέων οἰνοχόοι..., Xen. Cyr. 1, 3, 9.

§ 260.

γάρ, (nam) namely, for. Being a form of ye with the suffix ῥα, ἄρ, this particle denotes an affirmation (γε) which is explanatory (pa) of something else: sometimes the notion of explanation predominates, sometimes the affirmation.

a) It is little more than merely explanatory = namely, after demonstratives and short sentences, such as σημεῖον δέ, δῆλον δέ· δείκνυμι δέ, σκέψασθε δέ, &c. (in which there is always a demonstrative, e. g. ἐνθένδε, ἐντεῦθεν, &c. implied.) See examples in § 196, and R., to which add: οὐκοῦν τοσοῦτον μὲν ἡμῖν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν πεπέρανται; ὁ γάρ ἐσμεν, ἐπιεικῶς ὡμολόγηται, Pl. Alc. pr. 132. thus much, namely -. δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ἔφη, χαριέστερον εἶναι μῦθον ὑμῖν λέγειν. Ἦν γάρ ποτε, where the demonstrative is not expressed: to tell you a story. Namely, Pl. Prot. 320.

b) The affirmative force predominates in replies: ἔλεγες; ἔλεγον γάρ, why yes, I did. αἱ μητέρες τὰ παιδία μὴ ἐκδειματούντων. Μὴ γάρ, ἔφη (Pl.), why yes (you say true): they ought not = why no.

c) Very often, especially in Herodot. and Thucyd., the explanatory clause with γάρ is premised to the thing explained: see § 1966, and on the ellipsis in ἀλλὰ γάρ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ γάρ, see under ᾿Αλλά. On καὶ γάρ, see under Kaí,

d) The γάρ in interrogations may be referred to a) = " is this, namely, what you mean to say? " or b) = aye, is it so? " In many places it may be referred to a preceding assertion: thus, ὄλωλε γάρ; = ὄλωλεν; οὕτω γὰρ λέγεις. - To this head belong the interrogative replies equivalent to assertions: πῶς γάρ; for how can it be so? = how so? by no means: πῶς γὰρ οὐ; for how can it be not so? = to be sure, undoubtedly: ἢ γάρ; οὐ γάρ; is it not so? (which are sometimes inserted in the middle of a sentence (especially by later Atticists): καλήν γε (οὐ γάρ;) τὴν ἀμοιβὴν ἀποδώσομεν.

§ 261.

Τί γάρ; sometimes, like quid?, is a formula of transition to a new question. Οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν ἀναβατικωτέρους ἐπὶ τοὺς ἵππους ποιήσεις αὐτούς; Δεῖ γοῦν, ἔφη. Τί γάρ; ἐὰν που κινδυνεύειν δέῃ, πότερον -; Xen. In reply to a preceding question, it is a form of assent, ἄλλο understood (cf. τί μήν under μήν, § 231) = "(yes;) for wha (else is it, if not as you say)?" It may be rendered, why not? certainly, undoubtedly, or, after a negative assertion or question, certainly not. τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα παντὶ δῆλον, ὅτι οὐκ αἰσχρὸν τὸ γράφειν λόγους. Τί γάρ; why should it be? = of course it is not. Μενέλαε, προςφθέγγει νιν ἀνόσιον κάρα; “ τί γάρ; φίλος μοι πατρός ἐστιν ἔκγονος.”

Ιη γὰρ ἄν, οὐ γὰρ ἄν, there is sometimes a reference to a suppressed condition: οὐ φιλεῖς με, ὦ θύγατερ, οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐμὲ ἀπεκρύπτου τὰ σὰ πάθη, for (if you did) you would not-.

τούτου ἐνδεᾶ ἐφαίνετο· βίᾳ γὰρ ἂν εἶλον τὸ χωρίον, for (had it been otherwise-), Thuc.

§ 262.

ἆρα. This (Attic) particle represents the Epic ἦ ῥα, or rather ἦ ἄρα [1], and is described by ancient grammarians as σύνδεσμος ἀπορηματικός, denoting perplexity together with surprise; most commonly in interrogations, but sometimes also in exclamations.

[1]: Or, possibly, εἰ ἄρα, when, as is most usual, it is interrogative. Cf. the instances where it depends on a verb of considering, &c.

In questions, the meaning is, surely it should seem (or, it turns out, &c.) Or, aye, then? or, I wonder whether –? the interrogative force residing, not so much in the particle itself, as in the tone of the utterance: τί φῶ; ἆρ᾽ ἔστιν; ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν; ἢ γνώμη πλανᾷ; καὶ φημὶ κἀπόφημι, κοὐκ ἔχω τί φῶ, Soph. Œd. C. 315. ἆρ᾿ Ὀδυσσέως κλύω; can it be that? Phil. 964. Ἆρα, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, νῦν μὲν καιρὸς διαλυθῆναι; I should think it would be time –? Xen. Cyr. 7, 5, 40. Sometimes in the middle of a sentence: Ἄδμητον ἐν δόμοισιν ἆρα κιγχάνω; I wonder whether –? Eur. Alc. 495. Very often it introduces an interrogation dependent on a preceding verb, but always in the form of oratio recta: σκεψώμεθα ἆρα λύπη ὑπερβάλλει τὸ ἀδικεῖν; (as if it were εἰ ἄρα), Pl. Gorg. 475. δεῖ ἄρα – σκοπεῖν, ἆρα τεχνικός ἐστιν –; Pl. Lach. 185. ἐπισκέψασθαι, ἆρα ἃ νῦν δὴ διήλθομεν – ἁρμόττει; Pl. Rep. 462. (Cf. § 199 c, R. 1.)

§ 263.

In ἆρά γε, the interrogator believes, or pretends to believe, that the thing is as he says: Ὁ δὲ δὴ ἀὴρ ἆρά γε – ὅτι αἴρει τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, ἀὴρ κέκληται, I should say that –? Pl. Crat. 410. Ἆρ᾽ οὖν –; I presume, then –? either where no answer is expected, but the speaker passes on to some further view of the subject, or where the question is grounded on what goes before (according to the two leading uses of οὖν, § 264, a, b).

Αρ᾿ οὐ -; expects an affirmative, ἆρα μή –; a negative answer. ἆρ᾽ οὐ μωρόν ἐστι; = can it be, that it is not foolish? meaning, that it would be surprising if the thing were not so. ἆρα μὴ δοκεῖς; surely you do not imagine? = can it be, that there is reason to apprehend your imagining? (Cf. § 199 b.)

In the poets, ἆρα sometimes occurs in exclamations, in the same sense as ἄρα: οἶμοι ταλαίνης ἆρα τῆςδε συμφορᾶς, Soph. El. 1170. τοιοῖςδε χρησμοῖς ἆρα χρὴ πεποιθέναι, Æsch. Choeph. 287.

§ 264.

οὖν, Ionic ὧν. This word is explained (by Hartung) as accusative aur of aus, a Cretan and Laced. form of αὐτός. Hence its original force = " the same," " all one." (Others make it = ἐόν, ὄν, so that the primary sense is ut nunc est.)

a) Originally our appears only as an adjunct to pronouns and conjunctions. In Homer it occurs only so; chiefly with ἐπεί and ὡς (also οὔτ᾽ οὖν, and γοῦν): αἵ τ᾿ (the cranes) ἐπεὶ οὖν χειμῶνα φύγον καὶ ἀθέσφατον ὄμβρον, κλαγγῇ ταίγε πέτονται, at what same time, i. e. no sooner have they -, Il. 3, 4. τὸν δ᾽ ὡς οὖν ἐνόησε, ib. 21 and 30,and frequently: air' (the fawns) ἐπεὶ οὖν ἔκαμον —, ἑστᾶσι, Il. 4, 243. In Attic writers, ὅστις, ὅςπερ, ὅσος, ὁποῖος, &c., οὖν, with their adverbial forms ὅπῃ, ὥςπερ, &c. οὖν, all in the sense of the Lat. -cunque: e. g. γυναῖκα πιστὴν δ᾽ ἐν δόμοις εὕροι μολὼν οἷανπερ οὖν ἔλειπεν, such exactly (περ), whatever that might be (Clytæmn. is speaking of herself), Æsch. Ag. 565. πῶς λέγεις; ἔστι γὰρ ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα ὁτῳδὴ ὁπωςοῦν ἔχοντι ἄμεινον ἀγνοεῖν ἢ γιγνώσκειν; fully, anything, no matter what it may be, to any person soever, no matter in what condition, Pl. Alc. 2, 143. ὅπερ οὖν οὐδεὶς ἂν οἰηθείη, just what (without more ado about it, without question), ib.[1] τοῦδέ σοι μέλειν ἐφίεθ᾽ ἁνὴρ κεῖνος, ὥσπερ οὖν μέλει, Soph.Aj. 970. εἰ δ᾽ ἔστιν, ὥσπερ οὖν ἔστιν, Pl. Phædr. 242, with the same notion of indifference, not caring to argue the point further.[2]

[^1]: Buttmann in l. explains it as answering to a γάρ in the independent form of sentence: τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἂν οἰηθείη, and similarly Homer's ἐπεὶ οὖν ἔκαμον = αΐδε γὰρ, ἐπεὶ ἔκαμον. But this will hardly explain the other facts.

[2]: Not as Stallb. in l., οὖν, hic quoque nativam servat ratiocinandi et concludendi potestatem, which, in fact, is not the native force of the particle.

b) In its consecutive use, οὖν = thus, then, accordingly, such being the case: ἔδοξεν οὖν μοι. Hence frequent in resumptions, after interposed matter, κατανοῶν δὲ ὁ Κῦρος ὡς...., ἐκ τούτων οὖν (I say, or, so then) ἐπεθύμει, Xen. Cyr. 3, 3, 9. - In poetry, often between the preposition and its noun, ἐν οὖν ῥοπῇ τοιᾷδε, Soph. Tr. 82.

§ 265.

In Herodot. ὧν (οὖν) is frequently placed between a preposition and its verb: thus, ἤν τις ψαύσῃ παριὼν ὑὸς, αὐτοῖσι ἱματίοισι κατ᾿ ὧν ἔβαψε ἑωυτόν, 2, 47. (On the death thus, of any person of note) τὸ θῆλυ γένος πᾶν τὸ ἐκ τῶν οἰκίων τούτων κατ᾿ ὧν ἐπλάσατο τὴν κεφαλὴν πηλῷ, ib. 85. (In embalming) παρασχίσαντες παρὰ τὴν λαπάρην, ἐξ ὧν εἶλον τὴν κοιλίαν πᾶσαν, ib. 86. (In making boats) νομεῦσιν οὐδὲν χρέωνται, ἔσωθεν δὲ τὰς ἁρμόνίας ἐν ὧν ἐπάκτωσαν τῇ βίβλῳ, ib. 96. (In sacrificing) καὶ ἔπειτα βρόχῳ περὶ ὧν ἔβαλε τὸν αὐχένα, 4, 60: usually, as in these instances, with the aorist, in descriptions of a customary process: the force seems to be, without more ado, straightway [3]; comp. the Homeric οὖν in the relative member.

[3]. Compare the cognate αὐτίκα and αὕτως = αὕτως. Hartung says that it denotes a cool, offhand way of going to work; but this is evidently not always the case.

§ 266.

With ἀλλά, ἀτάρ, δé, it has a force resembling that of ὅμως: but, however (= all one for that), ἀλλ᾽ οὖν τοσοῦτόν γ'᾽ ἴσθι, Soph. Ph. 1289. ἔστω δ᾽ οὖν ὅπως ὑμῖν φίλον, Ed. C. 1207. καὶ ἐλέχθησαν λόγοι ἄπιστοι μὲν ἐνίοισι ῾Ἑλλήνων, ἐλέχθησαν δὲ ὧν, but spoken they were', all the same, Hdt. εἰ δὲ οὖν, φιλεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο μὴ ταύτῃ ῥέπειν, with aposiopesis, viz. ἄλλῃ ῥέπει, Soph. Ant. 722.

In alternatives, εἴτ᾽ οὖν – εἴτε, the οὖν implies that, whichever side be taken, it comes to the same thing: οὐκοῦν δαιμόνια μὲν φής με καὶ νομίζειν καὶ διδάσκειν, εἴτ᾿ οὖν καινὰ, εἴτε παλαιά· ἀλλ᾽ οὖν δαιμόνια γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, Pl.

Pl. Apol. 27 (comp. ἤτοι – ἤ, § 255): with οὖν in the second member, λέγοντες εἴτ᾿ ἀληθὲς, εἴτ᾿ ἄρ᾽ οὖν ματήν, or, for aught I care -, Soph. Phil. 345: in both members, καὶ τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἔχοντα, εἴτ᾿ οὖν ἀληθὲς εἴτ᾽ οὖν ψεῦδος· ἀλλ᾽ οὖν δεδογμένον γέ ἐστι τὸνΣωκράτη διαφέρειν τινὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, Pl. Apol. 34 fin. So οὔτ᾽ (μήτ') οὖν: οὔτε γὰρ θρασὺς, οὔτ᾽ οὖν προδείσας εἰμί, Soph. Ed. C. 90. μήτ᾿ ἄροτον αὐτοῖς γῆς ἀνιέναι τινὰ μήτ᾽ οὖν γυναικῶν παῖδας, ib. 275. Homer also has οὔτ᾽ οὖν: ἔνθ᾽ οὔτις τὴν νῆσον ἐσέδρακεν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν, οὔτ᾽ οὖν κύματα μακρὰ – εἰσίδομεν, Od. 9, 147. νῦν δ᾽ ἐπεὶ ἱκάνεις, οὔτ᾽ οὖν ἐσθῆτος δευήσεαι οὔτε τευ ἄλλου, Od. 6, 192.

§ 267.

γοῦν = γε οὖν (therefore placed like γε), yes, without more ado: ἔχεις διδάξαι δή δ μ', ὅποι καθέσταμεν;–“ τὰς γοῦν᾿Αθήνας οἶδα, τὸν δὲ χῶρον οὔ,” Soph. Ed. C. 24 (the feeling of certainty with indifference). τούτω δ᾽ οὐ πάλιν αὐτις ἀποίσετον ὠκέες ἵπποι ἄμφω ἀφ᾿ ἡμείων, εἰ γοῦν ἕτερός γε φύγῃσιν, Hom. Il. 5, 259, with the γοῦν in the condition (cf. § 264 a), where the Attics would place it in the apodosis, comp. εἰ καὶ τυραννεῖς, ἐξισωτέον τὸ γοῦν ἴσ᾽ ἀντιλέξαι, Soph. Ed. T. 408.

γὰρ οὖν, with adverbial γάρ, in answers, denotes assent with indifference: φημὶ γὰρ οὖν. οὐ γὰρ οὖν, Pl. passim. With γάρ, " for,” as in οὐ τήν γε μὴ θιγοῦσαν, εὖ γὰρ οὖν λέγεις, Soph. Ant. 772, for, of course: οἰκουμένη γὰρ οὖν στέγη πυρὸς μέτα πάντ᾽ ἐκπορίζει, Phil. 298.

μῶν – μὴ οὖν; surely (without more ado) not -? μῶν ᾿Ὀδυσσέως ἐπησθόμην; surely not Ulysses? (= I hope not.) With οὐ: μῶν οὐχ ὀρᾷς; surely it cannot be that you do not see this? Ed. C. 1729. But the separate force of the particles having become obscured, so that μῶν has subsided into a mere particle of interrogation, the Attics also say μῶν οὖν; = num igitur? and μῶν μὴ –; Μῶν δοῦλος ὤν (ἄρχει σου ὁ παιδαγωγός); then, μῶν μὴ καὶ οὗτοί σου ἄρχουσιν οἱ διδάσκαλοι; and μῶν μή τι ἠδίκηκας τὸν πατέρα ἢ τὴν μητέρα; Pl. Lys. 208.

§ 268.

οὔκουν, = not, all one for that; assuredly not, by no means. When the οὐκ is assertive, and the οὖν illative, not therefore, it should be written οὐκοῦν, or rather οὐκ οὖν; but in this sense the combination is rare: it is more frequent, when the οὐκ is interrogative, e. g. οὐκ οὖν μ᾽ ἐάσεις; wilt thou then not let me alone? and then it is usual to write οὐκοῦν, as also when the οὖν is not illative, and the combination represents assuredly not, but in an interrogation, wilt thou not assuredly (or, without more ado) let me go? (In both these cases it would be better to write οὔκουν; see 199 b, R.) But this negative interrogation is virtually a strong affirmation, and is often used as such, and then it is written οὐκοῦν: e. g. οὐκοῦν ὅταν δὴ μὴ σθένω, πεπαύσομαι, prop. shall I not-have done? = Aye, no doubt-, I shall have done: Soph. Ant. 91, with a bitter irony which sometimes accompanies this use of the particle. Hence οὐκοῦν οὐκ –; is it not then (or, not assuredly) the case that not? οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαί ποτε ταὐτὸν τῷ χαίρειν; “ πῶς γὰρ ἄν;” = is it not then the case, that the absence of grief will not be identical with rejoicing, or, well then, to be sure, the will not be? Pl. Phil. 360, where the second οὐκ is assertive. Sometimes also, where it is interrogative, οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη ἆρ᾽ οὐ τούτοις μόνοις προσήκει; Pl. Phædo, 68.

§ 269.

μὲν οὖν, prop. for one thing, with the same adjunct notion of indifference, it is all one, it makes no difference, &c. (But from this must be distinguished the cases where μέν is followed by a corresponding dé, and the our is illative, on the one hand therefore -.) Hence in affirmative answers, πάνυ μὲν οὖν = quite, for one thing (however it may be with the rest) decidedly (so): 50 κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν, παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. With Attic urbanity, this formula of assent is used with a corrective force = immo vero: ἐγὼ οὐ φημί; φημὶ μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε, I deny? nay, rather (=for one thing, decidedly) I assert it, Pl. Gorg. 466. Ἐγὼ σοὶ οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην ἀντιλέγειν–. “ οὐ μὲν οὖν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ– δύνασαι ἀντιλέγειν," nay, rather say, you cannot gainsay Truth, Pl. Conv. 201. In this sense, μὲν οὖν is sometimes used in continued discourse: δείσασα γὰρ γραῦς οὐδέν· ἀντίπαις μὲν οὖν, Æsch. Eum. 38. μάταιος ἆρ᾽ ἦν, οὐδαμοῦ μὲν οὖν φρενῶν, Eur. Hipp. 1009. It is often used in continuation of a preceding statement: ὁ μὲν οὖν (now what = as far as that goes, enough said) ἐγώ φημι τὴν ῥητορικὴν εἶναι, ἀκήκοας... ἴσως μὲν ουν (however, or now) ἄτοπον πεποίηκα... ἄξιον μὲν οὖν (however) ἐμοὶ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἐστί.... ἐὰν μὲν οὖν (then, on the one hand) καὶ ἐγὼ – μὴ ἔχω –, ἐὰν δὲ ἔχω –, Pl. Gorg. 465.

§ 270.

τοίνυν. This particle is compounded either of enclitic τοι (§ 252) (for that matter), or the stronger form τῷ, in that case, with νῦν (§ 243). Its use is in transitions and inferences: then (to proceed), then (in brief), well then, why then (especially in lively replies). In the beginning of a speech: ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν, I, for my part, sure enough, Xen. An. 5, 1, 2. In continuation: Ἔτι τοίνυν τάδε ὁρᾶτε, moreover now, ib. § 10. συνεπόμνυμι μηδὲ ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι στρατηγοὶ ἔλαβον εἰληφέναι, μὴ τοίνυν μήδε (nay, for that matter, in short, not even) ὅσα τῶν λοχαγῶν ἔνιοι, Xen. An. 7, 6, 19. In answers: ἄπειμι τοίνυν, well then (to cut the matter short) I am going, Soph. Œd. C. 444. In unwilling reply: τῶν Λαΐου τοίνυν τις ἦν γεννημάτων; well then (if you must needs have it), ib. 1167. – τὰ λῷστα τοίνυν ταῦτά μ᾿ ἀλγύνει πάλαι, why then (to dispose of that matter briefly) this which you call 'best' has been troubling me all along, ib. 1067.

§ 271.

τοίγαρ. The position of this particle in the beginning of a sentence shows that its first element is not the enclitic τοι, but the ancient τῷ, in that case, therefore. Hence, τοίγαρ = ergo, proinde. It is used in expressions of assent: why (γάρ) then (τῷ), τοίγαρ ποιήσω, Soph. Tr. 1249: in inference, Soph. Aj. 666 (after citing a proverb), τοίγαρ τὸ λοιπὸν εἰσόμεσθα, why then (such being the case) The rendering in each instance varies with that of γάρ: thus often in the beginning of a reply, yes, (and) therefore: e. g. τοίγαρ δι᾽ ὀρθῆς τήνδε ναυκληρεῖς πόλιν, Soph. Ant. 994.

τοιγάρτοι is the same with addition of τοι enclitic, why therefore to be sure. τοιγάρτοι νῦν, ἅτε μέγιστα ἠδικηκὼς τῶν ἐν Μακεδονία, ἀθλιώτατός ἐστι πάντων Μακεδύνων (ironically, after a recital of wicked acts), yes, and therefore no doubt -, Pl. Gorg.471.

τοιγαροῦν, why then, such being the case: ἀλλὰ θεοῖς γ᾽ ἔχθιστος ἥκω. “ τοιγαροῦν τεύξει τάχα,” why then for that very reason (they are the more likely to grant thy request), Soph. Œd. Τ. 1519. ὀρθῶς ἔλεξας· τοιγαροῦν τὸ σὸν φράσον, such then being the case, tell me, Phil. 341. ξύμφημι κἀγώ· τοιγαροῦν σώζου τόδε. Frequent in prose: e. g. (Cyrus never left a man's zeal in his service unrewarded) Τοιγαροῦν κράτιστοι δὴ ὑπηρέται παντὸς ἔργου Κύρῳ ἐλέχθησαν γενέσθαι, accordingly, and reason good this, Xen. An. 1, 9, 18. (He never broke promise) καὶ γὰρ οὖν (and therefore in fact) ἐπίστευον αὐτῷ –. Τοιγαροῦν ἐπεὶ -, accordingly, (it is no wonder that) when, ib. 1, 8, 7-9.

§ 272.

που. This enclitic particle (an adverbial form of τις, quis, kos, whence Ion. κου, κως, &c.) properly = somewhere. Apart from the notion of place, it means, somehow, in some sort or degree; in conjectures, = perhaps, I suppose, used in conversation when the speaker puts something in a half-questioning manner (surely), intending to build something on the affirmative answer of the person addressed: τὸ γάρ που κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲν διαφέρει, for, I presume (it being possible that the other would say there was some difference), Pl. Crito, 49. Also when, with a degree of uncertainty, a speaker repeats another's words: thus (Socr. having proposed a definition of σχῆμα, Meno says), Ὅτι σχῆμά πού ἐστι, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, ὁ ἀεὶ χρόᾳ ἔπεται, because figure, I take it –, Pl. Men. 75. Hence with Attic urbanity, it is used in matter of certainty, especially to intimate that, before the speaker proceeds with his argument, he waits for the other to affirm the point, or call it to mind: ὁ γὰρ σκυτοτόμος τέμνει που τομεῖ καὶ σμίλῃ καὶ ἄλλοις ὀργάνοις (I suppose you will grant, or, remember that), Pl. Alc. pr. 51. Οὐ τί που οἴει –; You do not, I trow, at all imagine (" mirantis et indignantis," Stallb.). Cf. οὐ δήπου. (Sometimes it is put before an interposed φημί, or the like, to which it belongs: ἔδοξέπούφησι, It says, I suppose, “ It seemed good, &c.," Pl. Phædr. 258.)

§ 273.

The same, with greater emphasis, is δήπου (we may say that at once, I suppose). Ἐγὼ γάρ που ἀπεκρινάμην τὸ διὰ παντὸς ὀρθῶς ἔχον· ὀρθῶς δὲ δήπου ἔχει τὸ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην γιγνόμενον, my answer, I presume you perceive, was as to what is done rightly (in wrestling) at all points: and rightly done – surely you will grant this – is what is done by strict rule of art, Pl. Alc. pr. 107. τῶν Λαΐου δήπου τις ὠνομάζετο, I suppose we may be pretty sure that –, Soph. Ed. T. 1042.

Sometimes in a direct interrogation, distinct from the latent interrogation of the particle itself: καὶ ἔστι δήπου τὸ δίψος δίψος τοῦ; Pl. Rep. 439; even when the interrogation is virtually negative: καὶ τούτου γε δήπου τις ἂν ἐπιθυμήσειεν; equivalent to οὐ γὰρ δήπου τούτουγέ τις ἐπιθυμήσειεν, Pl. Conv. 200. In οὐ δήπου (γε), the negation is expressed interrogatively: οὐ δή πού σε γε – ἄγουσιν, surely they are not? Soph. Ant. 381. οὐ γὰρ δήπου σοῦ γε-, Pl. Apol. 20. (“ οὐ δήπου est suspicantis: οὗ τί που mirantis et indignantis," Stallb.)

Stronger still is δήπουθεν (see § 240); used when the speaker, with a kind of defiance, disputes the possibility of an opposite assertion: ἑστάναι γὰρ ἐξέσται δήπουθεν αὐτῷ, for I presume there can be no doubt that -, Dem. Mid. c. 26.

REM. Cf. μέν in interrogation: Ἕλλην μέν ἐστι, καὶ ἑλληνίζει; Pl. Men. 82,

where μέν assumes the fact as unquestionable: που in the same question would

mean, that the speaker waits for the other's assent. (Buttm. in l. and Index, s. v.)

§ 274.

ποτέ (enclitic). This temporal adverb of τις (quis, κος, Ion. κοτέ), at some time; once (ποτέ μέν– ποτέ δέ, one while another while, modomodo, or ἐνίοτε, or ἄλλοτε δέ): at any time, ever. With other designations of time: νῦν ποτε, ἤδη ποτέ, πάλαι ποτέ, πρίν ποτε, πρόσθε πού ποτε, πώποτε, ἔτι ποτέ. The notion of time is less prominent in the following: μέθες μέθεςμε. “ ποῖ μεθῶ; ” μέθες ποτέ, do' let me go (utique, in any wise), Soph. Phil.816. τίσασθε, τίσασθ᾽ ἀλλὰ τῷχρόνῳ ποτέ, at last, tandem aliquando, or simply by the emphasis, do' avenge me! So μόγις οὖν ποτε ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπος ἀνέωξε τὴν θύραν, at last. Ἐκκάλυπτε νῦν ποθ' (now at last) ἡμῖν οὕςτινας λέγεις λόγους, Eur. Iph. A. 872. Κἀπειδὴ ἀφίκετό ποτε ὁ Ἵππαρχος.

In interrogations, it expresses impatience for an answer (tandem), or wonder, or emotion in general. τί ποτελέγεις; what do you say? τί ποτε πέπονθας; what (in the world) ails you? πῶς ποτε δράσεις; = how will you do it? τί ποτε (Hom. τίπτ'), what can be the reason that –? Ποίῳ ποτ᾿ ἐχρήσαντο τεκμηρίῳ; Xen. And so in indirect questions: ᾿Εθαύμασα ὅτῳ ποτὲτρόπῳ τοῦτ᾽ ἐγένετο: and with indefinite pronouns, όςτις ποτε, who-ever, &c.: and with εἰ, εἴποτε, if ever, and if perchance. With δή. ὅστις δήποτε, whosoever, ὅπου δή ποτε. δο εἰ δή ποτε. τίδήποτε; τοῦτο πέπρακται νυνὶ ὅπως δή ποτε, no matter how: and with οὖν. Ἐμισθώσατό με ὅστις δή ποτ' οὖν, Æsch. Οὐ δή ποτε in negations interrogatively expressed, surely never-? οὐ δή ποθ᾽ ἡμῖν ξυγγενὴς ἥκειςποθέν; surely it can never be that? Soph. El. 1202. Cf. οὐ δή που.

§ 275.

᾿Αλλά. This adverbial form (distinguished by its accent from pl. neut. ἄλλα) derives its force from the proper signification of ἄλλος = " what there is else remaining after the removal or exclusion of some:" i. e. the notion introduced by ἀλλά is presented as being exclusive of some other preceding notion; or ἀλλά corresponds to a preceding οὐ, expressed or understood.

α) οὐκ ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ σύ. οὐκ ἐάσομεν, ἀλλὰ κωλύσομεν: the second notion excludes the first, to which it stands in direct opposition.

b) αἰσχρὰν γυναῖκ᾽ ἔγημας, ἀλλὰ πλουσίαν. σοφὸς σὺ μάντις, ἀλλὰ τἀδικεῖν φιλῶν. Here the first notion is not expressly excluded, and the ἀλλά introduces, not its direct opposite, but something different. But here also ἀλλά has, in fact, its proper force with reference to a suppressed οὐ; for in this form of sentence the speaker implies, that the first notion, which he concedes, is not the point, but the second is. In the full expression of the thought, there is an opposition by μέν and δέ, with an οὐ in the δέ clause, to which οὐ the ἀλλά corresponds. Thus, τὸ σῶμα δοῦλον, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ νοῦς ἐλεύθερος, the body is enslaved – this indeed (μέν) I grant, but (δέ) not this is the point but (that) the mind is free. Often, to mark the concession more strongly, the μέν is expressed in the first clause: τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα ὠφέλιμον μέν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ δύσκολον, which, however, is by no means simply equivalent to ὠφ. μέν ἐ., δύσκολον δέ, nor does the ἀλλά correspond to the μέν, but to the negation in the suppressed δέ clause. In μέν – δέ, it is intimated that both considerations are taken into the account: in μέν – ἀλλά, the former is conceded only to be set aside. When the second member is negative, the μέν must be expressed, ὠφέλιμον μέν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ καλόν: without μέν, this would = advantageous, and not handsome; see c. – The first also may be negative, e. g. οὐκ ἀρνοῦμαι μέν, ἀλλ᾽ (ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως) ἐρωτῶ; but then the ἀλλά corresponds, not to the expressed, but to the implied negation, viz. not my not denying is the point, but my asking.

c) But the Greek often introduces with ἀλλά a negation in direct opposition to a preceding affirmation: thus, ἐκεῖθεν ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐνθένδε ἡρπάσθη, Pl. Phædr. 229. See other exx. in § 187, to which add: Χαραδριοῦ τινα αὖ σὺ βίον λέγεις, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ νεκροῦ οὐδὲ λίθου, Pl. Gorg. 494. κινδυνεύει τὸ ἑκόντα ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν ἰέναι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀνάγκην περιμένειν, αἰσχρὸν νενομίσθαι, coming forward to rule instead of (and not rather) waiting till one is forced, Pl. Rep. 347. τίς μηχανή – δικαιοσύνην τιμᾶν ἐθέλειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ γελᾶν ἐπαινουμένης ἀκούοντα; ib. 366. φιλοσόφους ἀλλ᾽ οὐ φιλοδόξους κλητέον, ib. 480. ἔπειτ᾿ ἀπὸ ταῤῥοῦ τοὺς θεοὺς ὑπερφρονεῖς, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς; Arist. Nub. The natural expression would be οὐκ ἐνθένδε ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖθεν, &c., but to give greater emphasis to the affirmation by more forcible repudiation of its opposite, which is assumed as having been asserted, or likely to be so, the order is inverted, so that the ἀλλά seems to belong, in a manner, to the preceding clause, and to look backward rather than forward: thence (quite another thing that!), not hence. But the true explanation (which reduces this to the form a) is this: ἐκεῖθεν ἡρπάσθη· οὐκ (ὡς σὺ λέγεις, οι, ὡς ᾠόμεθα, or the like) ἐνθένδε, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐνθένδε, thence-not as people might suppose, "hence" but " not hence." This explanation accounts for the irony which commonly appears in this use. Comp. ὑμεῖς– μάλιστ᾽ ἂν οὕτως– εὐδοκιμοῖτε καὶ οὐκ ἐπαινοῖσθε -· ἡμεῖς τ᾽ αὖ μάλιστ᾽ ἂν οὕτως εὐφραινοίμεθα οὐχ ἡδοίμεθα, Pl. Prot.

τὸ δὲ 337, followed in each instance by an explanation: τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐδοκιμεῖν....,

ἐπαινεῖσθαι... &c. Here is no irony: had such been the case, tre full form would have been, εὐδοκιμοῖτε καὶ οὐκ ἐπαινοῖσθε ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐπαινοῖσθε, = “ and the case would be, not a being praised, but a not being praised;" whence, the negative statement being suppressed, the form would be εὐδοκ. ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐπαινοῖσθε.

REM. This use of ἀλλ' οὐ must be distinguished from the but not -, which is opposed to a preceding μέν; see b: e. g. prof itable indeed, but not handsome, ὠφέλιμον μέν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ καλόν, which is better expressed, οὐ μέντοι (οι μὲν δὴ) καλόν γε.

§ 276.

οὐ μόνον – ἀλλὰ καὶ –, not only, but also - (the ἀλλά in direct opposition to οὐ, the καί = καὶ -, καὶ -), sometimes with the addition πρὸς τούτῳ, οι τούτοις. When the καί is omitted, the notioncontained in the first member is entirely put aside. Thus, in οὐ μόνον ἐκινδύνευσεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔπαθεν, not only was he in danger, but he (both was in danger, and) also suffered, an equal stress is laid on both notions: but in the same sentence without καί, on arriving at the second notion, we think it so important, that we reject the intention with which here also we set out, viz. of putting the notions (ἐκινδ. and ἔπαθε) on the same level by (καὶ -,) καὶ -.

§ 277.

a) When ἀλλά follows conditional clauses with εἰ, εἰ μή, &c., it may be rendered by yet, yet at least = saltem, certe. This case comes under b, viz. the ἀλλά refers to a suppressed apodosis with μέν δέ. Εἰ σῶμα δοῦλον, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ νοῦς ἐλεύθερος: the suppressed apodosis is ἔστω μὲν δοῦλον, to which ἀλλά refers in the manner explained above. So εἰ μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ πολλά γε ἴστε. (Comp. si mihi bona republica frui non licuerit, atcarebo mala.) This ἀλλά is often followed by οὖν (even so, all one for that, &c.; see § 266). Εἰ καὶ μὴ καθ' Ἑλλάδα τεθράμμεθ', ἀλλ᾽ οὖν ξυνετά μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν (Eur.). ἦν καὶ τὴν φύσιν καταδεεστέραν ἔχωσιν ἀλλ᾽ οὖν ταῖς γ᾽ ἐμπειρίαις... προέχουσιν (Isoc.).

REM. ἀλλά γε, in direct combination, perhaps never occurs (in fact this would = no yes); but ye, as in the preceding instances, heightens the antithetic word.

b) By an ellipsis of the conditional clause, ἀλλά comes to stand in the middle of a sentence: αὐτή γε νοῦν σχὲς ἀλλὰ τῷ χρόνῳ ποτέ (Soph.), the suppressed clause being, εἰ μὴ πρότερον. So, frequently, άλ

ἀλλὰ νῦν γε, ἀλλὰ νῦν γ᾽ ἔτι (Dem.). βούλομαι αὐτὸν διδάξαι, ἄν πως ἀλλὰ νῦν γε παιδευθῇ (Lys.). ὦ θεοὶ πατρῷοι ξυγγένεσθέ γ' ἀλλὰ νῦν, Soph. El. 411. In like manner ἀλλ᾽ οὖν: τοὺς πρώτους χρόνους ἀλλ᾽ οὖν προσεποιοῦνθ᾽ ὑμῖν φίλοι εἶναι (Esch.), (if they were not really so) at any rate they pretended.

§ 278.

Often ἀλλά stands at the beginning of a speech, either in opposition to something advanced or supposed to be advanced by another, or to some unexpressed thought of the speaker: viz. in quick, abrupt replies; in starting an objection, orin approbation and assent (§ 199 c, R. 2), in exclamations, exhortations, &c., especially when the discourse is suddenly interrupted and something new is introduced. Εὐριπίδη, Εὐριπίδιον, ὑπάκουσον, εἴπερ πώποτ᾽ ἀνθρώπων τινί. “ ἀλλ᾽ οὐ σχολή " (I hear,) but-. ἀλλ᾽ ἐκκυκλήθητ᾽ (If so,) why then, do' let yourself be rolled out (on the eccyclema). “ ἀλλ᾽ ἀδύνατον.” ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως, Nay, do though! ἀλλ᾽ ἐκκυκλήσομαι, καταβαίνειν δ᾽ οὐ σχολή, Why then, I will -, Arist. Ach. 404. τίνα καὶ ἀναβιβάσωμαι δεησόμενον ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ; τὸν πατέρα; ἀλλὰ τέθνηκεν. ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀδελφούς; ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ τοὺς παῖδας; ἀλλ᾽ οὔπω γεγένηνται, My father? Nay, but he's dead. Well then, my brothers? Why, I have none. My children then? (Andoc.). In Xen., Clearchus begins a speech with, ᾿Αλλ᾽ ὤφελε μὲν Κῦρος ζῆν, ἐπεὶ δὲ τετελεύτηκεν -, Well, I would Cyrus were alive -. And the same author even begins his Sympos. with ᾿Αλλ᾿ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ -, where the ἀλλά refers to considerations which he has been turning over in his mind; Well, after all, it does seem to me -.

ἀλλ᾽ ἄρα: εἰπέ μοι, ἔστι σοι ἀγρός; “ οὐκ ἔμοιγε.” ἀλλ᾽ ἄρα οἰκία προσόδους ἔχουσα; (you don't say so!) well then - ?

§ 279.

ἀλλ' ἦ; a question with surprise or perplexity, the dada denoting difference from what the enquirer expected: ἀλλ᾽ ἡ δόλον τιν', ὦ ξέν, ἀμφί μοι πλέκεις; why how (is this)? -Æsch. Choeph. 214. ἀλλ᾽ ἦ, τὸ λεγόμενον, κατόπιν τῆς ἑορτῆς ἥκομεν καὶ ὑστεροῦμεν; (Pl.) οὗτος, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ παραπαίεις; (Luc.)

Ιη ἀλλὰ δή, δῆτα, μέν, μὲν δή, μέν τοι, τοι, μήν, both particles have their distinct force, which is not affected by their concurrence in the same sentence.

ἀλλὰ γάρ (comp. § 196 b) is often elliptical, the sentence to which ἀλλά belongs being left to be gathered from the context. ᾿Αλλ᾽, ἡδὺ γάρ τοι κτῆμα τῆς νίκης λαβεῖν, τόλμα, where the sentence is completed by τόλμα (Soph.). ἴσως Ἐρινύς ἐστιν ἐκ τραγωδίας, βλέπει γέ τοι μανικόν τε καὶ τραγωδικόν. “ ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔχει γὰρ δᾷδας,” 1. θ. ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ Ἐ., οὐκ ἔχει γὰρ δ. (Arist.). ἀλλ᾽ ἔστ ἔμοιγ' υἱὸς καλός τε κἀγαθός ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐθέλει γὰρ μανθάνειν, where ἀλλὰ – γάρ seems to be a mere colloquialism = attamen, as the context contains nothing from which the sentence with ἀλλά may be completed (e. g. but what's the use of that?). In familiar discourse, the two particles may come together: εἰ ἐγὼ Φαῖδρον ἀγνοῶ, καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπιλέλησμαι· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδέτερα ἔστι τούτων, εὐ οἶδα ὅτι οὐχ ἅπαξ ἤκουσεν (Pl. = ἀλλὰ Φαῖδρον οὐκ ἀγνοῶ· οὐ γὰρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπιλέλησμαι· οὐδέτερα ἔστι τούτων).

§ 280.

In the combinations οὐ μὴν ἀλλά, οὐ μέντοι ἀλλά, and (much less frequent) οὐ γὰρ by ἀλλά, there is always an ellipsis (§ 215 b, R. 2), which may sometimes be supplied

repeating the preceding verb to οὐ μήν, &c. ὁ ἵππος πίπτει εἰς γόνατα, καὶ μικροῦ κἀκεῖνον ἐξετραχήλισεν· οὐ μὴν (supply ἐξετραχήλισεν) ἀλλὰ ἐπέμεινεν ὁ Κῦρος μόλις πως, the horse came down on his knees, and was within a little of throwing C. over his head; not [that he did throw him], however, but C. managed somehow to keep his seat (Xen.). μὴ σκῶπτέ μ᾽, ὠδέλφ᾽, οὐ γὰρ ἀλλ᾽ ἔχω κακῶς = οὐ γὰρ ὥστε σκώπτειν, for it is no jeering matter this, but I am indeed in a miserable condition. But sometimes the notion of opposition is too vague to be supplied, and the combination may be regarded as a colloquialism, οὐ μὴν (and μέντοι) ἀλλά = veruntamen, attamen, οὐ γὰρ ἀλλά (etenim: nearly = καὶ γάρ). τούτων ἀληθῆ μέν ἐστι τὰ πολλά, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως οὐχ ἡδέα ἀκούειν (Dem. where only ἡδέα could be supplied).

§ 281.

ἀλλ´ἤ. The union of these two particles after negations, direct or implied, is explainedby a union of two constructions. Οὐδένα ὁρῶ ἀλλὰ σε, may be strengthened by the insertion of ἄλλον, I see none other, but (I see) thee. But this sensemay also be expressed, with a slight difference, by οὐδένα ἄλλον ὁρῶ ἢ σέ, I see none-other-than thee; and with omission of the ἄλλον, οὐδένα ὁρῶ ἡ σέ. The two forms combined (whichwas the more natural by reason of the affinity which the particle ἀλλά, in respect of its origin, has for ἤ) result in the forms, οὐδένα ἄλλον ὁρῶ ἀλλ᾽ ἢ σέ, I see none other except that (I see) thee: in which, if we would express the force of both particles, we must say, I see none other than thee, but (I see) thee, or, I see none other, but I see (thee, and none other) than thee; and with omission of ἄλλον, οὐδένα ὁρῶ ἀλλ᾽ ἢ σέ. The combination originating in this simplest form of sentence finds its way into more complex enunciations.

In the neuter, it may often be doubted whether the wording is οὐδὲν ἀλλ᾽ ἤ = ἀλλὰ ἤ οι οὐδὲν ἄλλ᾽ ἤ = ἄλλο ἤ.

In the ellipsis of the verb (γίνεται, or the like) to οὐδέν (§ 215 b, R. 1), there is no doubt that the word is ἄλλο: thus, οὖς φαμεν μανθάνειν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἀναμιμνή σκονται (Pl. = οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποιοῦσιν ἢ -): whence οὐδὲν ἄλλ᾽ ἢ (not ἀλλ᾽ ἢ) προσκυ νεῖν ὑπελάμβανον, whether it be, I(did) nothing other than suppose him to bepraying, or, I supposed him to be (doing) nothing other than praying. In many other cases, the form ἄλλο is easily supposable: e. g. in ἐγὼ γὰρ δι᾽ οὐδὲν, ἄλλ᾽ ἢ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔσχηκα (Pl.), it is as natural to suppose the word to be ἄλλο, by none other thing than by -, as that it is ἀλλά. Only where an ἄλλος is expressed in the first member, it may seem more natural to assume the form to be ἀλλ᾽ ἤ: thus, οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ τὸ ἄριστον (Pl.). Madvig, however, conceives the true reading tobe, in all cases, ἄλλ᾽ ἤ; see § 91, R. 2. To the examples there cited, add: οὐδὲν γὰρ, ἔστ᾽ ἀλλ᾽ (ἄλλ', Brunck) ἢ κοάξ, Arist. Ran. 227. ἀργύριον μὲν οὐκ ἔχω, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ μικρόν τι, Xen. An. 7,7,53. ὡς δ᾽ οὐχὶ φιλεῖ σ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἔστ᾽ εὔνους, τοῦτ᾽ αὐτό σε πρῶτα διδάξω, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ διὰ τοῦτ᾽ αὖθ᾽ ὁτίη σου τῆς ἀνθρακιᾶς ἀπολαύει, Arist. Eq.779. μηδαμοῦ ἀλλόθι – ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ἐκεῖ (Pl.). μηδαμῶς ἄλλως – ἀλλ᾽ ἢ - (Isocr). In questions implying negation: τίς ἂν εἰς ἄλλο τι ἀποβλέψας ἢ δειλὴν ἢ ἀνδρείαν πόλιν εἴποι, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ εἰς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος; Pl. Rep. 429. τίνος ἕνεκα κἄν τις – ζώῃ ἀλλ᾽ ἡ τῶν τοιούτων ἡδονῶν ἕνεκα; Pl.

§ 282.

Sometimes ἀλλ᾽ ἤ results from confusion of οὐκ – ἀλλά with the elliptical οὐδὲν ἄλλο (γίγνεται, &c.) ἤ. Thus, οὐ δ᾽ οἶδε γ' εἶλκον οὐδὲν ᾿Αργεῖοι πάλαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ κατεγέλων τῶν ταλαιπωρουμένων – οὐδὲ εἶλκον ἀλλὰ κατεγέλων, and οὐδὲν ἐποίουν ἄλλο ή κατεγέλων, Arist. Pac.476. μή μοι μυρίους μηδὲ διςμυρίους ξένους, μηδὲ τὰς ἐπιστολιμαίους ταύτας δυνάμεις, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ τῆς πόλεως ἔσται, Dem. Phil. 45, 19, which Krüger explains as a union of the two constructions, an army must consist, not of mercenaries, nor -, but of citizens, and, not of mercenaries, &c., nor of other than citizens, = μηδὲ λέγε ἄλλας δυνάμεις ἢ τῆς πόλεως.

ἀλλά without ἤ: οὔτι μοι αἴτιος ἄλλος, ἀλλὰ τοκῆε δύω (Hom.). ἔπαισε δ᾽ αὐτόχειρ νιν οὔτις ἀλλ᾽ ἐγὼ, Soph. Ed. T. 1355. (ἀλλ᾽ ἤ is colloquial, therefore does not occur in Tragedy.) ἐν δὲ τῷ μέσῳ ἄλλη μὲν πόλις οὐδεμία οὔτε φιλία, οὔτε Ἑλληνίς, ἀλλὰ Θρᾷκες καὶ Βιθυνοί, Xen. An. 6, 2 (al. 4), 2. μηδένα ἕτερον εἶναι τὸν Νικομήδου φονέα ἀλλ᾽ ᾿Αρίσταρχον, Dem. Mid. 554. And in interrogation: ἢ ἔχετέ τι ἄλλο τέλος λέγειν, εἰς ὁ ἀποβλέψαντες αὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ καλεῖτε, ἀλλὰ (Steph. ex conj. ἀλλ᾽ ἤ) ἡδονάς τε καὶ λύπας, Pl. Prot. 354.

ἢ without ἀλλ᾽: τί ποιῶν ἢ εὐωχούμενος ἐν Θετταλία; Pl. Crito, 53 E. ἀλλὰ τί οὖν τούτων ἐστὶν αἴτιον, ἢ ὅτι -; Xen. Econ. 3, 3. σκοπῶ εἰ ἄρα τι ἐστὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἔργον, ἢ ἀνθρώπους θεραπεύειν, Xen. Mem. 4, 3, 9 (meaning, that he inclines to think that the gods have no (other) work than -).

§ 283.

ἤ, or, than. The original force of this particle (radically cognate with ve, ve-l, and possiblya mutilated form of the relative-comp. the use of the Lat. quam in comparison), is how, in what manner, as, in correlation (comp. ἢ μέν– ἢ δέ, ἠδέ, § 242), but always with the notion of other-ness: ἢ ἐγώ, ἢ σύ, prop. other-how I, other-how thou. Hence

In alternatives: ἤ - ἤ is both aut - aut and vel – vel: ἢ ἀμφαδὸν ἠὲ κρυφηδόν. ἢ τέον ἢ Αἴαντος γέρας, ἢ Ὀδυσῆος. Often the first ἤ is omitted, then ἤ = aut etiam, usually with a descensus a majore ad minus, viz. to something conceived as less likely: ἔξομεν κλέος καλῶς θανόντες ἢ καλῶς σεσωσμένοι, having nobly died, or - if that be possible - nobly saved, Eur. Or. 1145. ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐκεῖνος ᾤετο δεῖν ἀποθνήσκειν ἢ νικᾶν, aut, si fieri posset, vincere.-In Attic, the disjunction is often rendered stronger by τοι (usually followed by a ye) attached to the first ἤ, rarely to the second: ἤτοι ὅλου τοῦ εἴδους ἢ μέρους (Pl.). ἤτοι ἐπιστάμενοί γε – ἢ ὕστερον ἀναμιμνήσκονται (Pl.). ἤτοι πρότερόν γε ἢ ὕστερον (Pl.). And without the first ἤ: ἔοικας, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἤτοι ἡμῶν γε οὐδὲν κήδεσθαι, Like enough, said I (viz. that you do think so), or else (sure enough) you don't care for us, Pl. Rep. 344 (Stallb. in l.).

When the first member of the alternative is not expressed, ἤ = or (else), alias, alioquin.

αὕτη μὲν ἐκμοχθοῦσα κερκίσιν πέπλους, ἢ γυμνὸν ἕξω σῶμα (= as I must either do this, or else-), Eur. El. 306. τοῦτο δὲ οὔτ᾽ ἀπόλλυσθαι οὔτε γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν, ἢ (supply ἀναγκαῖον, or else needs must -) πάντα τε οὐρανὸν πᾶσάν τε γένεσιν συμπεσοῦσαν στῆναι, Pl. Phædr. 245. (Cic. renders it, vel concidat omne cælum omnisque natura. See further, § 186, R.)

§ 284.

In alternative (double) questions, Hom. has ἤ - ἤ -; (rare in Attic poetry): in later writers, especially Attic, πότερον - ἤ -; or the particle is omitted in the first clause, see § 199 c: and on ἆρα - ἤ -; ib. R.: also on ἄλλο τι ἤ, ἄλλο τι ἢ οὐ, ib. b. On ἤ - ἤ for εἰ - ἤ, in dependent questions, ib. c, R. 1. Sometimes, after a question put quite generally and indefinitely, a second is put with ἤ (an) with corrective or restrictive force = or, which I suppose is nearer to the truth -? πόθεν ἥκει; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ἐξ ἀγορᾶς; (Pl.) ἀλλὰ τίς σοι διηγεῖτο; ἢ αὐτὸς Σωκράτης, Pl. Conv. 173 (Stallb. in l. and Elmsl. on Soph. Ed. C. 66).

REM. When the second member of the disjunctive question is negative, this is expressed by ἢ οὐ, if the predicate, and by ἢ μή if only a part of the sentence, is negatived.

§ 285.

In comparison, after comparatives, and words implying comparison or opposition, ἄλλος, ἕτερος, ἐναντίος, &c., ἤ = than (quam, Germ. als, both illustrating the connexion of ἤ with the relative: our "than " is demonstrative, = " then"); see 89, sqq. Οη μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ, § 89, R. 2, cf. Herm. on Soph. Aj. 1260, where it is explained, that the last of the exx. above given (Thuc. 3, 36) is equivalent to οὐ τοὺς αἰτίους ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὴν πόλιν ὅλην. – (This union of two constructions resembles that which we have noticed above in οὐδεὶς ἄλλος ἀλλ᾽ ἤ.)

§ 286.

οὐ and μή. For the distinction and use of these particles, see § 200 sqq., and the §§ there referred to (cf. Index):[1] on οὐδέ, μηδέ, οὔτε, μήτε, see §§ 208, 216, 229 c.

[1]: Οὐ appears to be cognate with αὐ, ἀπό, ab, aut, haud, therefore primarily denotes separation or removal, reversal or contrast. Μή, although it coincides to a considerable extent with ne, appears to have a different origin from that particle (Sanscrit mā, Persian me, both prohibitive). It seems to stand on the same line with the pronoun of the first person, μέ, and with μά, μείς, μέν, &c.: but perhaps its peculiar force, as the particle of subjective denial, is best derived from the labial expression of rejection, dislike, impatience, &c., possibly with some notion of the first pers. pronoun in it, " I will not have it," or the like.

All the applications of μή may be derived from the prohibitive.

Μὴ τύπτε, μὴ τύψῃς. It is not, on the whole, indifferent which form is used. "Μή with imperative, enjoins the giving over something that a person is doing (or thinking of doing): with aor. subj., the not beginning it is ordered. Moreover, the present is used of a continued act, as μὴ βάλλετε: the aor. of a quickly transient, momentary act, μὴ βάλῃς, when a single throwing of the weapon is in question." Hermann. ad Viger. § 268, p. 809. The reason why the imperative phrase (in second pers.) must always be μὴ τύπτε, not μὴ τύψον, is, because the direct actual prohibition of a thing prohibits it, not as a single momentary act, but once for all. In μὴ τύπτε, μή expresses the prohibiting, τύπτε the act prohibited: in μὴ τύψῃς, there is an intermediate verbal notion, viz. an imperative: e. g. μὴ λέγε, μὴ ἐννόει, μὴ βούλου, or the like (or rather, the μή itself is the expression of such a verbal notion, "I will not have it," &c.), on which the subjunctive, as a form of the future, is dependent: e. g. "do not let the thought come into your mind, that you will strike." And because such a form of prohibition is more distinctly related to the future, therefore (cf. 128) the subj. aor. is used, not the subj. present. (Besides, μὴ τύπτῃς would be a circuitous way of expressing what is better said by μὴ τύπτε.) But μὴ τυψάτω is allowable, § 142, R. 1, though rare: for here, as in μὴ τυπτέτω, the verb has relation to a suppressed imperative, just as we are obliged to express the third pers. imperative by the verb let: μὴ (let - not) τυπτέτω (strike).

§ 287.

The construction of μή with the indicative and subj. in independent sentences is always to be referred to this principle of an unexpressed imperative. Thus in the question μὴ γράψεις; " do not say (think, &c.), you will write " = " surely you will not write?” (μή introduces a question to which we wish, but are not confident of receiving, an answer in the negative: with μῶν, we express a confidence that the answer will be, “ no ”). But λέξεις δὲ μηδὲν τῶν ἐμοὶ δεδογμένων, Eur. Med. 804: but you will (not) tell-do not think of it!-aught of what I have resolved upon; an assertion having the force of an express prohibition. ᾿Αλλ᾽ οὖν προμηνύσειςγε τοῦτο μηδενί, Soph. Ant. 84, with the same emphasis of entreaty or dehortation expressed by the following μηδενί, do not think of doing so (no, not) to anybody! The principle is the same for the subjunctive, which is in its origin only another form of the future:[1] but in the usage of the language, μηδὲν λέξῃς, μηδενὶ προμηνύσῃς has come to be merely the expression of a prohibition, as above explained; whereas the fut. indic. asserts that which will be. Καὶ τἀμὰ τεύχη μήτ᾿ ἀγωνάρχαι τινὲς θήσουσ᾽ ᾿Αχαιοῖς μήθ᾽ ὁ λυμεὼν ἐμός, Soph. Aj. 569 (" admodum notabilis hæc ratio particulæ cum fut. indic. positæ," Ellendt.; but the explanation is obvious on the principle here given, viz.), "and as for my arms, do not imagine (that) either-:" it is an emphatic negation.- So with subj. μὴ δοκῶμεν, and let us not think, where μή = the imperative " do not let.” ὦ ξεῖνοι, μὴ δῆτ᾽ ἀδικηθῶ, Soph. Oed. C. 172.

[1]: Thus, Od. 16, 437, οὐκ ἔσθ᾽ οὗτος ἀνήρ, οὐδ᾽ ἔσσεται, οὐδὲ γένηται (cf. Pl. Rep. 472, οὔτε γὰρ γίγνεται, οὔτε γέγονεν, οὐδὲ οὖν μή ποτε γένηται) ὃς κεν Τηλεμάχῳ σῷ υἱεῖ χεῖρας ἐποίσει: comp. Od. 6, 201, οὐκ ἔσθ' οὗτος ἀνὴρ διερὸς βροτός, οὐδὲ γένηται, ὅς κεν Φαιήκων ἀνδρῶν ἐς γαῖαν ἵκηται.

With the proper optative, e. g. μὴ νῦν ὀναίμην, Soph. Ed. Τ. 644. μὴ δῆτα – ἴδοιμι ταύτην ἡμέραν, ib. 830, the suitableness of μή, as expression of not wishing, is obvious.

§ 288.

With the adj., as also infin. and particip. of the verb, " μή, non reapse negat sed jubet cogitari negatum," Frank. Diss. de Partic. negant. i., p. 8. Τὸ μὴ καλόν, “ the (do not call, think it, &c.) good:” αἰσχρὸν (τὸ) μὴ βοηθεῖν (if one does not–), μὴ βοηθῶν, ὁ μὴ βοηθῶν. See § 205, 6. For μή with inf. after verbs of denying, &c., see § 210. Comp. under μὴ οὐ.

§ 289.

In sentences dependent on verbs denoting fear, anxiety, consideration, &c. (see §124, and R. 1, 2), the μή is evidently in its place as the expression of not wishing, and has the same force as in the independent sentence. φοβοῦμαι μὴ εὑρήσομεν: without φοβοῦμαι, (do) not (say) we shall find, i. e. I hope we shall not: in φοβοῦμαι, the nature of the unwillingness is expressed: I am afraid (we shall). And so with the subj., δέδοικα μὴ ἐπιλαθώμεθα. Φροντίζω μὴ κράτιστον ᾖ. –Hence the absence of δέδοικα, &c., is not necessarily elliptical. Μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἢ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, do not say it is, I fear it may be. - In the usage of the language, φοβοῦμαι μὴ ἔστι is, I fear it is: φοβοῦμαι μὴ ᾖ, I fear it may turn out to be: φοβοῦμαι μὴ ἔσται, I fear (I think with fear) it certainly will be. - The same principle holds for the optative under the same circumstances, § 131, e. g. ἔδεισαν μὴ προσαγάγοιεν = the præteritive enunciation of φοβοῦνται μὴ προσαγάγωσιν.

§ 290.

With ὁρᾷν, and the like, μή seems to have more interrogative force. Ὁρῶμεν, μὴ Νικίας οἴεται, you do not say N. thinks? (surely he does not think?) let us see whether he does. Ὅρα μὴ τίθης, see whether you are putting: ὅρα μὴ τιθῇς, see whether it may not turn out that you are putting: ὅρα μὴ θήσεις, see whether you will be putting.

§ 291.

In sentences of intention, § 122, ἵνα, ὅπως, &c., μή, and object-sentences after verbs of endeavour, &c., § 123, the μή has the same force as in the prohibitive sentence, e. g. τὴν γέφυραν λῦσαι ὡς μὴ διαβῆτε, the primary sentence being, " Μὴ διαβῶσιν, let them not cross."

§ 292.

The use of μή in conditional (εἰ μή), § 202, temporal (ὅταν, ὁπότε μή), and, generally, relative sentences (ὅς, ὅσος, &c., ὃς ἄν, &c., μή), ib. and 203, is determined by the thought, " no notion of," " not to be supposed," or the like. Thus, εἰ μὴ δώσου σιν = " in case there be no notion of their giving;” but εἰ οὐ δώσουσιν, “ in case of their not-giving: " i. e. the difference is the same as that between μὴ δώσω = don't suppose I shall give, and οὐ δώσω, I shall not give: of which the former is obviously more suitable to the hypothetical form of statement with εἰ, εάν. Hence also with ὅς, ὅσος, &c., ὅτε, ὁπότε, &c., the principle is that μή is used when there is room for supposition in each case that the thing does (will, &c.) occur, or that it does (will, &c.) not, but the supposition of its occurrence is negatived. Thus, ὃς οὐκ οἶδεν, "a person who (as matter of fact) knows not,” ὃς μὴ οἶδεν, " who (as matter of necessary supposition) knows not: " in the one case, the εἰδέναι is denied directly; in the other, there is implied a previous consideration, μὴ οἶδεν, “ do not suppose he knows," whence ὃς μὴ οἶδεν, “ the sort of person that does not know: ” ἃ μὴ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἴομαι εἰδέναι, " what I know not," = " if there are things that I do not know," or, " say I do not know them." And just so with ὅτε and other adv. forms of the relative. - With ἄν (ὃς ἄν, ὅταν, &c.) the negation is necessarily μή, in virtue of the notion of contingency conveyed by that particle.

§ 293.

In § 124, R. 4, the use of οὐ μή with second pers. fut. indic. denoting peremptory prohibition, is distinguished from that (ib. R. 3) which, with subjunct. or also fut. indic., expresses a strong negation in the form of an assertion. In the latter, the μή is usually explained as referring to a suppressed verb or verbal notion, e. g. δέδοικα, δέος ἐστί, which is negatived by οὐ: comp. the full expression οὐ γὰρ ἦν δεινὸν μὴ ἁλῷ ποτε, Hdt. 1,84, with καὶ τῶνδ᾽ ἀκούσας οὗ τι μὴ ληφθῶ δολῷ: while the former, e. g. οὐ μὴ ληρήσεις, is explained as, “ will you not not-trifle? " = " will you not have done with your nonsense? " But both phrases are referable to the same origin, and (considered in themselves) admit alike of the interrogative or of the assertive notion, i. e. on the one hand, οὐ μὴ ληρήσεις may be, “ no, don't think you will (shall) talk nonsense,” a union of οὐ ληρήσεις, with μὴ ληρήσεις (= μὴ ληρήσῃς): on the other, οὔ τι μὴ ληφθῶ (= ληφθήσομαι), “ shall I not-be-taken? " i. e. " shall I not be safe from being taken? " (Cf. Herm. Cens. Elmsl. in Eur. Med.) In the practice of the language, however, the οὐ μή of prohibition with second pers. is best understood interrogatively; in other cases, οὐ μὴ is assertive. Thus, in the exx. given in § 124, R. 4, and Eur. Bacch. 340, οὐ μὴ προσοίσεις χεῖρα, βακχεύσεις δ᾽ ἰών, μηδ᾽ ἐξομόρξει μωρίαν τὴν σὴν ἐμοί; where the groundwork of the sentence is οὐ βακχεύσεις; will you not go, play the Bacchanal? into which μὴ προσοίσεις χεῖρα, do not imagine you shall lay your hand upon me, is inserted, and μηδ' ἐξ., &c., is added as opposition. But in Soph. Ed. C. 173,οὔτοι μή ποτέ σ᾽ ἐκ τῶνδ᾽ ἑδράνων, ὦ γέρον, ἄκοντά τις ἄξει, the interrogative form is evidently not intended, and the sense is," no, assuredly! do not imagine, do notfear, &c. (= μή) that any shall carry thee off, &c." The usage of the language would rather require ἄξῃ (ἀγάγῃ), but the thought prominent at last in the speaker's mind is οὐκ ἄξει: hence the future indic. = " do not imagine that the thing shall be; it shall not be." So Ed. C. 848, οὔκουν ποτ᾿ ἐκ τούτοιν γε μὴ σκήπτροιν ἔτι ὁδοιπορήσεις -, where, though the verb is in the second person, οὐ μή is assertive, not prohibitive; you shall not have these do not imagine it-as props in your wayfarings, and the assertion is stronger than with ὁδοιπορήσῃς. Soph. El. 1052, ἀλλ᾽ εἴσιθ · οὔ σοι μὴ μεθέψομαί ποτε, οὐδ᾽ ἦν σφόδρ᾽ ἱμείρουσα τοῦτο τυγχάνης, the fut. indic., as in the preceding instance, because the action is negatived for all future time. Arist. Ran. 508, μὰ τὸν ᾿Απόλλω, οὐ μή σ᾽ ἐγὼ περιόψομαι ἀπελθόντα, an asseveration beginning in the usual form, μὰ τὸν ᾿Α. οὐ, and strengthened by the prohibition of imagining the contrary [1]. - In the dependent sentence, ἐθέσπισεν ὡς οὐ μή ποτε πέρσοιεν, Soph. Phil. 607, represents οὐ μή ποτε πέρσουσι of oratio recta. So acc. c. inf., σαφῶς γὰρ εἶπε Τειρεσίας, οὐ μή ποτε σοῦ τήνδε γῆν οἰκοῦντος εὐ πράξειν πόλιν, Eur. Phœn. 1606.

[1] The pres. subj. is rare: οὐ μὴ δύνωμαι (Xen.), and οὐ μὴ οἷός τ᾿ ἧς (Pl.), are not conclusive instances, since these verbs have no aor., and, besides, δύνασθαι and οἷόν τ' εἶναι have in themselves the future signification which is required in this phrase. In Soph. Ed. C. 1023, the text is uncertain: οὓς οὐ μή ποτε χώρας φυγόντες τῆςδ᾽ ἐπεύχωνται, al. ἐπεύξωνται, for the ἐπεύχονται of the MSS. Ellendt receives ἐπεύχωνται, in the sense, " are now giving thanks to the gods," viz. " because Theseus surmises the persons to be already taken: with ἐπεύξονται or ἐπεύξωνται, he would imply, that they would be taken;" and so Hermann in 1.; but Schneidewin reads, οὓς οὐ δή ποτε, and ἐπεύχονται. As regards the principle, there is no reason why the vulg. should not be retained, viz. μή and ἐπεύχονται, " they are not – never imagine it! - giving thanks -."

§ 294.

The usage of μὴ οὐ is derived from that of μή prefixed to a verb negatived by οὐ.

In the independent sentence, this combination does not occur with the indicative, i. e. not μὴ οὐ γράφεις; you do not say you are not writing? but only μῶν οὐ: thus, ἐν οἷς τί χρῆν ποιεῖν ἐμέ; μῶν οὐχ ὅπερ ἐποίουν; Soph. Ed. C. 1727. But with the subjunctive in a form of sentence which may be considered as elliptical (cf. § 289), we have μὴ οὖν, ἔφη, οὐ δύνωμαι ἐγὼ... ἐξηγήσασθαι; you do not say I am not to be able? Xen. Mem. 4, 2, 12. ἡμῖν δὲ... μὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκεπτέον ᾖ, where the supposed ellipsis is ὅρα, Pl. Crito, 48.-In the dependent sentence, δέδοικα μὴ οὐκ ἀποθάνῃ, ἐδεδ. μὴ οὐκ ἀποθάνοι, δέδοικα μὴ οὐ τέθνηκεν, require no further explanation.

§ 295.

With the inf., see § 211, comp. § 210. Here observe that (1) οὐκ ἀρνοῦμαι οὕτως εἶναι represents the simple assertion οὕτως ἔστιν, with negation of denial, οὐκ ἀρνοῦμαι. (2) In ἀρνοῦμαι μὴ οὕτως εἶναι, there is a union of ἀρνοῦμαι οὕτως εἶναι with μὴ οὕτως ἔστιν, you do not say that it is so? or with φημὶ μὴ οὕτως εἶναι: the phrase is therefore stronger than (1), viz. = both I deny that it is so, and, I have no notion that it is so; and, the whole phrase being negatived, οὐκ ἀ. μὴ οὕτως εἶναι = I do not deny that it is so, and, I would not have you imagine that it is not so, which is equivalent to contendo ita esse. (3) Lastly, οὐκ ἀρνοῦμαι μὴ οὐχ οὕτως εἶναι may be referred to a union of οὐκ ἀρνοῦμαι οὕτως εἶναι and μὴ οὐχ οὕτως ἔστιν, you do not say that it is not so? In this construction, the leading verb must be expressly or virtually (by interrogation) negatived, or must contain a negative notion, δεινόν, αἰσχρόν, αἰσχύνη, &c. (cf. § 211 b): thus, οὔτε μὴ μεμνῆσθαι δύναμαι αὐτοῦ, οὔτε μεμνημένος μὴ οὐκ ἐπαινεῖν (Xen. Apol. fin.), where μὴ μεμνῆσθαι is the necessary infinitive form of οὐ μέμνημαι, and μὴ οὐκ ἐπαινεῖν of μὴ οὐκ ἐπαινέσω: you do not imagine I am not to praise him? Impossible (not to do so).[1]

[1]: "Per μή certo, per μὴ οὐ dubitantius negatur," Hermann ad Vig. p. 797. But in many places, the meaning is rather that of wondering or indignant repudiation of the opposite notion, e. g. οὐδ᾽ ἐθέλω προλιπεῖν τόδε, μὴ οὐ τὸν ἐμὸν στοναχεῖν πατέρ ἄθλιον, Soph. El. 131; I will not forego or desert this sad duty – you do not imagine that I should not bewail, &c.? Hence (as H. also suggests) its force may be rendered by mirum foret, ni –.

§ 296.

With the participle, μὴ οὐ (rare in Attic prose, § 211 c) will be found to involve the same relation to μὴ οὐ with the indicative = you do not suppose, &c., that – not –? Thus, οὐκ ἂν ἀξιόπιστος εἴην μὴ οὐχὶ πρότερον αὐτὸς φανεὶς οἷός εἰμι: with οὐ only, this sentence, reduced to its simplest form, is οὐ πρ. φανείς –, οὐκ ἀξ., "a person not first showing himself what he is, is a person not worthy of credit:" with μή only, οὐκ ἀ. ἂν εἴην, μὴ πρ. φανείς: both expressions are united upon the basis of the expression μὴ οὐ πρ. ἐφάνην, you do not suppose I have not first showed myself? so that the whole is not simply = without first showing myself, which would be sufficiently expressed by μή alone, but together with this, as it is not to be supposed that I should not. So Soph. Ed. T. 13, δυσάλγητος γὰρ ἂν εἴην τοιάνδε μὴ οὐ κατοικτείρων ἕδραν, without οὐ [2], the sense would be, εἰ μὴ κατοικτείροιμι, with it δυσάλγ. must be resolved into a negative expression, and we have then οὐ κατοικτείρων, οὐκ εὐάλγητος: οὐκ εἴην ἂν εὐάλγ. μὴ κατοικτείρων: and, as the basis of their union, μὴ οὐ κατοικτείρω, you do not imagine that I do not take pity? Soph. Ed. C. 359, ἥκεις γὰρ οὐ κενή γε, τοῦτ᾽ ἐγὼ σαφῶς ἐξοῖδα, μὴ οὐχὶ δεῖμ᾽ ἐμοὶ φέρουσά τι: the negation is οὐ κενή, and this is taken up and enlarged upon in the last clause, which, however, is formed as if the negation were οὐχ ἥκεις: thou comest not empty – (not) without being the bearer – I am sure it cannot be otherwise – of some terror to me. With ellipsis of the participle, αἱ πόλεις πολλαὶ καὶ χαλεπαὶ λαβεῖν αἱ τῶν Φωκέων, μὴ οὐ χρόνῳ καὶ πολιορκίᾳ (Dem. in § 211, c). The ellipsis is ἁλοῦσαι, or the like, and χαλεπαὶ λαβεῖν = οὐκ εὐάλωτοι, and the explanation is the same as in the former instances. With the gen. absolute: εἰνάτῃ δὲ οὐκ ἐξελεύσεσθαι ἔφασαν μὴ οὐ πλήρεος ἐόντος τοῦ κύκλου, Hdt. 6, 106. The elements are, οὐ πλ. ἐστιν ὁ κ., οὐκ ἐξελευσόμεθα: οὐκ ἐξ. μὴ πλ. ἐόντος τοῦ κ.: μὴ ἐξελευσόμεθα, οὐ πλ. ἐ. τοῦ κ., "do not imagine we shall go out with the moon not at the full."

[2]: Omitted by Schneidewin on grounds which seem to be insufficient, since, according to the explanation in the text, the οὐ before κατοικτ. does not serve for "merely external correlation " to the οὐ involved in the primary clause. In Ed. Τ. 221, οὐ γὰρ ἂν μακρὰν ἴχνευον αὐτός, μὴ οὐκ ἔχων τι σύμβολον, the μή is better omitted (with Schn.), since Ed. does not mean to allege that he has a clue, and οὐκ ἔ. τι σ. carries on the notion of αὐτός, " left to myself alone."

§ 297.

ἄν, and enclitic κε, κεν (not Attic). Ἄν is probably cognate with the preposition ἀνά (Hermann, de Part. Ἄν, Opusc. t. iv., makes ἐβουλόμην ἂν εἰ ἐδυνάμην = ἐβουλόμην ἀνὰ τοῦτο εἰ ἐδυνάμην, secundum hoc); and κε, κεν with κατά, therefore also with καί (Hermann), and pre-eminently with the enclitic τις in the form κος (κου = που, κως = πως). – In the earlier (not Attic) Greek, κεν and ἄν often appear in correlation (cf. τε – καί, § 222), the former in the protasis, the latter in the apodosis, εἴπερ γάρ κε βλεῖο –, οὐκ ἂν – πέσοι βέλος, Il. 13, 288, but often so that the apodosis stands first: thus, αὐτὸν δ᾽ ἂν πύματόν με κύνες πρώτῃσι θύρῃσιν ὠμησταὶ ἐρύουσιν, ἐπεί κέ τις – ἐκ θυμὸν ἔληται, Il. 22, 66. ὡς ἂν ἔπειτ᾽ ἀπὸ σεῖο – οὐκ ἐθέλοιμι λείπεσθ᾽, οὐδ᾽ εἴ κέν μοι ὑποσταίη θεὸς αὐτός, Il. 9, 444. The force of κεν – ἄν is, in some (or, any) way (sort, case, &c.) –, in that way (sort, case, &c.). More frequently κεν appears in both clauses (cf. τε – τε, § 227): εἰ δέ κε μὴ δώωσιν, ἐγὼ δέ κεν αὐτὸς ἕλωμαι = if in any way – then in some way. ὁ δέ κεν κεχολώσεται ὅν κεν ἵκωμαι. But the one or the other particle is often omitted: αἴ κ᾽ αὐτὸν γνώω νημερτέα πάντ᾽ ἐνέποντα, ἕσσω μιν χλαῖναν. And very often the protasis or condition to which ἄν or κεν refers, is not expressed. Thus, πληθὺν δ᾽ οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ μυθήσομαι οὐδ᾽ ὀνομήνω, viz. (εἴ κε –) “if I try,” or, “if another can:” καί κέ τις ὧδ᾽ ἐρέει, viz. “(if in any wise so be,) then may-hap –.” Ἄν, and in apodosis κεν, always thus looks back to a supposition expressed or understood.

§ 298.

But ἄν, though it properly belongs to the apodosis, is often drawn into the protasis, viz. with the particle ei in ἐάν, ἤν, with ὅς, and its adverbial forms (ὃς ἄν, ὅταν, ὡς ἄν, &c.); also εὔτ᾽ ἄν, ἐπεὶ ἄν, and ἐπήν, &c. In all these cases, the ἄν, together with its verb, is apodosis to a suppressed condition: thus, ὄψεαι ἦν ἐθελῃσθα = thou shalt see, if, when the time comes, then thou shalt be willing (i. e. if in the event it shall appear that thou art willing). So with the relative forms. Οὓς ἂν ἴδῃς κάλεσον, = whom, if so and so (e. g. if there be any to be seen), you shall see. ὡς ἂν ἐγὼν εἴπω, πειθώμεθα = in what way (whatever the way may be,) I shall speak, or, in what way (supposing that I speak,) I shall speak: i. e. the groundwork of the sentence is, if I speak, I shall speak so (εἴ κ' εἴπω, τὼς ἂν εἴπω), and this thrown into the relative form becomes ὡς ἂν εἴπω. So ἐκ γὰρ ᾿Ορέσταο τίσις ἔσσεται ὅπποτ᾽ἂν ἡβήσῃ: the groundwork, "when the time shall come (ὅτε κεν –), τότ᾽ ἂν ἡβήσῃ," in the relative form, ὅπποτ᾽ ἂν ἡβήσῃ. Or, as all relatives imply correlation, the relative with ἄν may be explained as condensed from demonstr. with ἄν together with relative with κεν, viz. τότ᾽ ἂν (ἔσσεται) ὅτε κεν ἡβήσῃ. So Il. 15, 232, τὅφρα γὰρ οὖν οἱ ἔγειρε μένος μέγα, ὅφρ᾽ ἂν ᾿Αχαιοὶ φεύγοντες νῆάς τε καὶ ῾Ελλήσποντον ἵκωνται = τὅφρα ἂν (ἐγερεῖς) . . . ὅφρα κεν ἵκωνται. Hence, where ἄν appears in the protasis, the apodosis rarely (perhaps never) has κεν: i. e. it would be difficult to produce a sentence of the form ἣν δὲ μὴ δώωσιν, ἐγὼ δέ κεν αὐτὸς ἔλωμαι. In νῦν γάρ χ᾽ Ἕκτορ᾽ ἔλοις, ἐπεὶ ἂν μάλα τοι σχεδὸν ἔλθοι, Il. 9, 304, the κεν in the first clause corresponds with an unexpressed εἴ κε θέλοις, εἴ κεν ἔλθοι, or the like, not with ἐπεὶ ἄν in the latter clause, which resolves itself into some such correlation as διὰ τοῦτο ἂν (sc. ἔλοις) ὅτι κεν μ. σχ. ἔλθοι.

Sometimes ἄν and κεν appear in the same clause: thus, ἵσταντο φάλαγγες, ἃς οὔτ᾽ ἂν κεν Ἄρης ὀνόσαιτο μετελθών, οὔτε κ᾽ Ἀθηναίη, Il. 13, 127, where ἄν (see next paragraph) is attracted by οὔτε, and the sentence may be resolved either into ταὶ ἂν ἔσονται (αἱ φ.) ἃς οὔτε κεν Ἄρ., οὔτε κ᾽ Ἀθ., or, independently of the relative, οὔτε, εἴ κεν Ἄρης ἔλθοι (or ἐθέλοι, &c., or εἴ κεν Ἄρη λέγοις, &c.), Ἄρης ὀνόσαιτο ἄν. (See other instances under ὅφρα.)

§ 299.

With respect to position in the sentence, κε never recedes far from the beginning. Εἰ δ᾽ Ὀδυσεὺς ἔλθοι –, αἰψά κε – ἀποτίσεται, Od. 17, 540. ἀλλ᾽ ἤτοι νῦν μέν κε νεμεσσηθεὶς ὑποείξω, Il. 15, 211. καί κέ τις ὧδ᾽ ἐρέει, Il. 4, 176 (not καί τίς κ᾽ ὧδ᾽ ἐρέει, like μαθὼν δέ τις ἂν ἐρεῖ, Pind. Nem. 7, 68 [1]).

[1] Hermann remarks, that ἢ κε μέγ' ὠμώξειεν ὁ Πελοπίδης ᾿Αγαμέμνων, Hdt. 7, 159, was suggested by reminiscence of ἢ κε μέγ' οἰμώξειε γέρων ἱππηλάτα Πηλεύς: else the speaker would have said, ἢ μέγ᾽ ἂν ᾠμ.

But ἄν, besides its attraction by the relative or conditional word, though its proper place is with the predicate, usually attaches itself to the emphatic word of the clause. Thus, πατρὸς δὲ καὶ μητρὸς οὐκέτι μευ ζωόντων, ἀδελφεὸς ἂν ἄλλος οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ γένοιτο, Hdt. 3, 119 (see § 139 b). Hence it likes to attach itself to words by which the simple form of the sentence is altered, such as οὐκ, οὔτ᾽, οὐδ᾽, οὔποτε, &c., τίς, τί, πῶς, ἆρα, &c., adverbs of time, place, manner, such as ἐνταῦθα, τότε, τάχα, ἴσως, εἰκότως, ῥᾳδίως, ῥᾷστα, μάλιστα, μόλις, σχολῇ, ἡδέως (ἄσμενος), σφόδρα, καί (κἄν, etiam, vel), &c., and the inferential οὖν, τί οὖν ἄν τις εἴποι -, the principle being the same in all, viz. that that term of the apodosis which is to have the greatest prominence in reference to the conditional sentence (expressed or unexpressed) draws the ἄν after it, because ἄν has the same reference. For other remarkable attractions (hyperbaton) of ἄν, see § 139 b, R.

§ 300.

For the usage of the particle ἄν, see the Index. – In the cultivated Attic prose, the use of ἄν with fut. indicative (Homer, Pindar, and lyrical parts of Tragedy) is rejected, partly in consequence of the rejection of κε, partly because the provinces of the indicative future and the subjunctive are more clearly discriminated (whence also the omission of ἄν with the subj. in conditional and relative sentences, which is frequent in the early and extra-Attic Greek, is rare in Attic, e. g. εἰ ποιήσῃς, ὅτε λέξης).

Thus, αὐτὸν δ᾽ ἂν πύματόν με κύνες πρώτῃσι θύρῃσιν ὠμησταὶ ἐρύουσιν, ἐπεί κέ τις ἐκ θυμὸν ἔληται, Il. 22, 66, an apodosis with ἄν, followed by its protasis with κε: here the Attic, rejecting the ke, gives the protasis in the different form, ἐπειδὰν ἕληται; consequently, the ἄν of the apodosis falls away. In the elliptical sentence, πληθὺν δ᾽ οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ μυθήσομαι, where ἄν points to an unexpressed εἴ κε -, e. g. “ if I shall try," the Attic retaining ἄν for the like reference uses the optative. In the passages (of Attic prose) where ἄν appears with fut. indic., there is some negligence of construction. Thus, Pl. Apol. 29, ὡς εἰ διαφευξοίμην, ἤδη ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ υἱεῖς ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἃ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντάπασι διαφθαρήσονται (so all the best MSS.): the writer meant to say, ἤδη ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ υἱεῖς ἐπιτηδεύοιεν...., καὶ π. π. διαφθαρήσονται, but, changing the construction, puts the participle in place of the finite mood. The other two undoubted instances in Pl., are Rep. 615, οὐχ ἥκει, οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἥξει δεῦρο; Phædon. 61, οὐδ᾽ ὁπωςτιοῦν ἄν σοι ἑκὼν εἶναι πείσεται: in both, the irregularity is caused by the aptness of ἄν to attach itself to οὐδ᾽ and οὖν. So Thuc. 2, 80, ῥᾳδίως ἂν σχόντες – κρατήσουσι, the adv. ῥᾳδίως drawing ἄν after it, as if the writer had meant to say, σχοῖεν, καὶ σχόντες κρατήσουσι. Just so Xen. Cyr. 6,1, 45, ἄσμενος ἂν πρὸς ἄνδρα οἷος σὺ εἶ ἀπαλλαγήσεται = ἡδέως ἄν, " he would gladly come forward (or the like), and will -." Ib. 7, 5, 21, πολὺ ἂν ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν ἀχρεῖοι ἔσονται = πολὺ ἂν – τοῦτο γένοιτο -, ὅτι -. Æsch. de f. leg. 196, οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μάλιστα μεμνήσομαι καὶ δυνήσομαι εἰπεῖν, = ἂν εἴη, ὅτι – And in questions: τί ποτ᾽ ἂν ἐκ τούτων ἐρεῖ; Eur. Bacch. 595. ἆρά γε τοῦτ᾽ ἂν ἐγώ ποτ᾽ ἐπόψομαι; Arist. Nub. 465. τί ποτ᾽ ἂν ἐρεῖ; Æsch. Ctes. 155: here the ἄν does not belong to the verb, but to an unexpressed optative, λέγοις, φαίης, or the like, followed by ὅτι.

With imperf. and aor. indic., ἄν is always = " in that case," with reference to a preceding “ if:" εἰ ἐβουλόμην, ἔλεγον ἄν. – οἱ μὲν ὄνοι, ἐπεί τις διώκοι, προδραμόντες ἂν εἱστήκεσαν (præcurrere et deinde restitare solebant, Porson: instead of the vulg. ἀνειστήκεσαν, for which others ἕστασαν without ἄν), Xen. An. 1, 5, 2, so often as -, (in that case) they would - (ἄν rei fieri solite): cf. Soph. Phil. 287-295, which is the locus classicus for this usage.

So in all the usages of ἄν with optative; μένοιμ᾽ ἄν (viz. εἰ θέλοις, or the like). –

But ἄν with subjunctive always accompanies a conditional or relative word; and here the " in that case" refers to a latent condition, as explained above, whence it closely accompanies, or even coalesces with, the conjunction or relative. When with the temporal particles, ἐπεί, ἕως, μέχρι οὗ, &c., the ἄν is omitted, the event is put by itself without the " in that case," or " if so be," involved in ἄν. Ἔσπεισται μέχρι οὗ ἐπανέλθωσιν οἱ πρέσβεις (Th.), ἐν τῷ φρονεῖν γὰρ μηδὲν ἥδιστος βίος, ἕως τὸ χαίρειν καὶ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι μάθῃς (Soph.). (Οη πρίν, πρὶν ἄν with subj., see § 306.)

§ 301.

It follows from the foregoing principles, that ἄν cannot appear in the indicative or optative protasis, unless the protasis be itself in some respect conceived as apodosis to some other proposition. Thus, ἔδωκας ἂν, ἃ ἂν ἤθελες αὐτός, " you would have given what (if so and so) you would have wished.” ὁπόταν ἥκοι ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖπνον, λέγοιμ' ἄν (Xen.) = ὁπότε (if so and so, ἥκοι ἄν,) λέγοιμ' ἄν. (This, however, may be considered as indirect form of ὁπόταν ἥκῃ, λέξω: comp. the ex. of opt. with ἐπειδάν in a depend. sentence which has passed from the subj. into the opt., § 132 b, R.) With εἰ, the ἄν will usually follow the verb: Εἰ λῷον καὶ ἄμεινον εἴη ἂν τῇ πόλει οὕτω κατασκευαζομένῃ (Dem.): here the basis of the sentence is, λ. καὶ ἄ. εἴη ἂν τῇ π. οὕτω κ., = εἰ οὕτω κατασκευάζοιτο, and this whole assertion is made conditional with εἰ. So from the assertion δοῦλον ἀκρατῆ (= εἰ ἀκρατὴς εἴη) οὐ δεξαίμεθ᾽ ἄν, we have the condition εἴ γε μηδὲ δοῦλον ἀκρατῆ δεξαίμεθ᾽ ἄν. ᾿Αγαπητόν, εἰ καὶ ἐξ ὑποβολῆς δύναιντ᾽ ἂν ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ εἶναι (Xen.), the fundamental assertion being καὶ εἰ ὑποβολή.. εἴη, ἐξ ὑ. δύναιντ᾿ ἄν. – Εἰ τοίνυν τοῦτο ἰσχυρὸν ἂν ἦν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τεκμήριον κἀμοὶ γενέσθω τεκμήριον, Dem. c. Timoth. 1201, " if this, had it been alleged, would havebeen-. " – Οὐ γὰρ ἂν καλῶς ἔχοι, εἰ ὅτι τελέως ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ἐγένετο, διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲ μειόνων γ᾽ ἂν τυγχάνοι ἐπαίνων (Xen.); here the assertion μειόνων γ᾽ ἂν τυγχάνοι, εἰ καὶ δικαίων μὴ τυγχάνοι, negatived by οὐδέ, is put hypothetically with εἰ. Οὗτοι δ᾽ εἰ μὲν εἶχον χείρον᾽ ἂν ἡμῶν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν δεινόν (Dem.), i. e. εἰ εἶχον, χείρον᾽ ἂν ἡμῶν εἶχον, and εἰ χείρον᾽ ἡμῶν εἶχον, οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν δεινόν.

§ 302.

With the final particles, ὡς, ὅπως (poet. ὅφρα) ἄν with subj., refers to a condition implied either in the protasis or in the apodosis. Thus, ὡς ἂν μάθῃς, ἄκουσον, ut discas, audi (i. e. ut discas, si forte discas, Herm.); or, and this more frequently, ut discas, disces autem si audias. This will be evident upon reducing ὡς ἂν μάθῃς to its original correlation: ὡς κεν ἀκούσεις, τῶς ἂν μαθήσῃ. – ναυκλήρου τρόποις μορφὴν δολώσας, ὡς ἂν ἄγνοια προσῇ, Soph. Ph. 129 = "that it may be so, as, if I do this, it will be so;" therefore almost equivalent to so shall –.[1] ἐάσωμεν... ἕκηλον αὐτόν, ὡς ἂν εἰς ὕπνον πέσῃ, ib. 815 = "that he may –, as he will, if we leave him quiet." ὡς ἂν σκοποὶ νῦν ἦτε τῶν εἰρημένων, Ant. 215 = "(you say well: do it then;) so shall ye be –." Creon not only insists that they shall make this their object (ἦτε), but that it shall result (ἔσεσθε) [2]. ἴσθι πᾶν τὸ δρώμενον, ὅπως ἂν εἰδὼς ἡμῖν ἀγγείλῃς σαφῆ, "acquaint yourself with all that is doing, that you may –," and, "so shall you –." With the optative, ὡς ἄν, ὅπως ἄν = quomodo, or ut. προμηθοῦνται ὅπως ἂν εὐδαιμονοίης, derived from the direct interrogation πῶς ἂν (εἰ δυνατὸν εἴη) εὐδαιμονοίης; ἵνα with ἄν, subj. or opt., is never final, § 122. πατρὶς γάρ ἐστι πᾶσ᾽ ἵν᾽ ἂν (ubicumque) πράττῃ τις εὐ, Arist.

[1]: I cannot assent to M.'s statement, § 122, note, that ἄν does not perceptibly alter the meaning.

[2]: Comp. ὅπως with fut. in the phrase ὅπως οὖν ἔσεσθε ἄνδρες ἄξιοι τῆς ἐλευθερίας, Xen. An. 1, 7, 3.

§ 303.

ὅφρα (Hom.). The derivation is either the relative form ὅ-φι with ῥα, or ὁ πάρα, and the meaning, until that, while that; but ὅφρα also assumes the force of a final particle, the point of time to be reached being conceived as the goal or intent of the action. In this sense, ὅφρα ἴδω, ὅφρα πυθοίμην expresses the same thing as ὡς, ὅπως, ἵνα. The appearance of ke and ἄν with this particle results from the correlation ὅφρα κε –, τόφρ᾽ ἂν (or κε) -. Ὗε δ᾽ ἄρα Ζεὺς συνεχές, ὅφρα κε θᾶσσον ἁλίπλοα τείχεα θείη, Il. 12, 25 (as the direct expression of the purpose would be τόφρ᾽ ἂν (or κεν) ὕσω, ὅφρα κε θείω). So, ὅφρα κε τερπόμενος ὄπ᾿ ἀκούῃς Σειρήνοιϊν, Od. 12, 51, “ (let them bind thee= they shall bind thee the while, τόφρ᾽ ἂν (or κεν) δήσουσι) that thou the while mayest hear, &c." Μή μέ πω ἐς θρόνον ἵζε, διοτρεφές, ὅφρα κεν Έκτωρ κεῖται (Γ. κῆται) ἐνὶ κλισίῃσιν ἀκηδής, Il. 24, 553. In this correlation, the ἄν is often attracted to the relative clause, especially when the demonstrative clause is imperative: μνήσασθε δὲ θούριδος ἀλκῆς ὅφρ᾽ αν ἐγὼν ᾿Αχιλῆος ἀμύμονος ἔντεα δύω. So τὸν ξεῖνον δύστηνον ἄγ᾽ ἐς πόλιν, ὅφρ᾽ ἂν ἐκεῖθι δαῖτα πτωχεύῃ. In a few passages, where the correlation is expressed, we have ὅφρ᾽ ἂν μέν κεν -, τὅφρα: viz. ὅφρ᾽ ὅν μέν κεν ὁρᾷ τόφρ᾽ ἀναχωρείτω, ΙΠ. 11, 187, and ib. 202. ὅφρ᾽ ἂν μέν κεν δούρατ᾿ ἀρήρῃ, τόφρ᾽ αὐτοῦ μενέω, Od. 5, 361, and ὅφρ' αν μέν κ᾿ ἀγροὺς ἴομεν -, τὅφρα – καρπαλίμως ἔρχεσθαι, ib. 6, 259. [1]

[1]: Thiersch holds, that ὅφρα with κεν, ἄν, is not final, "in order that," but "while," "until;" but in several of the passages cited, an intention is clearly implied. Rost makes ὅφρ᾽ ἄν to be = ut, si forte, and ὅφρα κε to imply that the event is confidently expected. Quite an erroneous distinction. The difference at most is that between ὅφρα κε – τόφρα κε, and ὅφρα κε – τόφρ᾽ ἄν (§ 297); and ὅφρ᾽ ἂν δύω is "so shall (or, may) I the while put on," ὅφρα δύω, "while that I put on."

§ 304.

ἕως. τέως. The earlier form is probably nos or ἦος (comp. ἦμος). Its correlative is τέως, but also τὅφρα is so used. τὅφρα γὰρ ἂν ποτιπτυσσοίμεθα μύθῳ. ἕως κ᾿ ἀπὸ πάντα δοθείη, Od. 2, 77. ἕως (ἦος) ὁ ταῦθ᾽ ὥρμαινε, τὅφρα οἱ ἔγγυθεν ἦλθεν–Νέστορος υἱός, Il. 18, 15. Sometimes ἕως in Homer is demonstrative, e. g. ὡς Ἕκτωρ εἶως μὲν ἀπείλει, in the same sense as τέως μὲν (for a while) ἡσύχαζον, ἐπεὶ δέ –, Xen.: and sometimes in Attic prose, τέως is used for ἕως. (Buttmann, Index ad Dem. Mid.)

§ 305.

ἔστε. Comp. Homer's εἰς ὅτε, εἴσοκε, and Lat. usque. The Attics use it instead of ὅφρα, and in the sense usque with a preposition, ἔστε ἐπὶ τὸ δάπεδον (Xen.).

REM. The same sense is expressed by ἕως οὗ, μέχρις οὗ, ἄχρις οὗ. These two prepositional adverbs, in which there is no perceptible difference of meaning, are derived from μακρός, ἀκρός (“ to the length of where," " up to where "). Hom. has also μέσφα (related to μέσος) in the sense of μέχρι, Il. 8, 508.

§ 306.

πρίν. This particle, whether explained as a locative form of the root προ, or as an ancient comparative (πριον-, comp. prius and pris in priscus, &c.), is properly an adverb (and so used especially in poetry: ὧν πρὶν οὐκ ἀκήκοας. ὃς πρὶν ᾤχετο. ἐν τῷ πρὶν χρόνῳ, &c.), and is still in fact such even when it is used as a conjunction in the connexion of sentences, and ranks, as such, with the temporal particles ὅτε, ἐπεί, ἕως, &c. (§§ 127, 138.)

Thus, in Homer, οὐδ᾽ ὅγε πρὶν λοιμοῖο βαρείας κῆρας ἀφέξει, πρίν γ᾽ ἀπὸ πατρὶ φίλῳ δόμεναι ἑλικώπιδα κούρην, Il. 1, 97, with correlation, nor will he sooner hold off-, sooner there must be a giving -: the first πρίν looking forward, = " before the giving;" the second looking back,= " before the holding off.” ἥμεθ᾽ ἀτυζόμεναι... πρίν γ'᾽ ὅτε δή με σὸς υἱὸς ἀπὸ μεγάροιο κάλεσσεν, Od. 23, 43: here the πρίν properly belongs to the first clause, we sat - before, and then indeed, which in the relative form becomes before (the time) when at last, or πρὶν ἢ ὅτε. So with ὅταν: ὄμοσον μὴ μυθήσασθαι, πρίν γ᾽ ὅταν. γένηται, = μὴ πρὶν μυθήσασθαι, ἢ ὅταν, οι ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν. – In good Attic authors, we find πρὶν ἄν with subj., πρίν with opt., only after a negation expressed or implied, probably because this form of sentence is conceived as resting on the correlation of πρίν – πρίν, which necessarily involves a negation of one clause. This correlation is sometimes even expressed: e. g. οὐκ ἀποκρινοῦμαι πρότερον.... πρὶν ἂν πρῶτον ἀποκρίνωμαι ὅ τι ἐστίν (Pl.) = “ I will not answer sooner... (but) before (doing so) I will first answer," combined with the form οὐκ ἀποκρινοῦμαι πρίν, ἢ (or ἀλλ᾽) ὅταν ἀποκρ. So (εἰ) μὴ ἀνείη πρὶν ἐξελκύσειεν εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς, which is the indirect form of οὐκ ἀνήσει (πρίν, or πρότερον), πρὶν (ἀνιέναι) ἐξελκύσει, and οὐκ ἀνήσει πρὶν (ἢ ὅτε) ἐξελκύσει. Or, the πρίν may be conceived to belong to the latter clause, but with relation to the first, as in Homer's τὴν δ᾽ ἐγὼ οὐ λύσω· πρίν μιν καὶ γῆρας ἔπεισιν, " I will not let her go: before (ere, sooner than, that shall be) old age shall come upon her." With the indicative, an affirmative sometimes precedes, but this is comparatively rare (mostly confined to Trag. and Thuc., who usually has πρὶν δή, πρίν γε δή). Thus, οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἡσύχαζον, πρὶν δὴ ἡ δύναμις τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων σαφῶς ἤρετο (Thuc.) - a phrase contracted from ἡσύχαζον πρίν, καὶ τότε δή –, or ἡσ. πρὶν ἢ ὅτε δή. Παραπλήσια.. ἔπασχον, πρίν γε δὴ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἔτρεψαν (Thuc.). Here no correlation is implied: but in the negative sentence, οὐκ ἰέναι ἤθελεν πρὶν ἡ γυνὴ αὐτὸν ἔπεισεν (Xen.), the form may be either οὐκ ἤθελε πρίν, πρὶν ἔπεισεν, οι οὐκ ἤθ. πρίν, ἢ (or ἀλλ᾽) ὅτε ἔπεισεν. So πρίν with inf. may follow either a negative or an affirmative assertion, according as there is or is not correlation. Οὐδέ τις ἔτλη πρὶν πιέειν, πρὶν λεῖψαι, Il. 7, 480, the elements being, " they will not drink first, (but) first they will make a libation," " they will not drink before (libation made), before (drinking, there must be) libation: " but στῆτ᾽ αὐτοῦ πρὶν πεσέειν – στῆτ᾽ αὐτοῦ πρὶν ἢ πεσεῖτε, Il. 6, 82. (Both forms, infin. and subj., are united by ἤ, " or," after a negation, in Il. 14, 504.)

REM. In Attic, ἤ is rarely expressed after πρίν; and ἂν with the subj. is sometimes omitted, as also with μέχρι οὗ, ἕως, especially in Trag. and Thuc. οὐ χρὴ ἀρχῆς ἄλλης ὀρέγεσθαι, πρὶν ἣν ἔχομεν βεβαιωσώμεθα (Thuc.), the thought being, before (we do that), let us (= I counsel, that we first) make sure what we have. Μὴ στέναζε, πρὶν μάθῃς, Soph. Phil. 917, "before (you groan), (I advise you to) learn," combined with μὴ στ. πρὶν μαθεῖν: but πρὶν ἂν μάθῃς would be, "not sooner, but when, if so be, you shall have learnt.' On the other hand, ἄν is sometimes inserted with optative: ἀπαγορευόντων μὴ ἀποκτείνειν τὸν ἄνδρα πρὶν ἂν ἐγὼ ἔλθοιμι (Antiph. 5, 113), as indirect form of μὴ ἀπόκτεινε πρὶν ἂν ἐγὼ ἔλθω.

§ 307.

ὡς. This adverbial form of the relative ős, the same as ut (i. e. quut from qui), derives its various usages partly from the correlation τῶς (ὥς, οὕτως) – ὡς, ὡς, in the manner in which, so - as; partly from the corresponding interrogative form πῶς; (κῶς; from κός = τίς; quis?) and indirect interrogative ὅπως.

a) as, sicut, quemadmodum, in comparison, οὕτως ὡς ἔχω, just as I am. πρέπει ὡς τύραννος (sc. πρέπει) εἰσορᾶν (Soph.): ἐχίδνης ἰὸς ὡς (sc. δαίνυται) ἐδαίνυτο (Soph.): and frequently in Homeric similes, ὡς δὲ –, ὡς -, and as -, so. Strengthened by περ, e. g. ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκβαίνουσα ὥσπερ πνεῦμα ἢ καπνὸς διασκεδασθεῖσα οἴχεται. - In wishes and asseverations, as in Engl., " so heaven help me, as -:" οὕτως ὀναίμην τούτων ὡς ἀληθῆ ἐρῶ, cf. ita me dii ament ut ego lætor (Ter.). – With ὁ αὐτός, ἴσος, &c., the same as, for ὅς. τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα ὥσπερ τὸ πρῶτον (Xen.). τοῦτον δὲ εἶναι τὸν πλάστην τὸν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ τότε. Similarly, πιστὸς ὡς τις καὶ ἄλλος implies the comparison, as faithful as -.

b) As, ut, in the sense quantum, quantum quidem, in interposed sentences of a limiting or restrictive kind (where the speaker qualifies a statement by remarking, that he puts it, or wishes it to be understood, in that way in which it holds, is allowable, &c., under the circumstances described in the parenthetic clause): e. g. " he will come to-day, as I hear, ὡς ἀκούω: as they say, ὡς λέγουσιν: as it seems, ὡς ἔοικεν.” The correlation is, e. g. I speak this (so) as I hear, &c. Σὺ δ᾽, ὡς ἔοικας, νομίζεις. – Of the same kind is the ws with inf. in the phrases ὡς εἰπεῖν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν (where we use the demonstrative, " so to say "), = οὕτω λέγω ὡς ἔξεστιν εἰπεῖν, or the like: ὡς συντόμως εἰπεῖν, ὡς συνελόντι εἰπεῖν. Elliptically, ὡς πλήθει, ut summatim dicam (Pl.),– and ἐπίσταμαι ἰδιώτας ὄντας ὡς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀγωνίζεσθαι, and ἢ ὡς with inf. after a comparative. So ὡς γ᾽ ἐμοὶ κριτῇ, for which we have also ὥς γ᾽ ἐμοὶ χρῆσθαι κριτῇ, ὣς γ᾽ ἐμοὶ ἀκροατῇ: – ὡς ἐμῇ δόξῃ (Xen.). ὡς γε ἐντεῦθεν ἰδεῖν: ὥς γε οὗτωσὶ δόξαι (Pl.). So ὡς with a preposition and its case, πυργοὶ μὲν ὡς ἀπ᾿ ὀμμάτων πρόσω (Soph.). ὡς ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν, ὡς ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων (Thuc.): ἄπιστον τὸ πλῆθος λέγεται ἀπολέσθαι ὡς πρὸς τὸ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως (Thuc.). To the same head may be referred the ὡς which we should express by for. Thus, ἦν δὲ οὐδὲ ἀδύνατος, ὡς Λακεδαιμόνιος, εἰπεῖν (Thuc.), for a Lacedæmonian. πιστὸς ὡς νομεὺς ἀνήρ (Soph. Ed. T. 1118), faithful, for a herdsman, that is (viz. considered as a mere herdsman, as far as such a person is likely to be faithful). φρονεῖ γὰρ ὡς γυνὴ μέγα, she has, for a woman, a high spirit. (Here the force of the particle will be perceived by subs tuting an interrogation with πῶς; e. g. " for how should a Lac. be δυνατὸς εἰπεῖν;” πῶς ἂν γυνὴ φρονοῖ μέγα; &c.) And with the same construction, the dative: μακρὰν γὰρ ὡς γέροντι προυστάλης ὁδόν (Soph.), long, for an old man. ταχεῖαν, ὡς ἐμοὶ, σκέψιν ἐπιτάττεις (Pl.). — Ὡς τὰ πολλά, ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος, and the like, may be explained in the same way.

c) As, in the sense quasi, tanquam, also quippe, utpote. In this use of ὡς with nouns and participles, there is involved a notion of cause, as when we say, " as the case is so and so, therefore -:" i. e. the relation is partly that which is expressed by "how-? as -," partly by " why -? because -." This use of ὡς also differs from a), as the things are not compared in their own nature, but put together as like in some thought, feeling, or purpose of the speaker or some other person. Thus, ὡς πολεμίους ἐφυλάττοντο ἡμᾶς, as (they thought us) enemies, (therefore) they were on their guard against us (so as they would be against enemies). εἴπερ ὡς φίλοι προσήκετε, if, as (you wish to be) friends (therefore) you are come (in the way that friends do come). ὡς φύλακα συνέπεμψεν αὐτόν, as (he wished him to be) a guard, (therefore) he sent him with (us) (so as one sends a guard). ὁ δ᾽ ὡς ἀνὴρ γενναῖος οὐκ οἴκτου μετὰ κατήνεσ', as (he was) a noble-spirited man, (therefore) he complied (in the way in which such an one acts). Especially with the participle (as, indeed, in the case of subst. and adjj., the participle ὤν, ἐσόμενος, &c., may always be supplied). Thus, ἀγανακτοῦσιν ὡς ηπατημένοι, as (they think themselves) deceived, (therefore) they are indignant (in the way that people are, who find themselves deceived). παρεσκευάζετο ὡς μαχούμενος, as (he said to himself) he would fight, (therefore) he made ready (as one does who is going to fight). ᾐτιῶντο ὡς πείσαντα, as (they said) he had been the mover, (therefore) &c. See § 175 d. (Ἅτε, ἅτε δή, in the same connexion, denotes the objective reason, § 175 c.) Hence with the gen. absol. ὡς ἠπατημένων ἡμῶν ἠγανάκτουν, as (they said) we were deceived, they were indignant (so, as in the case of our having been deceived); see § 181, R. 2: and the acc. absol., see § 182, with R. 1. – In like manner, ὡς with the finite verb, in the sense as = "as assured that –," especially followed by a negation. δέομαι οὖν σου παραμεῖναι ἡμῖν, ὡς ἐγὼ οὐδ᾽ ἑνὸς ἥδιον ἀκούσαιμι ἢ σοῦ. And so with fut. indic. ὡς οὔτις ἀμφὶ τῷδ᾽ ὑγρὰν θήσει κόνιν, Eur. Cf. § 215 b, R. 2. ὡς, ἂν σοὶ πειθώμεθα, οὔτε ὁ γεωργὸς γεωργὸς ἔσται, = since, or for –, Pl.

As if, with the finite verb, in the ironical ὡς δή –, e. g. ὡς δὴ σὺ βραχέα ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐν καιρῷ λέγεις (Soph.), as if forsooth -! This might also be referred to the sense how, see under e. Comp. οἷα δή –, ἅτε δή.

With εἰς, ἐπί, πρός c. acc.: e. g. παρεσκευάζετο ὡς ἐς μάχην (Thuc.), ἀνάγεσθαι ἔμελλεν ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαν (Xen.). Here the sense quasi is unsuitable, and it is better to understand the phrase in the same manner as ὡς μαχούμενος, with the intention of going to -. In the same way, κατέλαβε τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ὡς ἐπὶ τυραννίδι = ὡς τυραννήσων. – ᾿Απαγγέλλετε τῇ μητρὶ χαίρειν, ὡς ἀπ᾿ ἐμοῦ = ὡς ἀπαγγέλλων, or ἄγγελος ἀπ᾿ ἐμοῦ.

Ως with numerals, ἔδωκεν ὡς μυρίας δραχμάς (Lys.), some ten-thousand drachmæ, scarcely differs from eis: thus, in the enumeration Xen. An. 1, 2, 3, ὁπλίτας εἰς πεντακοσίους καὶ χιλίους..., ὁπλ. ὡς πεντακοσίους (ἄνδρας) εἰς ἑπτακοσίους. It is usually referred to the sense quasi, but is rather to be explained as ὅσον: comp. the particles in the phrases, " how many? " " as many as," and ἕως, ὧδε, usque.

REM. Ως with the accus. (but only of personal objects, or objects conceived as persons) is distinct from the preceding ὡς εἰς, &c. It is a pronominal form (like Lat. quo, comp. usque), denoting the direction whither, the terminus ad quem of a motion, and used quite as a preposition. αἰεὶ τὸν ὅμοιον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὅμοιον (Hom.), like to like. οὐχ ἥκει πρὸς σὲ κηρύσσων ὅδε, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐμέ (Eur.). πορεύεται ὡς βασιλέα (Xen.). ἥκοντος ὡς τὴν Μίλητον, and ὡς Ἄβυδον (Thuc.).

d) With superlatives, especially adverbs, ὡς τάχιστα = quam celerrime. Cf. ὅτι (= ὅ, τι) τάχιστα: both combined, ὡς ὅτι σμικρόταται. Comp. also ἀπέχθειαι οἷαι χαλεπώταται, Pl. χωρίον οἷον χαλεπώτατον, Xen. Here the full construction is ὡς δυνατὸν, or οἷόν τε, or δύνανται, &c., τάχιστα. See § 96. Also with some positives: ὡς ἀληθῶς = ὡς οἷόν τε ἀληθῶς, as true as possible. So ἤγγειλαν ὡς ἐτητύμως (Soph.), and ὡς ἠπίως ἐννέπειν (Soph.), [1] and ὡς τάχος = "in what way speed is possible." So ὡς ἀτεχνῶς, ὡς πάνυ, ὡς μάλα. ὡς αὕτως (ὡσαύτως), ὡς ἑτέρως. Hence we may explain ὡς ἕκαστοι as representing ὡς ἕκας (ἑκάς).

[1]: Not as Ellendt s. v. ὡς explains, = οὕτως ὥστε ἐτητύμως ἀγγελθέντα (ἠπίως εἰρημένον) δοκεῖν.

e) how, quomodo (and quantopere). In the sense of ὅπως, in indirect interrogation: thus, (πῶς ἔχει τὸ πρᾶγμα;) αὐτὸς ἂν εἴποι ὡς ἔχει τὸ πρᾶγμα, how the affair stands. ὡς δ᾽ οἶδα ταῦτα τῇδ᾽ ἔχοντ᾽, ἐγὼ φράσω (Soph.), how I know –. And in exclamations: ὡς ἀστεῖος ὁ ἄνθρωπος, (see,) how polite the man is –! ὡς οὐδὲν ἄρα ἴσμεν, (to think) how ignorant we are! ὡς μ᾽ ὑπῆλθέ τις φόβος (Soph.). So εὐδαίμων μοι Σωκράτης ἐφαίνετο ὡς ἀδεῶς καὶ γενναίως ἐτελεύτα (Pl.), when I thought how fearlessly –, though this may also be explained as § 198 a, R. 3.[2]

[2]: Xen. An. 2, 5, 39, οὐκ αἰσχύνεσθε –, οἵτινες ὀμόσαντες ἡμῖν –, τοὺς ἄνδρας αὐτοὺς οἷς ὤμνυτε ὡς ἀπολωλέκατε, an anacoluth.: ὡς either = (to think) how –! or ὅτι τοιούτως, that you have so –.

ἃ πρὸς τὸν Θυέστην ὡς ὠμὰ διεπράττετο, Pl. Crat. 395, may be explained as a parenthetic exclamation, how ruthless! [1] θαυμαστὰ γὰρ τὸ τόξον ὡς ὀλισθάνει, Soph., whence the adverbial phrases θαυμαστῶς ὡς, § 198 a, R. 4. – In wishes, ὡς ὅλοιτο! how (I wish) he might perish! unless this is rather to be referred to the ancient use of ὡς demonstr. = οὕτως. But comp. πῶς ἄν in wishes, § 129, R. 1. Possibly, ὡς δή ironical: how much forsooth it is the case that –! but see under c.

[1]: Heindorf. in l. and in Phædon., p. 152, explains it, " perquam sæva," which is not amiss, though many of his exx. are of a different kind. (It may also come under d.)

f) In object-sentences, § 123, ὡς for ὅπως with fut. indic. ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ὡς ἔσονται, how they shall be: with subj., ἐπιμελοῦνται ὡς ἔχῃ οὕτως, prop. how it may be so (the latter usage is rare). – In final sentences with subj. and opt., § 122, 131, a, b. τὴν γέφυραν λύσει ὡς μὴ διαβῆτε = either (considering, planning, &c.) how you shall not cross, or with the notion of intention as explained under c. So Κῦρος φίλων ᾤετο δεῖσθαι ὡς συνεργοὺς ἔχοι, Xen. On ὡς ἄν, see § 302: but ὡς ἄν with opt., τὰ βασίλεια οἰκοδομεῖν ὡς ἂν ἀπομάχεσθαι ἱκανὰ εἴη, = in the manner in which –, § 137. – With the past tense of the indic., ὡς is used in the same manner as ἵνα, see § 131 b, R. 3, to denote an unattained result: τί μ᾽ οὐ λαβὼν ἔκτεινας εὐθὺς, ὡς ἔδειξα μήποτε ἐμαυτὸν ἀνθρώποισιν ἔνθεν ἦν γεγώς, (so) as I should never have shown –, = so had I never shown, approx. to the final that I might never –. See under ἵνα.

g) To the same head belongs the use of ὡς instead of ὅτι after verba declarandi et sentiendi, § 159, R. 3, as we sometimes in the like case use how, or how that (and in vulgar Engl. as how). μαθὼν τὸν Σμέρδιος θάνατον ὡς κρύπτοιτο γενόμενος καὶ ὡς ὀλίγοι ἦσαν οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι αὐτὸν Περσέων, when he learnt the death of S., how (that) the fact of its having taken place was concealed, and how (that) few –. With verbs of fearing, considering, &c., ὡς with fut. indic. is rare: μὴ δείσητε ὡς οὐχ ἡδέως καθευδήσετε (Xen.).

h) When ὡς with inf. denotes effect or consequence (more commonly ὥστε), it may be explained as representing the correlation τοσοῦτος – ὅσος, τοιοῦτος – οἷος. Thus, εὗρος ὡς δύο τριήρεις πλέειν ὁμοῦ, a breadth (so great, or such) as for two triremes to sail abreast: and ἢ ὡς with inf. after a comparative, μείζω ἢ ὡς (ὥστε) φέρειν. So μείζονα ἡγησάμενος εἶναι ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ Πισίδας τὴν παρασκευήν (Xen., suppl. εἶναι). In Herod. and Att. poets, sometimes also in Xen., ὡς for ὥστε occurs with the finite mood, with the correlation οὕτω – ὡς, τοιοῦτος – ὡς expressed: see the exx. in 166 c, R. 2. – Ως also occurs (and ὥςπερ) where we should expect ἤ after a comparative, μᾶλλον ὥς μοι προσήκει (Lys.). The full construction is ἢ ὡς. Thus, μαλακώτεροι γίγνονται ἢ ὡς κάλλιον αὐτοῖς (Pl.).

i) Lastly, ὡς = ὅτε, ὡς ἴδεν, when he saw, ut vidit: and hence, like other temporal particles, it denotes cause, see c. "Cræsus, as it was summer, did so and so," ὡς θέρος ἦν (Xen.).

The comparative ὡς is strengthened with περ, ὥσπερ, just as: οὕτως, τοιοῦτος, ὁ αὐτός, ἴσος – ὥσπερ. On the ellipsis ὥσπερ (ὡς) ἂν εἰ –, see § 139 c.

REM. On ὡς, in the sense ὅτι οὕτως, see under e.

§ 308.

ὥς, demonstr. thus, so. Frequent in Hom. ὡς ἔφατ', &c., and in comparisons, ὡς δ' -, ὡς -, and as - so. Also οὐδ᾽ ὡς, not even so, which is also used in Attic prose. Plato has also ὡς - ὥς: ὡς πρὸς ἀστρονομίαν ὄμματα πέπηγεν, ὡς πρὸς ἐναρμόνιον φορὰν ὦτα (κινδυνεύει) παγῆναι, Rep. 530: and ὡς φήσομεν, ib. 415, Stallb., so we shall say. ὡς οὖν ποιήσετε καὶ πείθεσθέ μοι, id. Prot. 338, thus then ye shall do-.

§ 309.

ὥστε = ὡς with the particle τε, § 227.

a) It is used in comparisons by Hom. and the Tragedians, πάντες ὥςτε τοξόται τοξεύετε, Soph., and now and then in the older Attic prose.

b) In the sense (so) that, it refers to a preceding οὕτως, or the like, expressed or understood. ἡ δ᾽ ὧδε τλήμων, ὥστε τῷ μιάστορι ξύνεστι, Soph. ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς προύργου θύειν – μάτην (Pl.) = quocirca, igitur, i. e. the case is such that -. θνητὸς δ᾽ ᾿Ορέστης, ὥστε μὴ λίαν στένε (Soph.).

c) With infin. ἔχεις ἔγκλημα ὥστε θυμοῦσθαι, such as (is reason enough = ἀρκούντως ὥστε) to be angry, § 152. So that, see § 166, a, b. (In the passage cited in 144, R. 1, ἀδύνατον ὑμῖν ὥστε Πρωταγόρου τοῦδε σοφώτερον ἑλέσθαι (βραβευτὴν τῶν λύγων), ὥστε is not superfluous: this construction occurs only with ἀδύν. and the like, and implies the looking out, &c. for a way so as to: i. e. it is impossible for you to be in such a condition as to -: it combines ἀδύνατον ἑλέσθαι and οὐκ ἔσεσθε οἷοί τε ελέσθαι.)

d) With the participle, in Herodot. where the Attics have ὡς, or ἅτε: ἦν γὰρ ἀδύνατος, ὥςτε σηπομένου τοῦ μηροῦ. – Cf. § 166, note.

§ 310.

ὅπως. This is properly the dependent interrogative adverb corresponding with πῶς, how, as ὁ-πόσος with πόσος, ὁ-πότε with πότε &c. Thus, ἔστω δ᾽ οὖν ὅπως ὑμῖν φίλον (Soph.): the direct interrogation is πῶς ὑμῖν φίλον; indirect or dependent (σκέψασθε) ὅπως ὑ. φ.: hence, (say for yourselves,) how you like to have it, (and) so let it be = so be it, as you like. In most of its usages it coincides with ὡς, differing from it (originally) only as implying a question how?

a) As correlated to ὧδε, οὕτως. Frequent in poetry, but less so in prose. Ὅπως ἕκαστος ὑμῶν βούλεται, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον φερέτω τὴν ψῆφον (Isocr.) = ὅντινα τρόπον. χρὴ τοὐμὸν σῶμα θάπτειν οὕτως ὅπως ἂν ἡγῇ νόμιμον εἶναι (Pl.). Ποίει ὅπως ἄριστόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι (Xen.). Like ὡς in comparisons, it frequently follows the term compared: Ἔρωτι – ὅστις ἀντανίσταται, πύκτης ὅπως ἐς χεῖρας, οὐ καλῶς φρονεῖ (Soph.).

b) The sense ὅτι, after verba declarandi, &c., is even more rare (viz. like ὡς, especially after a negative verb of this kind: οὐ λέγω ὅπως), and where it does occur, the sense is still that of a depend. interrogation: τοῦτον ἔχοι τις ἂν εἰπεῖν ὅπως οὐ δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἀποθνήσκειν; (Xen.) = πῶς οὐ δ., “ how it is not just -? can any one say how?" τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ μή μοι φράζ᾽ ὅπως οὐκ εἰ κακός (Soph.), don't tell me (that you are not a villain): how are you not a villain? Comp. § 159, R. 3.

c) The force of ὅπως is just the same in οὐκ ἔσθ᾽ ὅπως –, there exists not the way in which, it cannot be but that –, § 102 b, R. 2: 122, R. 2, and in the elliptical οὐχ ὅπως – ἀλλά –, "I say not how = not only, but –," § 212. – It should be observed, however, that this phrase (and οὐχ ὅτι) is sometimes not only, sometimes not only not. Thus, οὐχ ὅπως ἔτρεσεν, ἀλλ᾽ (or ἀλλὰ καὶ) ἔφυγεν, should prop. = I say not how he was frightened (he was frightened, and not only that) but he also fled. οὐχ ὅπως ἔφυγεν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ ἔτρεσεν –: here the negation in οὐδέ extends to both members, he did not – I say not, flee – but (not) even tremble. Ἔφυγεν, οὐχ ὅπως ἔτρεσεν, he fled, (I say not how =) much more, he was afraid; fugit, nedum extimuerit. But in the usage of the language, οὐχ ὅπως in the first clause is often non solum non, even when the adversative clause is positive: thus, οὐχ ὅπως χάριν αὐτοῖς ἔχεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ – κατὰ τουτωνὶ πολιτεύῃ (Dem.), you not only are not grateful to them, but you even –, viz. because the first clause is, to say nothing of your being grateful – (you are not grateful, and not only so) but –: in other words, οὐχ ὅπως has become a phrase of negation, as if it were one word, like οὔπως. On the other hand, in οὐχ ὅπως τοὺς πολεμίους ἐτρέψαντο οἱ Ἕλληνες, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν χώραν αὐτῶν ἐκάκωσαν (Xen.), the οὐχ ὅπως is not treated as a negation of ἐτρ., but retains its proper force, I say not how they routed; they not only did that, but also. With the infinitive: μὴ ὅπως ὀρχεῖσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ὀρθοῦσθαι ἐδύνασθε, not only not to dance, but not even to stand upright (Xen.). (τοὺς Θηβαίους) ἡγεῖτο οὐχ ὅπως ἀντιπράξειν – ἀλλὰ καὶ συστρατεύσειν (Dem.), that they would not only not act against him, but would even join with him in the expedition: = that far from acting against him, &c.

d) With the superlative, ὅπως ἄριστα: to be explained in the same way as ὡς, viz. ὅπως δυνατόν ἐστι, &c. (" how can it be best done?")

e) After such verbs as σκοπεῖν, βουλεύεσθαι, μηχανᾶσθαι, σπουδάζειν, φροντίζειν, and the like: to see how, &c.: see the rules and exx. in the §§ referred to in the Index. Hence the ellipsis, ὅπως οὖν ἔσεσθε, (see then) how ye shall be.- Also after verbs of fearing and of prohibition, § 124 b, e. g. δέδοικα ὅπως μὴ γενήσεται, I fear (considering with myself) how it shall not be. ᾿Απείρηταί μοι, ὅπως μηδὲν ἐρῶ —, the prohibition being, ὅρα ὅπως μηδὲν ἐρεῖς. f) As final particle, ὅπως and ὅπως μή with subj. and opt., § 122 and 131 b. εἰς καιρὸν ἥκεις ὅπως ἀκούῃς = your intention being how you may hear. On ὅπως ἄν with subj., see under "Av, § 302. It results from the proper interrog. signification of ὅπως that this particle (not ὡς or ἵνα) can be used with fut. indic. in the final sense, see the exx. at end of § 122. (To do so and so) ὅπως μαχοῦνται = with this view and intention, how they shall fight.

g) Its use with histor. tenses of indic. to denote an unattained result is rare. ᾿Εχρῆν σε Πήγασον ζεύξαι ὅπως ἐφαίνου τραγικώτερος = that you might have appeared, prop. how you would have -. See the expl. under ἵνα.

§ 311.

ἵνα. The root is either the pronoun of the third person i or ", or perhaps more probably the relative 8- with the vowel lightened (attenuated) into L. The original meaning is " where," " in which (or, what) case," &c. (comp. ἐν in ἔνθα, where, and the first element of in-de, un-de, last of alio-quin.)

a) ubi and quo. ἵν' οἴχεται, where (whither) it is gone, Hom. Od. 4, 821: and demonstratively, ἵνα γάρ σφιν ἐπέφραδον ἠγερέεσθαι, for there (= it was there that)-, Il. 10, 127. This use is almost entirely confined to the poets. ἱκόμην ἵν᾽ ἱκόμην. οὐδ᾽ ὁρᾶς ἵν᾽ εἶ κακοῦ, Soph. (ἵνα with gen.) With ἄν: σε προσθέσθαι πέλας χώρας θέλουσι, μηδ᾽ ἵν᾽ ἂν σαυτοῦ κρατῇς, Soph., and not where (if they place thee) thou shalt be thine own master. (Brunck and Elmsl. κρατοῖς, wrongly, since ἵν' ἄν is never final = ὅπως ἄν.)

b) With subj. and optat. it forms sentences of intention, that, in order that. ἐξαύδα, μὴ κεῦθε νόῳ, ἵνα εἴδομεν (= εἰδῶμεν) ἄμφω, prop. in that case (or, as the case in which) we shall both know it. See § 122. 131. ἵνα τί; ellipsis, § 198 a, note.

c) More frequently than ὡς, it is used with the historical tenses of the indicative to denote an unattained result, i. e. something which would be (or would have been) attained on the supposition made by the speaker (in the form of a wish, a question implying a wish, or of a declaration of what should be, or should have been). Here, " I wish he had come, in which case (= so that) I should (might) have seen him," implying, " but he did not come, so I did not see him." See the exx. in § 131 b, R. 3. Thus, " he does (did) so and so, ἵν' ᾖ (εἴη) τυφλός, as the case wherein he may (as he purposes) be blind;" but " he should have done so, &c., ἵν' ἢ (imperf. indic). τυφλός, as the case in which he would have been blind. " The force of the latter clause rests upon the convertible proposition, " where this (e. g. the doing) is, there. that (e. g. the being blind) is," and " where that is, there this," so that the one being denied, the other is also denied.

The absence of ἄν from the relative clause is explained by the kindred meaning of the two particles, ἵνα and ἄν: comp. εἰ ἐβουλόμην λέγειν, ἤκουσας ἄν, “ if I had wished to speak, you would in that case have heard,” with ἐβουλόμην ἂν λέξαι, ἵνα ἤκουσας, “ I wish I had spoken, in which case you would have heard." Where ἄν does occur in the relative clause, it is drawn in by some other consideration: thus, καίτοι οὐ προσῆκεν ἀλλ᾽ εὐθὺς λέγειν – ἵνα μᾶλλον ἂν ἐπιστεύετο ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν (Isaus), the ἄν attaches itself to μᾶλλον as a set phrase (see ἄν, § 299).

§ 312.

ὅτι. This is the Lat. quod, our that: not originally the neut. of ὅστις, but the ancient form of neut. acc. of ὅς, ὅτ, covered with the vowel ι. Hence Hom. has indifferently ὅ and ὅτι.

a) that, after verba declarandi, sentiendi, &c. οὐκ ἀΐεις ὅ με βάλεν Αἴας; Hom. prop. hear you not this - which (= that) Ajax has wounded me? λέγει (ἀκούει, οἴεται, &c.) ὅτι νοσεῖς: ἔλεγεν ὅτι ἐνόσουν, ὅτι νοσοῖμι. § 159, R. 3,4; 178 a, R. 5. On the moods in object-sentences with ὅτι, see § 108.130 a, b; 137. On the difference between ὅτι and ὡς (ὅπως), § 159, R. 3. “ Ὅτι and ὡς are very rare after verbs denoting a purely subjective or uncertain view (e. g. οἴεσθαι, δοκεῖν, νομίζειν, φάναι = 'to declare one's own opinion:' but we find φάναι ὅτι, Pl. Gorg. 487; ὡς, Dem. 4, 48, Xen. Hell. 6, 3, 7; οἴεσθαι ὡς, Xen. Mem. 3, 3, 14. In later writers, δοκεῖν ὅτι, Polyb. 28, 9, 14; ἐλπίζειν ὅτι, Arr. An. 1, 4, 7. Cf. Thuc. 8,54. νομίζειν ὡς, Thuc. 3, 88). But after λέγειν, to tell (with reference to the substance of the narrative), and εἰπεῖν (with reference to the expression), ὅτι and ὡς are not uncommon." Krüger. Also, it follows from the original meaning of ὡς, that this particle is preferred to ὅτι where the " as " or " how" is of more importance than the " that: " hence, πείθειν ὡς, to get one to believe, and ἀκούειν, πυνθάνεσθαι, ἀγγέλλειν, to bring a report, ἀποδεικνύναι, &c. ὡς; and after verbs of calumniating, reproaching, accusing, &c.

On ὅτι in the sense (the circumstance) that -, (in regard) that -, § 170 a, R.: (to prove) that -, § 192 b, R. Τὸ δὲ μέγιστον ὅτι, § 197. And on μὴ ὅτι (= μὴ εἴπω ὅτι), οὐχ ὅτι (= οὐκ ἐρῶ ὅτι), see § 212, and cf. under ὅπως, § 310 c.

REM. We also find, οὐ μόνον ὅτι: thus, καὶ μὴν ὑπεραποθνήσκειν γε μόνοι ἐθέλουσιν οἱ ἐρῶντες, οὐ μόνον ὅτι ἄνδρες, ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναῖκες (non modo – sed etiam, Pl.). Likewise οὐχ ὅσον and οὐχ οἷον: οἱ μὲν οὐχ ὅσον οὐκ ἠμύναντο, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐσώθησαν, Thuc., which might have been expressed by οὐχ ὅπως, or by μὴ (οὐχ) ὅτι, ἠμύναντο. Οὐχ οἷον ὠφελεῖν δύναιντ᾽ ἂν τοὺς φίλους, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ αὐτοὺς σώζειν, Polyb.

b) because, for διὰ τοῦτο ὅτι, whence also διότι. ἆρα τὸ ὅσιον, ὅτι ὅσιόν ἐστι, φιλεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, ἢ, ὅτι φιλεῖται, ὅσιόν ἐστι; Pl. Διὰ τί δὲ ἄλλο ἄλυποι ἀλλήλοις εἰσὶν οἱ ἐμπλέοντες, ἢ διότι ἐν τάξει – κάθηνται; Xen.

REM. The poets have in the same sense, οὖνεκα = οὗ ἕνεκα, i. e. τούτου ἕνεκα, ὁ –, and ὁθούνεκα = ὅτου ἕνεκα.

With the superlative, though written as the conjunction, ὅτι τάχιστα, the word is ὅ τι, acc. neut. governed by δύναμαι, or nom. neut. subject to δυνατόν ἐστι, or the like.- Also in the elliptical ὅτι μή (except), the full construction is οὐδὲν ὅ τι μή.

§ 313.

ὅτε, when. This adverbial form is not a compound with τε, but its second syllable is an ancient case suffix: cf. quum, quando. Like other temp. adverbs, it is also used in a causal sense, § 127, R. 1, whence ὅτε μή = quando non and si non.

On μέμνημαι, ὅτε, see § 178 a, R. 5, and note. – With μέν and δέ, sometimes – sometimes, the accent conforms itself to that of ποτέ, viz. ὁτὲ μέν – ὁτὲ δέ.

The correlative of ὅτε is τότε, then. The corresponding interrogative πότε, when? indef. ποτέ, at some (any) time, § 274, and relative (depend.) interrogative, ὁπότε. Hence ὁπότε, as implying the question when? is indefinite. Cf. παρήγγειλεν ὑπομένειν ὅτε οἱ πολέμιοι ἐπικέοιντο (Xen.), and εἰώθει γοῦν ὁπότε δεῦρ᾽ ἐμβάλλοι, whenever -, Xen.

§ 314.

ὅπου, where. As ὅτε, πότε; ὁπότε, ποτέ (encl.) of time, so οὗ, ποῦ, ὅπου, πού (encl.) of place. The correlative (τοῦ being lost) is ἔνθα, demonstr. or ἐνταῦθα. – In prose, ὅπου has taken the place of οὗ, as the simple relative where. – Sometimes, but rarely, it is since, siquidem, quandoquidem: and then the apodosis is often ἦπου, in the sense, if –, then surely. ὅπου γὰρ ᾿Αθηνόδωρος καὶ Καλλίστρατος – οἷοί τε γεγόνασιν, ἦπου – ἡμεῖς – ἂν δυνηθείημεν (Isocr.), if A. and C. have been able, surely we should be able.

§ 315.

ἐπεί (ἐπειδή). Properly a particle of time, when, after, postquam, but, like most particles of time, also denotes cause, since, quoniam, quandoquidem. ἐπεὶ τάχιστα, as soon as ever. – Both are also since (ex quo) of time. Οὐ πολὺς χρόνος ἐπειδὴ χιτῶνας λινοῦς ἐπαύσαντο φοροῦντες (Thuc.). With ἄν: ἐπειδάν, ἐπάν, ἐπήν; the first by far the most frequent, and the second somewhat more so than the third.

In the sense "for if not," "for otherwise," "for if so" (where εἰ δὲ μή, or εἰ δέ after a negat. proposition might have been used), there is an ellipsis: since (if you doubt it, or, if you think so, &c.) –. Νόσον γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ ἀλλόκοτον αὐτοῦ νοσεῖ, ἣν οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἷς γνοίη πότ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἂν ξυμβάλοι εἰ μὴ πύθοιθ᾽ ἡμῶν, ἐπεὶ τοπάζετε, Aristoph.

§ 316.

εἰ, if. This is an ancient dative of the pronoun of the third person, ἷ or ἴ, comp. Lat. si (sibi). Its original force is "in this that," "in the (case, hap, event) that," "on the (condition) that." [1]

[1]: This (the reflexive) pronoun is closely connected with the relative pronoun, so that, in point of sense, the conditional particle may be said to be directly derived from the relative. Thus in Sanskrit, from relat. yas, yâ, yat, ὅς, ἥ, ὅ, we have yadi = ὅτε, "when," and yadi = "if;" and in German, "wenn" is both when and if. Accordingly, the usages of the relat. (and interrog.) and of the conditional particle very often run over into each other. Thus, ὅτε and ὅπου approach to the sense of condition: εἴ τις is more nearly = ὅς τις than "if any:" θαυμάζω εἰ represents θ. ὅτι (see § 194 c); the εἰ of wishing may also be expressed by ὡς and πῶς (the relat. utinam), and the interrogative εἰ (whether) by πότερα.

For the use of εἰ, ἐάν, ἤν, in conditional propositions, see the Index.

From such expressions as σκέψαι εἰ -, consider if-, results the sense whether in dependent interrogation, § 199 b. εἰ (ἐάν) is thus used only in indirect, and, indeed, properly only in double questions, denoting a wavering between two considerations: but often only one member is expressed, the other being present in the mind of the speaker. Where both are expressed, the second is introduced by ἤ, § 199 c. Σκέψαι εἰ ὁ Ἑλλήνων νόμος κάλλιον ἔχει, whether it be not (Xen.). δέομαι ὑμῶν τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἢ μή (= μὴ δίκαια) Pl. Comp. πρὶν δῆλον εἶναι... πότερον ἔψονται Κύρῳ ἢ οὔ (= οὐχ ἔψονται). – The same thing is expressed by εἴτε εἴτε, § 199 c. In poetry we also find εἴτε – ἤ, εἰ – εἴτε, and – εἴτε with the first εἴτε omitted.

REM. Εἴτε εἴτε is also conditional, viz. where several cases are put conditionally, both if and if: but here also in English we use the interrogative whether or. See § 194 a.

§ 317.

The use of εἰ in wishes, εἰ γὰρ ὤφελον πρότερος ἰδεῖν, is elliptical: if it were so, it would be well. Thus we say, O if it were so! (i. e. how happy I should be!) – Hence with suffix θε, § 239, εἴθε, utinam. See exx. in § 129, and R. 2.

εἴ γε (= si quidem) if at least, if, that is (εἰ – γέ when the γέ distinguishes the interposed word, εἴ γε when its influence extends to the whole clause). Οὐδείς, εἴ γε σὺ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, nobody, if, that is (or, if, at least) what you say is true.

εἴπερ is εἰ strengthened by πέρ. It calls attention to the condition, and so adds emphasis to it. The force of πέρ may be rendered in the condition by always supposing that, in the apodosis by, then it quite follows that —.

καὶ εἰ, is even if: the καί emphasizes the condition, marks it as improbable, extreme, or as the most unfavorable that can well be conceived. In εἰ καί, the καί gives emphasis, not to the condition, but to the thing supposed. καὶ εἰ λέγω, even supposing I say, i. e. go so far as to suppose that I say. εἰ καὶ λέγω, supposing I even say, i. e. suppose I go so far as to say. For (see § 222) καί adverbial implies a correlation καί – καί: therefore the first is καὶ (ἄλλως), καὶ εἰ λέγω; the second, εἰ καὶ (ἄλλως), καὶ λέγω. This is the principle of the distinction, but in practice the difference is often so slight, that no reason appears why one form should be chosen rather than the other.

§ 318.

εἶτα. ἔπειτα. These particles, perhaps, are related to εἰ, ἐπεί, as δῆτα to δή, τηνικαῦτα to τηνίκα; and thus they may be considered as denoting the demonstrative apodosis of a suppressed condition (if) or relative (when). Thus Ellendt remarks that εἶτα may sometimes be explained by a sentence with εἰ or εἰ καί. Soph. Phil. 1337, ἀλλ᾽ εἰκάθω δῆτ᾽; εἶτα πῶς ὁ δύσμορος εἰς φῶς – εἶμι; i. e. (and if I yield) then how?

Others make εἶτα cognate with ἔτι (corresponding forms in Sanskrit ati, éta), and ἔπειτα = ἐπ᾿ εἶτα (Kühner). – In Latin, the sense is expressed by deinde: –

a) In enumerations, πρῶτον (μέν) –, εἶτα, ἔπειτα (δέ) –. (b) In the usage with participles, see § 175 a (comp. 181, R. 2). (c) In interrogations, expressed with vehemence or indignation: as in the ex. given above. Εὖ ἴσθι, ἔφη, ὅτι, εἰ νομίζοιμι θεοὺς ἀνθρώπων τι φροντίζειν, οὐκ ἂν ἀμελοίην αὐτῶν. Σ. Ἔπειτ᾿ οὐκ οἴει φροντίζειν; (Xen.) It may be explained = post talia (Gronov.), quum ita sit, ergo: the Lat. uses deinde in the same way: quæ nunc deinde mora est, aut ut quid jam, Turne, retractas? Virg. Æn. 12, 889. Hercules solus domat. Cur deinde latebras aut fugam vecors petam? Sen. Herc. 1407. Often κᾆτα, κἄπειτα, which are more emphatic: κἄπειτα τοιοῦτον ὄντα οὐ φιλεῖς αὐτόν; (Xen.) – Εἶτα, ἔπειτα, and then, § 185 a, R. 6.

§ 319.

ἔτι. This particle is cognate with Lat. et, at, prep. ad, at-que = ad-que. Its meaning is, further (on), yet, still. Comp. also Lat. item. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν πάντα ὁμοίως ἀμφοτέρων ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ τὸ μάχεσθαι οὐκέτι (οὐκ ἔτι, non item) ἀμφοτέρων (Xen.). ἀνεστράφησαν οἱ ἀμφὶ βασιλέα, πεζοὶ μὲν οὐκέτι, τῶν δὲ ἱππέων ὁ λόφος ἐνεπλήσθη (Xen.).

§ 270.

§ 270.

τοίνυν. This particle is compounded either of enclitic τοι (§ 252) (for that matter), or the stronger form τῷ, in that case, with νῦν (§ 243). Its use is in transitions and inferences: then (to proceed), then (in brief), well then, why then (especially in lively replies). In the beginning of a speech: ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν, I, for my part, sure enough, Xen. An. 5, 1, 2. In continuation: Ἔτι τοίνυν τάδε ὁρᾶτε, moreover now, ib. § 10. συνεπόμνυμι μηδὲ ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι στρατηγοὶ ἔλαβον εἰληφέναι, μὴ τοίνυν μήδε (nay, for that matter, in short, not even) ὅσα τῶν λοχαγῶν ἔνιοι, Xen. An. 7, 6, 19. In answers: ἄπειμι τοίνυν, well then (to cut the matter short) I am going, Soph. Œd. C. 444. In unwilling reply: τῶν Λαΐου τοίνυν τις ἦν γεννημάτων; well then (if you must needs have it), ib. 1167. – τὰ λῷστα τοίνυν ταῦτά μ᾿ ἀλγύνει πάλαι, why then (to dispose of that matter briefly) this which you call 'best' has been troubling me all along, ib. 1067.

τοίνυν. This particle is compounded either of enclitic τοι (§ 252) (for that matter), or the stronger form τῷ, in that case, with νῦν (§ 243). Its use is in transitions and inferences: then (to proceed), then (in brief), well then, why then (especially in lively replies). In the beginning of a speech: ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν, I, for my part, sure enough, Xen. An. 5, 1, 2. In continuation: Ἔτι τοίνυν τάδε ὁρᾶτε, moreover now, ib. § 10. συνεπόμνυμι μηδὲ ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι στρατηγοὶ ἔλαβον εἰληφέναι, μὴ τοίνυν μήδε (nay, for that matter, in short, not even) ὅσα τῶν λοχαγῶν ἔνιοι, Xen. An. 7, 6, 19. In answers: ἄπειμι τοίνυν, well then (to cut the matter short) I am going, Soph. Œd. C. 444. In unwilling reply: τῶν Λαΐου τοίνυν τις ἦν γεννημάτων; well then (if you must needs have it), ib. 1167. – τὰ λῷστα τοίνυν ταῦτά μ᾿ ἀλγύνει πάλαι, why then (to dispose of that matter briefly) this which you call 'best' has been troubling me all along, ib. 1067.

§ 271.

§ 271.

τοίγαρ. The position of this particle in the beginning of a sentence shows that its first element is not the enclitic τοι, but the ancient τῷ, in that case, therefore. Hence, τοίγαρ = ergo, proinde. It is used in expressions of assent: why (γάρ) then (τῷ), τοίγαρ ποιήσω, Soph. Tr. 1249: in inference, Soph. Aj. 666 (after citing a proverb), τοίγαρ τὸ λοιπὸν εἰσόμεσθα, why then (such being the case) The rendering in each instance varies with that of γάρ: thus often in the beginning of a reply, yes, (and) therefore: e. g. τοίγαρ δι᾽ ὀρθῆς τήνδε ναυκληρεῖς πόλιν, Soph. Ant. 994.

τοιγάρτοι is the same with addition of τοι enclitic, why therefore to be sure. τοιγάρτοι νῦν, ἅτε μέγιστα ἠδικηκὼς τῶν ἐν Μακεδονία, ἀθλιώτατός ἐστι πάντων Μακεδύνων (ironically, after a recital of wicked acts), yes, and therefore no doubt -, Pl. Gorg.471.

τοιγαροῦν, why then, such being the case: ἀλλὰ θεοῖς γ᾽ ἔχθιστος ἥκω. “ τοιγαροῦν τεύξει τάχα,” why then for that very reason (they are the more likely to grant thy request), Soph. Œd. Τ. 1519. ὀρθῶς ἔλεξας· τοιγαροῦν τὸ σὸν φράσον, such then being the case, tell me, Phil. 341. ξύμφημι κἀγώ· τοιγαροῦν σώζου τόδε. Frequent in prose: e. g. (Cyrus never left a man's zeal in his service unrewarded) Τοιγαροῦν κράτιστοι δὴ ὑπηρέται παντὸς ἔργου Κύρῳ ἐλέχθησαν γενέσθαι, accordingly, and reason good this, Xen. An. 1, 9, 18. (He never broke promise) καὶ γὰρ οὖν (and therefore in fact) ἐπίστευον αὐτῷ –. Τοιγαροῦν ἐπεὶ -, accordingly, (it is no wonder that) when, ib. 1, 8, 7-9.

τοίγαρ. The position of this particle in the beginning of a sentence shows that its first element is not the enclitic τοι, but the ancient τῷ, in that case, therefore. Hence, τοίγαρ = ergo, proinde. It is used in expressions of assent: why (γάρ) then (τῷ), τοίγαρ ποιήσω, Soph. Tr. 1249: in inference, Soph. Aj. 666 (after citing a proverb), τοίγαρ τὸ λοιπὸν εἰσόμεσθα, why then (such being the case) The rendering in each instance varies with that of γάρ: thus often in the beginning of a reply, yes, (and) therefore: e. g. τοίγαρ δι᾽ ὀρθῆς τήνδε ναυκληρεῖς πόλιν, Soph. Ant. 994.

τοιγάρτοι is the same with addition of τοι enclitic, why therefore to be sure. τοιγάρτοι νῦν, ἅτε μέγιστα ἠδικηκὼς τῶν ἐν Μακεδονία, ἀθλιώτατός ἐστι πάντων Μακεδύνων (ironically, after a recital of wicked acts), yes, and therefore no doubt -, Pl. Gorg.471.

τοιγαροῦν, why then, such being the case: ἀλλὰ θεοῖς γ᾽ ἔχθιστος ἥκω. “ τοιγαροῦν τεύξει τάχα,” why then for that very reason (they are the more likely to grant thy request), Soph. Œd. Τ. 1519. ὀρθῶς ἔλεξας· τοιγαροῦν τὸ σὸν φράσον, such then being the case, tell me, Phil. 341. ξύμφημι κἀγώ· τοιγαροῦν σώζου τόδε. Frequent in prose: e. g. (Cyrus never left a man's zeal in his service unrewarded) Τοιγαροῦν κράτιστοι δὴ ὑπηρέται παντὸς ἔργου Κύρῳ ἐλέχθησαν γενέσθαι, accordingly, and reason good this, Xen. An. 1, 9, 18. (He never broke promise) καὶ γὰρ οὖν (and therefore in fact) ἐπίστευον αὐτῷ –. Τοιγαροῦν ἐπεὶ -, accordingly, (it is no wonder that) when, ib. 1, 8, 7-9.

§ 272.

§ 272.

που. This enclitic particle (an adverbial form of τις, quis, kos, whence Ion. κου, κως, &c.) properly = somewhere. Apart from the notion of place, it means, somehow, in some sort or degree; in conjectures, = perhaps, I suppose, used in conversation when the speaker puts something in a half-questioning manner (surely), intending to build something on the affirmative answer of the person addressed: τὸ γάρ που κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲν διαφέρει, for, I presume (it being possible that the other would say there was some difference), Pl. Crito, 49. Also when, with a degree of uncertainty, a speaker repeats another's words: thus (Socr. having proposed a definition of σχῆμα, Meno says), Ὅτι σχῆμά πού ἐστι, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, ὁ ἀεὶ χρόᾳ ἔπεται, because figure, I take it –, Pl. Men. 75. Hence with Attic urbanity, it is used in matter of certainty, especially to intimate that, before the speaker proceeds with his argument, he waits for the other to affirm the point, or call it to mind: ὁ γὰρ σκυτοτόμος τέμνει που τομεῖ καὶ σμίλῃ καὶ ἄλλοις ὀργάνοις (I suppose you will grant, or, remember that), Pl. Alc. pr. 51. Οὐ τί που οἴει –; You do not, I trow, at all imagine (" mirantis et indignantis," Stallb.). Cf. οὐ δήπου. (Sometimes it is put before an interposed φημί, or the like, to which it belongs: ἔδοξέπούφησι, It says, I suppose, “ It seemed good, &c.," Pl. Phædr. 258.)

που. This enclitic particle (an adverbial form of τις, quis, kos, whence Ion. κου, κως, &c.) properly = somewhere. Apart from the notion of place, it means, somehow, in some sort or degree; in conjectures, = perhaps, I suppose, used in conversation when the speaker puts something in a half-questioning manner (surely), intending to build something on the affirmative answer of the person addressed: τὸ γάρ που κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲν διαφέρει, for, I presume (it being possible that the other would say there was some difference), Pl. Crito, 49. Also when, with a degree of uncertainty, a speaker repeats another's words: thus (Socr. having proposed a definition of σχῆμα, Meno says), Ὅτι σχῆμά πού ἐστι, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, ὁ ἀεὶ χρόᾳ ἔπεται, because figure, I take it –, Pl. Men. 75. Hence with Attic urbanity, it is used in matter of certainty, especially to intimate that, before the speaker proceeds with his argument, he waits for the other to affirm the point, or call it to mind: ὁ γὰρ σκυτοτόμος τέμνει που τομεῖ καὶ σμίλῃ καὶ ἄλλοις ὀργάνοις (I suppose you will grant, or, remember that), Pl. Alc. pr. 51. Οὐ τί που οἴει –; You do not, I trow, at all imagine (" mirantis et indignantis," Stallb.). Cf. οὐ δήπου. (Sometimes it is put before an interposed φημί, or the like, to which it belongs: ἔδοξέπούφησι, It says, I suppose, “ It seemed good, &c.," Pl. Phædr. 258.)

§ 273.

§ 273.

The same, with greater emphasis, is δήπου (we may say that at once, I suppose). Ἐγὼ γάρ που ἀπεκρινάμην τὸ διὰ παντὸς ὀρθῶς ἔχον· ὀρθῶς δὲ δήπου ἔχει τὸ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην γιγνόμενον, my answer, I presume you perceive, was as to what is done rightly (in wrestling) at all points: and rightly done – surely you will grant this – is what is done by strict rule of art, Pl. Alc. pr. 107. τῶν Λαΐου δήπου τις ὠνομάζετο, I suppose we may be pretty sure that –, Soph. Ed. T. 1042.

Sometimes in a direct interrogation, distinct from the latent interrogation of the particle itself: καὶ ἔστι δήπου τὸ δίψος δίψος τοῦ; Pl. Rep. 439; even when the interrogation is virtually negative: καὶ τούτου γε δήπου τις ἂν ἐπιθυμήσειεν; equivalent to οὐ γὰρ δήπου τούτουγέ τις ἐπιθυμήσειεν, Pl. Conv. 200. In οὐ δήπου (γε), the negation is expressed interrogatively: οὐ δή πού σε γε – ἄγουσιν, surely they are not? Soph. Ant. 381. οὐ γὰρ δήπου σοῦ γε-, Pl. Apol. 20. (“ οὐ δήπου est suspicantis: οὗ τί που mirantis et indignantis," Stallb.)

Stronger still is δήπουθεν (see § 240); used when the speaker, with a kind of defiance, disputes the possibility of an opposite assertion: ἑστάναι γὰρ ἐξέσται δήπουθεν αὐτῷ, for I presume there can be no doubt that -, Dem. Mid. c. 26.

REM. Cf. μέν in interrogation: Ἕλλην μέν ἐστι, καὶ ἑλληνίζει; Pl. Men. 82,

where μέν assumes the fact as unquestionable: που in the same question would

mean, that the speaker waits for the other's assent. (Buttm. in l. and Index, s. v.)

The same, with greater emphasis, is δήπου (we may say that at once, I suppose). Ἐγὼ γάρ που ἀπεκρινάμην τὸ διὰ παντὸς ὀρθῶς ἔχον· ὀρθῶς δὲ δήπου ἔχει τὸ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην γιγνόμενον, my answer, I presume you perceive, was as to what is done rightly (in wrestling) at all points: and rightly done – surely you will grant this – is what is done by strict rule of art, Pl. Alc. pr. 107. τῶν Λαΐου δήπου τις ὠνομάζετο, I suppose we may be pretty sure that –, Soph. Ed. T. 1042.

Sometimes in a direct interrogation, distinct from the latent interrogation of the particle itself: καὶ ἔστι δήπου τὸ δίψος δίψος τοῦ; Pl. Rep. 439; even when the interrogation is virtually negative: καὶ τούτου γε δήπου τις ἂν ἐπιθυμήσειεν; equivalent to οὐ γὰρ δήπου τούτουγέ τις ἐπιθυμήσειεν, Pl. Conv. 200. In οὐ δήπου (γε), the negation is expressed interrogatively: οὐ δή πού σε γε – ἄγουσιν, surely they are not? Soph. Ant. 381. οὐ γὰρ δήπου σοῦ γε-, Pl. Apol. 20. (“ οὐ δήπου est suspicantis: οὗ τί που mirantis et indignantis," Stallb.)

Stronger still is δήπουθεν (see § 240); used when the speaker, with a kind of defiance, disputes the possibility of an opposite assertion: ἑστάναι γὰρ ἐξέσται δήπουθεν αὐτῷ, for I presume there can be no doubt that -, Dem. Mid. c. 26.

REM. Cf. μέν in interrogation: Ἕλλην μέν ἐστι, καὶ ἑλληνίζει; Pl. Men. 82,

where μέν assumes the fact as unquestionable: που in the same question would

mean, that the speaker waits for the other's assent. (Buttm. in l. and Index, s. v.)

§ 274.

§ 274.

ποτέ (enclitic). This temporal adverb of τις (quis, κος, Ion. κοτέ), at some time; once (ποτέ μέν– ποτέ δέ, one while another while, modomodo, or ἐνίοτε, or ἄλλοτε δέ): at any time, ever. With other designations of time: νῦν ποτε, ἤδη ποτέ, πάλαι ποτέ, πρίν ποτε, πρόσθε πού ποτε, πώποτε, ἔτι ποτέ. The notion of time is less prominent in the following: μέθες μέθεςμε. “ ποῖ μεθῶ; ” μέθες ποτέ, do' let me go (utique, in any wise), Soph. Phil.816. τίσασθε, τίσασθ᾽ ἀλλὰ τῷχρόνῳ ποτέ, at last, tandem aliquando, or simply by the emphasis, do' avenge me! So μόγις οὖν ποτε ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπος ἀνέωξε τὴν θύραν, at last. Ἐκκάλυπτε νῦν ποθ' (now at last) ἡμῖν οὕςτινας λέγεις λόγους, Eur. Iph. A. 872. Κἀπειδὴ ἀφίκετό ποτε ὁ Ἵππαρχος.

In interrogations, it expresses impatience for an answer (tandem), or wonder, or emotion in general. τί ποτελέγεις; what do you say? τί ποτε πέπονθας; what (in the world) ails you? πῶς ποτε δράσεις; = how will you do it? τί ποτε (Hom. τίπτ'), what can be the reason that –? Ποίῳ ποτ᾿ ἐχρήσαντο τεκμηρίῳ; Xen. And so in indirect questions: ᾿Εθαύμασα ὅτῳ ποτὲτρόπῳ τοῦτ᾽ ἐγένετο: and with indefinite pronouns, όςτις ποτε, who-ever, &c.: and with εἰ, εἴποτε, if ever, and if perchance. With δή. ὅστις δήποτε, whosoever, ὅπου δή ποτε. δο εἰ δή ποτε. τίδήποτε; τοῦτο πέπρακται νυνὶ ὅπως δή ποτε, no matter how: and with οὖν. Ἐμισθώσατό με ὅστις δή ποτ' οὖν, Æsch. Οὐ δή ποτε in negations interrogatively expressed, surely never-? οὐ δή ποθ᾽ ἡμῖν ξυγγενὴς ἥκειςποθέν; surely it can never be that? Soph. El. 1202. Cf. οὐ δή που.

ποτέ (enclitic). This temporal adverb of τις (quis, κος, Ion. κοτέ), at some time; once (ποτέ μέν– ποτέ δέ, one while another while, modomodo, or ἐνίοτε, or ἄλλοτε δέ): at any time, ever. With other designations of time: νῦν ποτε, ἤδη ποτέ, πάλαι ποτέ, πρίν ποτε, πρόσθε πού ποτε, πώποτε, ἔτι ποτέ. The notion of time is less prominent in the following: μέθες μέθεςμε. “ ποῖ μεθῶ; ” μέθες ποτέ, do' let me go (utique, in any wise), Soph. Phil.816. τίσασθε, τίσασθ᾽ ἀλλὰ τῷχρόνῳ ποτέ, at last, tandem aliquando, or simply by the emphasis, do' avenge me! So μόγις οὖν ποτε ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπος ἀνέωξε τὴν θύραν, at last. Ἐκκάλυπτε νῦν ποθ' (now at last) ἡμῖν οὕςτινας λέγεις λόγους, Eur. Iph. A. 872. Κἀπειδὴ ἀφίκετό ποτε ὁ Ἵππαρχος.

In interrogations, it expresses impatience for an answer (tandem), or wonder, or emotion in general. τί ποτελέγεις; what do you say? τί ποτε πέπονθας; what (in the world) ails you? πῶς ποτε δράσεις; = how will you do it? τί ποτε (Hom. τίπτ'), what can be the reason that –? Ποίῳ ποτ᾿ ἐχρήσαντο τεκμηρίῳ; Xen. And so in indirect questions: ᾿Εθαύμασα ὅτῳ ποτὲτρόπῳ τοῦτ᾽ ἐγένετο: and with indefinite pronouns, όςτις ποτε, who-ever, &c.: and with εἰ, εἴποτε, if ever, and if perchance. With δή. ὅστις δήποτε, whosoever, ὅπου δή ποτε. δο εἰ δή ποτε. τίδήποτε; τοῦτο πέπρακται νυνὶ ὅπως δή ποτε, no matter how: and with οὖν. Ἐμισθώσατό με ὅστις δή ποτ' οὖν, Æsch. Οὐ δή ποτε in negations interrogatively expressed, surely never-? οὐ δή ποθ᾽ ἡμῖν ξυγγενὴς ἥκειςποθέν; surely it can never be that? Soph. El. 1202. Cf. οὐ δή που.

§ 275.

§ 275.

᾿Αλλά. This adverbial form (distinguished by its accent from pl. neut. ἄλλα) derives its force from the proper signification of ἄλλος = " what there is else remaining after the removal or exclusion of some:" i. e. the notion introduced by ἀλλά is presented as being exclusive of some other preceding notion; or ἀλλά corresponds to a preceding οὐ, expressed or understood.

α) οὐκ ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ σύ. οὐκ ἐάσομεν, ἀλλὰ κωλύσομεν: the second notion excludes the first, to which it stands in direct opposition.

b) αἰσχρὰν γυναῖκ᾽ ἔγημας, ἀλλὰ πλουσίαν. σοφὸς σὺ μάντις, ἀλλὰ τἀδικεῖν φιλῶν. Here the first notion is not expressly excluded, and the ἀλλά introduces, not its direct opposite, but something different. But here also ἀλλά has, in fact, its proper force with reference to a suppressed οὐ; for in this form of sentence the speaker implies, that the first notion, which he concedes, is not the point, but the second is. In the full expression of the thought, there is an opposition by μέν and δέ, with an οὐ in the δέ clause, to which οὐ the ἀλλά corresponds. Thus, τὸ σῶμα δοῦλον, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ νοῦς ἐλεύθερος, the body is enslaved – this indeed (μέν) I grant, but (δέ) not this is the point but (that) the mind is free. Often, to mark the concession more strongly, the μέν is expressed in the first clause: τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα ὠφέλιμον μέν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ δύσκολον, which, however, is by no means simply equivalent to ὠφ. μέν ἐ., δύσκολον δέ, nor does the ἀλλά correspond to the μέν, but to the negation in the suppressed δέ clause. In μέν – δέ, it is intimated that both considerations are taken into the account: in μέν – ἀλλά, the former is conceded only to be set aside. When the second member is negative, the μέν must be expressed, ὠφέλιμον μέν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ καλόν: without μέν, this would = advantageous, and not handsome; see c. – The first also may be negative, e. g. οὐκ ἀρνοῦμαι μέν, ἀλλ᾽ (ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως) ἐρωτῶ; but then the ἀλλά corresponds, not to the expressed, but to the implied negation, viz. not my not denying is the point, but my asking.

c) But the Greek often introduces with ἀλλά a negation in direct opposition to a preceding affirmation: thus, ἐκεῖθεν ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐνθένδε ἡρπάσθη, Pl. Phædr. 229. See other exx. in § 187, to which add: Χαραδριοῦ τινα αὖ σὺ βίον λέγεις, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ νεκροῦ οὐδὲ λίθου, Pl. Gorg. 494. κινδυνεύει τὸ ἑκόντα ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν ἰέναι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀνάγκην περιμένειν, αἰσχρὸν νενομίσθαι, coming forward to rule instead of (and not rather) waiting till one is forced, Pl. Rep. 347. τίς μηχανή – δικαιοσύνην τιμᾶν ἐθέλειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ γελᾶν ἐπαινουμένης ἀκούοντα; ib. 366. φιλοσόφους ἀλλ᾽ οὐ φιλοδόξους κλητέον, ib. 480. ἔπειτ᾿ ἀπὸ ταῤῥοῦ τοὺς θεοὺς ὑπερφρονεῖς, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς; Arist. Nub. The natural expression would be οὐκ ἐνθένδε ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖθεν, &c., but to give greater emphasis to the affirmation by more forcible repudiation of its opposite, which is assumed as having been asserted, or likely to be so, the order is inverted, so that the ἀλλά seems to belong, in a manner, to the preceding clause, and to look backward rather than forward: thence (quite another thing that!), not hence. But the true explanation (which reduces this to the form a) is this: ἐκεῖθεν ἡρπάσθη· οὐκ (ὡς σὺ λέγεις, οι, ὡς ᾠόμεθα, or the like) ἐνθένδε, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐνθένδε, thence-not as people might suppose, "hence" but " not hence." This explanation accounts for the irony which commonly appears in this use. Comp. ὑμεῖς– μάλιστ᾽ ἂν οὕτως– εὐδοκιμοῖτε καὶ οὐκ ἐπαινοῖσθε -· ἡμεῖς τ᾽ αὖ μάλιστ᾽ ἂν οὕτως εὐφραινοίμεθα οὐχ ἡδοίμεθα, Pl. Prot.

τὸ δὲ 337, followed in each instance by an explanation: τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐδοκιμεῖν....,

ἐπαινεῖσθαι... &c. Here is no irony: had such been the case, tre full form would have been, εὐδοκιμοῖτε καὶ οὐκ ἐπαινοῖσθε ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐπαινοῖσθε, = “ and the case would be, not a being praised, but a not being praised;" whence, the negative statement being suppressed, the form would be εὐδοκ. ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐπαινοῖσθε.

REM. This use of ἀλλ' οὐ must be distinguished from the but not -, which is opposed to a preceding μέν; see b: e. g. prof itable indeed, but not handsome, ὠφέλιμον μέν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ καλόν, which is better expressed, οὐ μέντοι (οι μὲν δὴ) καλόν γε.

᾿Αλλά. This adverbial form (distinguished by its accent from pl. neut. ἄλλα) derives its force from the proper signification of ἄλλος = " what there is else remaining after the removal or exclusion of some:" i. e. the notion introduced by ἀλλά is presented as being exclusive of some other preceding notion; or ἀλλά corresponds to a preceding οὐ, expressed or understood.

α) οὐκ ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ σύ. οὐκ ἐάσομεν, ἀλλὰ κωλύσομεν: the second notion excludes the first, to which it stands in direct opposition.

b) αἰσχρὰν γυναῖκ᾽ ἔγημας, ἀλλὰ πλουσίαν. σοφὸς σὺ μάντις, ἀλλὰ τἀδικεῖν φιλῶν. Here the first notion is not expressly excluded, and the ἀλλά introduces, not its direct opposite, but something different. But here also ἀλλά has, in fact, its proper force with reference to a suppressed οὐ; for in this form of sentence the speaker implies, that the first notion, which he concedes, is not the point, but the second is. In the full expression of the thought, there is an opposition by μέν and δέ, with an οὐ in the δέ clause, to which οὐ the ἀλλά corresponds. Thus, τὸ σῶμα δοῦλον, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ νοῦς ἐλεύθερος, the body is enslaved – this indeed (μέν) I grant, but (δέ) not this is the point but (that) the mind is free. Often, to mark the concession more strongly, the μέν is expressed in the first clause: τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα ὠφέλιμον μέν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ δύσκολον, which, however, is by no means simply equivalent to ὠφ. μέν ἐ., δύσκολον δέ, nor does the ἀλλά correspond to the μέν, but to the negation in the suppressed δέ clause. In μέν – δέ, it is intimated that both considerations are taken into the account: in μέν – ἀλλά, the former is conceded only to be set aside. When the second member is negative, the μέν must be expressed, ὠφέλιμον μέν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ καλόν: without μέν, this would = advantageous, and not handsome; see c. – The first also may be negative, e. g. οὐκ ἀρνοῦμαι μέν, ἀλλ᾽ (ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως) ἐρωτῶ; but then the ἀλλά corresponds, not to the expressed, but to the implied negation, viz. not my not denying is the point, but my asking.

c) But the Greek often introduces with ἀλλά a negation in direct opposition to a preceding affirmation: thus, ἐκεῖθεν ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐνθένδε ἡρπάσθη, Pl. Phædr. 229. See other exx. in § 187, to which add: Χαραδριοῦ τινα αὖ σὺ βίον λέγεις, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ νεκροῦ οὐδὲ λίθου, Pl. Gorg. 494. κινδυνεύει τὸ ἑκόντα ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν ἰέναι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀνάγκην περιμένειν, αἰσχρὸν νενομίσθαι, coming forward to rule instead of (and not rather) waiting till one is forced, Pl. Rep. 347. τίς μηχανή – δικαιοσύνην τιμᾶν ἐθέλειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ γελᾶν ἐπαινουμένης ἀκούοντα; ib. 366. φιλοσόφους ἀλλ᾽ οὐ φιλοδόξους κλητέον, ib. 480. ἔπειτ᾿ ἀπὸ ταῤῥοῦ τοὺς θεοὺς ὑπερφρονεῖς, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς; Arist. Nub. The natural expression would be οὐκ ἐνθένδε ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖθεν, &c., but to give greater emphasis to the affirmation by more forcible repudiation of its opposite, which is assumed as having been asserted, or likely to be so, the order is inverted, so that the ἀλλά seems to belong, in a manner, to the preceding clause, and to look backward rather than forward: thence (quite another thing that!), not hence. But the true explanation (which reduces this to the form a) is this: ἐκεῖθεν ἡρπάσθη· οὐκ (ὡς σὺ λέγεις, οι, ὡς ᾠόμεθα, or the like) ἐνθένδε, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐνθένδε, thence-not as people might suppose, "hence" but " not hence." This explanation accounts for the irony which commonly appears in this use. Comp. ὑμεῖς– μάλιστ᾽ ἂν οὕτως– εὐδοκιμοῖτε καὶ οὐκ ἐπαινοῖσθε -· ἡμεῖς τ᾽ αὖ μάλιστ᾽ ἂν οὕτως εὐφραινοίμεθα οὐχ ἡδοίμεθα, Pl. Prot.

τὸ δὲ 337, followed in each instance by an explanation: τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐδοκιμεῖν....,

ἐπαινεῖσθαι... &c. Here is no irony: had such been the case, tre full form would have been, εὐδοκιμοῖτε καὶ οὐκ ἐπαινοῖσθε ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐπαινοῖσθε, = “ and the case would be, not a being praised, but a not being praised;" whence, the negative statement being suppressed, the form would be εὐδοκ. ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐπαινοῖσθε.

REM. This use of ἀλλ' οὐ must be distinguished from the but not -, which is opposed to a preceding μέν; see b: e. g. prof itable indeed, but not handsome, ὠφέλιμον μέν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ καλόν, which is better expressed, οὐ μέντοι (οι μὲν δὴ) καλόν γε.

§ 276.

§ 276.

οὐ μόνον – ἀλλὰ καὶ –, not only, but also - (the ἀλλά in direct opposition to οὐ, the καί = καὶ -, καὶ -), sometimes with the addition πρὸς τούτῳ, οι τούτοις. When the καί is omitted, the notioncontained in the first member is entirely put aside. Thus, in οὐ μόνον ἐκινδύνευσεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔπαθεν, not only was he in danger, but he (both was in danger, and) also suffered, an equal stress is laid on both notions: but in the same sentence without καί, on arriving at the second notion, we think it so important, that we reject the intention with which here also we set out, viz. of putting the notions (ἐκινδ. and ἔπαθε) on the same level by (καὶ -,) καὶ -.

οὐ μόνον – ἀλλὰ καὶ –, not only, but also - (the ἀλλά in direct opposition to οὐ, the καί = καὶ -, καὶ -), sometimes with the addition πρὸς τούτῳ, οι τούτοις. When the καί is omitted, the notioncontained in the first member is entirely put aside. Thus, in οὐ μόνον ἐκινδύνευσεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔπαθεν, not only was he in danger, but he (both was in danger, and) also suffered, an equal stress is laid on both notions: but in the same sentence without καί, on arriving at the second notion, we think it so important, that we reject the intention with which here also we set out, viz. of putting the notions (ἐκινδ. and ἔπαθε) on the same level by (καὶ -,) καὶ -.

§ 277.

§ 277.

a) When ἀλλά follows conditional clauses with εἰ, εἰ μή, &c., it may be rendered by yet, yet at least = saltem, certe. This case comes under b, viz. the ἀλλά refers to a suppressed apodosis with μέν δέ. Εἰ σῶμα δοῦλον, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ νοῦς ἐλεύθερος: the suppressed apodosis is ἔστω μὲν δοῦλον, to which ἀλλά refers in the manner explained above. So εἰ μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ πολλά γε ἴστε. (Comp. si mihi bona republica frui non licuerit, atcarebo mala.) This ἀλλά is often followed by οὖν (even so, all one for that, &c.; see § 266). Εἰ καὶ μὴ καθ' Ἑλλάδα τεθράμμεθ', ἀλλ᾽ οὖν ξυνετά μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν (Eur.). ἦν καὶ τὴν φύσιν καταδεεστέραν ἔχωσιν ἀλλ᾽ οὖν ταῖς γ᾽ ἐμπειρίαις... προέχουσιν (Isoc.).

REM. ἀλλά γε, in direct combination, perhaps never occurs (in fact this would = no yes); but ye, as in the preceding instances, heightens the antithetic word.

b) By an ellipsis of the conditional clause, ἀλλά comes to stand in the middle of a sentence: αὐτή γε νοῦν σχὲς ἀλλὰ τῷ χρόνῳ ποτέ (Soph.), the suppressed clause being, εἰ μὴ πρότερον. So, frequently, άλ

ἀλλὰ νῦν γε, ἀλλὰ νῦν γ᾽ ἔτι (Dem.). βούλομαι αὐτὸν διδάξαι, ἄν πως ἀλλὰ νῦν γε παιδευθῇ (Lys.). ὦ θεοὶ πατρῷοι ξυγγένεσθέ γ' ἀλλὰ νῦν, Soph. El. 411. In like manner ἀλλ᾽ οὖν: τοὺς πρώτους χρόνους ἀλλ᾽ οὖν προσεποιοῦνθ᾽ ὑμῖν φίλοι εἶναι (Esch.), (if they were not really so) at any rate they pretended.

a) When ἀλλά follows conditional clauses with εἰ, εἰ μή, &c., it may be rendered by yet, yet at least = saltem, certe. This case comes under b, viz. the ἀλλά refers to a suppressed apodosis with μέν δέ. Εἰ σῶμα δοῦλον, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ νοῦς ἐλεύθερος: the suppressed apodosis is ἔστω μὲν δοῦλον, to which ἀλλά refers in the manner explained above. So εἰ μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ πολλά γε ἴστε. (Comp. si mihi bona republica frui non licuerit, atcarebo mala.) This ἀλλά is often followed by οὖν (even so, all one for that, &c.; see § 266). Εἰ καὶ μὴ καθ' Ἑλλάδα τεθράμμεθ', ἀλλ᾽ οὖν ξυνετά μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν (Eur.). ἦν καὶ τὴν φύσιν καταδεεστέραν ἔχωσιν ἀλλ᾽ οὖν ταῖς γ᾽ ἐμπειρίαις... προέχουσιν (Isoc.).

REM. ἀλλά γε, in direct combination, perhaps never occurs (in fact this would = no yes); but ye, as in the preceding instances, heightens the antithetic word.

b) By an ellipsis of the conditional clause, ἀλλά comes to stand in the middle of a sentence: αὐτή γε νοῦν σχὲς ἀλλὰ τῷ χρόνῳ ποτέ (Soph.), the suppressed clause being, εἰ μὴ πρότερον. So, frequently, άλ

ἀλλὰ νῦν γε, ἀλλὰ νῦν γ᾽ ἔτι (Dem.). βούλομαι αὐτὸν διδάξαι, ἄν πως ἀλλὰ νῦν γε παιδευθῇ (Lys.). ὦ θεοὶ πατρῷοι ξυγγένεσθέ γ' ἀλλὰ νῦν, Soph. El. 411. In like manner ἀλλ᾽ οὖν: τοὺς πρώτους χρόνους ἀλλ᾽ οὖν προσεποιοῦνθ᾽ ὑμῖν φίλοι εἶναι (Esch.), (if they were not really so) at any rate they pretended.

§ 278.

§ 278.

Often ἀλλά stands at the beginning of a speech, either in opposition to something advanced or supposed to be advanced by another, or to some unexpressed thought of the speaker: viz. in quick, abrupt replies; in starting an objection, orin approbation and assent (§ 199 c, R. 2), in exclamations, exhortations, &c., especially when the discourse is suddenly interrupted and something new is introduced. Εὐριπίδη, Εὐριπίδιον, ὑπάκουσον, εἴπερ πώποτ᾽ ἀνθρώπων τινί. “ ἀλλ᾽ οὐ σχολή " (I hear,) but-. ἀλλ᾽ ἐκκυκλήθητ᾽ (If so,) why then, do' let yourself be rolled out (on the eccyclema). “ ἀλλ᾽ ἀδύνατον.” ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως, Nay, do though! ἀλλ᾽ ἐκκυκλήσομαι, καταβαίνειν δ᾽ οὐ σχολή, Why then, I will -, Arist. Ach. 404. τίνα καὶ ἀναβιβάσωμαι δεησόμενον ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ; τὸν πατέρα; ἀλλὰ τέθνηκεν. ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀδελφούς; ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ τοὺς παῖδας; ἀλλ᾽ οὔπω γεγένηνται, My father? Nay, but he's dead. Well then, my brothers? Why, I have none. My children then? (Andoc.). In Xen., Clearchus begins a speech with, ᾿Αλλ᾽ ὤφελε μὲν Κῦρος ζῆν, ἐπεὶ δὲ τετελεύτηκεν -, Well, I would Cyrus were alive -. And the same author even begins his Sympos. with ᾿Αλλ᾿ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ -, where the ἀλλά refers to considerations which he has been turning over in his mind; Well, after all, it does seem to me -.

ἀλλ᾽ ἄρα: εἰπέ μοι, ἔστι σοι ἀγρός; “ οὐκ ἔμοιγε.” ἀλλ᾽ ἄρα οἰκία προσόδους ἔχουσα; (you don't say so!) well then - ?

Often ἀλλά stands at the beginning of a speech, either in opposition to something advanced or supposed to be advanced by another, or to some unexpressed thought of the speaker: viz. in quick, abrupt replies; in starting an objection, orin approbation and assent (§ 199 c, R. 2), in exclamations, exhortations, &c., especially when the discourse is suddenly interrupted and something new is introduced. Εὐριπίδη, Εὐριπίδιον, ὑπάκουσον, εἴπερ πώποτ᾽ ἀνθρώπων τινί. “ ἀλλ᾽ οὐ σχολή " (I hear,) but-. ἀλλ᾽ ἐκκυκλήθητ᾽ (If so,) why then, do' let yourself be rolled out (on the eccyclema). “ ἀλλ᾽ ἀδύνατον.” ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως, Nay, do though! ἀλλ᾽ ἐκκυκλήσομαι, καταβαίνειν δ᾽ οὐ σχολή, Why then, I will -, Arist. Ach. 404. τίνα καὶ ἀναβιβάσωμαι δεησόμενον ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ; τὸν πατέρα; ἀλλὰ τέθνηκεν. ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀδελφούς; ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ τοὺς παῖδας; ἀλλ᾽ οὔπω γεγένηνται, My father? Nay, but he's dead. Well then, my brothers? Why, I have none. My children then? (Andoc.). In Xen., Clearchus begins a speech with, ᾿Αλλ᾽ ὤφελε μὲν Κῦρος ζῆν, ἐπεὶ δὲ τετελεύτηκεν -, Well, I would Cyrus were alive -. And the same author even begins his Sympos. with ᾿Αλλ᾿ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ -, where the ἀλλά refers to considerations which he has been turning over in his mind; Well, after all, it does seem to me -.

ἀλλ᾽ ἄρα: εἰπέ μοι, ἔστι σοι ἀγρός; “ οὐκ ἔμοιγε.” ἀλλ᾽ ἄρα οἰκία προσόδους ἔχουσα; (you don't say so!) well then - ?

§ 279.

§ 279.

ἀλλ' ἦ; a question with surprise or perplexity, the dada denoting difference from what the enquirer expected: ἀλλ᾽ ἡ δόλον τιν', ὦ ξέν, ἀμφί μοι πλέκεις; why how (is this)? -Æsch. Choeph. 214. ἀλλ᾽ ἦ, τὸ λεγόμενον, κατόπιν τῆς ἑορτῆς ἥκομεν καὶ ὑστεροῦμεν; (Pl.) οὗτος, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ παραπαίεις; (Luc.)

Ιη ἀλλὰ δή, δῆτα, μέν, μὲν δή, μέν τοι, τοι, μήν, both particles have their distinct force, which is not affected by their concurrence in the same sentence.

ἀλλὰ γάρ (comp. § 196 b) is often elliptical, the sentence to which ἀλλά belongs being left to be gathered from the context. ᾿Αλλ᾽, ἡδὺ γάρ τοι κτῆμα τῆς νίκης λαβεῖν, τόλμα, where the sentence is completed by τόλμα (Soph.). ἴσως Ἐρινύς ἐστιν ἐκ τραγωδίας, βλέπει γέ τοι μανικόν τε καὶ τραγωδικόν. “ ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔχει γὰρ δᾷδας,” 1. θ. ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ Ἐ., οὐκ ἔχει γὰρ δ. (Arist.). ἀλλ᾽ ἔστ ἔμοιγ' υἱὸς καλός τε κἀγαθός ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐθέλει γὰρ μανθάνειν, where ἀλλὰ – γάρ seems to be a mere colloquialism = attamen, as the context contains nothing from which the sentence with ἀλλά may be completed (e. g. but what's the use of that?). In familiar discourse, the two particles may come together: εἰ ἐγὼ Φαῖδρον ἀγνοῶ, καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπιλέλησμαι· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδέτερα ἔστι τούτων, εὐ οἶδα ὅτι οὐχ ἅπαξ ἤκουσεν (Pl. = ἀλλὰ Φαῖδρον οὐκ ἀγνοῶ· οὐ γὰρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπιλέλησμαι· οὐδέτερα ἔστι τούτων).

ἀλλ' ἦ; a question with surprise or perplexity, the dada denoting difference from what the enquirer expected: ἀλλ᾽ ἡ δόλον τιν', ὦ ξέν, ἀμφί μοι πλέκεις; why how (is this)? -Æsch. Choeph. 214. ἀλλ᾽ ἦ, τὸ λεγόμενον, κατόπιν τῆς ἑορτῆς ἥκομεν καὶ ὑστεροῦμεν; (Pl.) οὗτος, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ παραπαίεις; (Luc.)

Ιη ἀλλὰ δή, δῆτα, μέν, μὲν δή, μέν τοι, τοι, μήν, both particles have their distinct force, which is not affected by their concurrence in the same sentence.

ἀλλὰ γάρ (comp. § 196 b) is often elliptical, the sentence to which ἀλλά belongs being left to be gathered from the context. ᾿Αλλ᾽, ἡδὺ γάρ τοι κτῆμα τῆς νίκης λαβεῖν, τόλμα, where the sentence is completed by τόλμα (Soph.). ἴσως Ἐρινύς ἐστιν ἐκ τραγωδίας, βλέπει γέ τοι μανικόν τε καὶ τραγωδικόν. “ ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔχει γὰρ δᾷδας,” 1. θ. ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ Ἐ., οὐκ ἔχει γὰρ δ. (Arist.). ἀλλ᾽ ἔστ ἔμοιγ' υἱὸς καλός τε κἀγαθός ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐθέλει γὰρ μανθάνειν, where ἀλλὰ – γάρ seems to be a mere colloquialism = attamen, as the context contains nothing from which the sentence with ἀλλά may be completed (e. g. but what's the use of that?). In familiar discourse, the two particles may come together: εἰ ἐγὼ Φαῖδρον ἀγνοῶ, καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπιλέλησμαι· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδέτερα ἔστι τούτων, εὐ οἶδα ὅτι οὐχ ἅπαξ ἤκουσεν (Pl. = ἀλλὰ Φαῖδρον οὐκ ἀγνοῶ· οὐ γὰρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπιλέλησμαι· οὐδέτερα ἔστι τούτων).